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Introduction: National Parliaments, Electorates and EU 
Affairs 
Katrin Auel and Tapio Raunio 
 
The role of national legislatures in the political system of the European Union (EU) first 
received serious political and academic attention in the mid-1990s in connection with 
debates on how to cure the EU’s democratic deficit (Norton 1995; Raunio 1999; Raunio & 
Hix 2000). Academic interest in the topic drew further inspiration from the first comparative 
projects that showed domestic legislatures to be largely ineffective or uninterested in 
controlling their governments in EU matters (Laursen & Pappas eds. 1995; Norton ed. 1995; 
Smith ed. 1996). Since then the role of national parliaments has featured quite prominently 
on the research agenda of both parliamentary and EU scholars, with several comparative 
research projects on national parliamentary scrutiny of EU policies completed during the first 
decade of the new millennium (Maurer & Wessels eds. 2001; Auel & Benz eds. 2005; Szalay 
2005; Gates 2006; Kiiver 2006; Kiiver ed. 2006; Holzhacker & Albæk eds. 2007; O´Brennan 
& Raunio eds. 2007; Tans et al. eds. 2007; Barrett ed. 2008). 
Thanks to this lively academic debate, we are now in a much better position to evaluate the 
ways in which national legislatures are affected by and get involved in European integration. 
While national parliaments have certainly been late adapters to integration, there is no doubt 
that they exercise tighter scrutiny of their governments over EU matters than before. 
Domestic legislatures have reformed their scrutiny systems, mainly by upgrading the powers 
and resources of the European Affairs Committees (EAC) and involving specialized 
committees more regularly in EU affairs. Inter-parliamentary networking in COSAC1 and 
other forums has facilitated the sharing of ‘best practices’, with the individual parliaments 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the scrutiny arrangements in the other 
legislatures. This learning of best practices applies particularly to those countries that joined 
the EU in 2004 and 2007. Indeed, early evidence from the new member states indicates that 
their parliaments have on average implemented more comprehensive scrutiny mechanisms 
than the parliaments of the older EU countries (see particularly Szalay 2005; O’Brennan & 
Raunio eds. 2007; Karlas 2011).  
However, practically all existing research has focused on parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
affairs. Most of this literature, both case studies and comparative analyses, has emphasized 
institutional adaptation by domestic legislatures. Scholars have been particularly interested 
                                                     
1
 COSAC stands for Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European 
Union (www.cosac.eu/en). The biannual COSAC meetings bring together delegations from the EACs of the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament. COSAC decides normally by consensus, but following a rule change 
adopted in May 2003, its non-binding decisions (called ‘contributions’) can be passed with 3/4 of votes cast (which 
must constitute at last half of all votes). COSAC also has a secretariat in Brussels. (Knudsen & Carl 2008). 
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in comparing the effectiveness of alternative scrutiny systems and in explaining the adoption 
of specific scrutiny models. There is also a small but growing body of research on inter-
parliamentary cooperation among national legislatures (and the European Parliament). But 
the main point is that practically all previous research has focused on the relationship 
between the parliament and the government, with scholars neglecting the linkage between 
legislatures and citizens.2  
The same narrow or one-sided focus applies to the political debates and legal regulations.  
National constitutions typically give domestic legislatures certain rights (such as to receive 
information from the government on EU affairs) and set them specific responsibilities (such 
as transposing directives or approving Treaty amendments), with the constitutions often also 
containing rules about how EU matters are processed by parliaments. Beyond such rules 
parliaments are free to decide how and whether to become involved in EU politics. Also the 
EU Treaties give national parliaments certain rights (such as to receive EU documents) and 
allocate them certain specific duties that mainly deal with the division of competencies 
between the EU and its member states.  When the role of national parliaments was debated 
in the Convention, the discussion was restricted almost exclusively to government scrutiny 
and compliance with subsidiarity principle. Even COSAC, which has a basically 
unconstrained agenda and can discuss any issue it wants, has focused its meetings on 
parliamentary scrutiny and recently on the subsidiarity control mechanism. (Raunio 2011) 
Hence there is a clear need for studies on how national parliaments perform other than 
government-related functions in EU affairs. In fact, we know hardly anything about whether 
and how individual MPs, political parties, or legislatures as institutions ‘link’ with their 
electorates in EU affairs. Do parliaments inform the public about European matters? Are EU 
issues debated in plenary and are these debates covered by the media? Do MPs and 
political parties use publicly accessible control mechanisms like parliamentary questions or 
confidence votes in EU matters? Are citizens approaching MPs with requests or concerns 
about the EU? Do MPs defend constituency interests in EU affairs – if yes, how is this done? 
Do political parties and their parliamentary groups have specific mechanisms for interacting 
with their supporters in EU affairs? 
The objective of this Collection of Working Papers is to provide first and (necessarily) 
preliminary answers to these important and until now unanswered questions. The next 
section of this introductory article discusses why engaging with the public in EU affairs is – or 
at least should be – an important aspect of parliamentary work. The third section introduces 
our research questions and hypotheses and examines the openness of parliamentary EU 
scrutiny across the 27 member states. The final section outlines the structure of this 
Collection of Working Papers.    
                                                     
2
 For reviews of the literature, see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2008) and Raunio (2009). 
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1. Bringing the public in – parliaments and the legitimacy of EU governance 
The argument that transparency and access to information are a fundamental precondition 
for the exercise of democratic popular control over government activities is so widely shared, 
mentioning it seems almost trivial. But given the focus in the literature outlined above, it is 
nonetheless worth repeating that democracy depends on a viable public debate on policy 
choices and political alternatives to allow citizens to make informed political (electoral) 
choices and to exercise democratic control. 
Within our democratic systems, parliaments are usually seen as not the only, but certainly 
one of the most important ‘means by which the measures and actions of government are 
debated and scrutinised on behalf of citizens, and through which the concerns of citizens … 
may be voiced. The extent to which they carry out such actions, and are seen by citizens to 
carry out such actions, may be argued to constitute the essential underpinning of legitimacy 
of the political system in the eyes of electors’ (Norton 1998:1, emphasis added).3  Among the 
most important means for parliaments to fulfil this information and communication function 
are public debates in the plenary or – to a lesser extent – in committees as well as 
parliamentary questions or confidence votes. Debates are vital elements of electoral 
competition as they provide for a public articulation of societal interests and the discussion of 
policies thus informing citizens about complex political issues. Without debates allowing the 
electorate to identify competing leaders and policy agendas it is difficult for them to assess 
the performance of the government and to hold it accountable.  
While parliamentary information and communication functions are important in every political 
system that aspires to be democratic, they have been considered of particular relevance in 
the EU system of multilevel governance. As Benz (2003: 103) has argued, deficits in the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy are not primarily caused by deficits in the mediation of citizens’ 
interests, at least if compared to the political practice of nation states and using realistic 
standards to assess the quality of interest mediation. Regarding the transmission of citizens’ 
interests, the European multi-level polity proves ‘to be open to a plurality of interests …, to 
those of different territories as much as to those of sectoral interests’. At the same time, it is 
exactly this interplay of different interests and institutions which results in the opacity of 
policy-making processes and the lack of accountability that have been defined as core 
                                                     
3
 The argument is, of course, by no means new, but already present in the classic writings of Walter Bagehot or 
John Stuart Mill (1998 [1861]). In Chapter IV of his classic The English Constitution Bagehot (2009 [1867]) outlines 
five core functions of parliament: the elective function, the articulation function, the educative function, the 
information function and the legislative function. For Mill (1998 [1861]: 282), “Parliament’s part is to indicate wants, 
to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relation to public matters, 
both great and small.” Thus, for both Bagehot and Mill, parliaments served mainly as arenas of public debate, to 
inform the public, to take up their needs and opinions, and to serve as a forum of complaint and petitions. 
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problems in both academic and political debates on the democratic deficit of the EU (e.g., 
Weiler 1991; Harlow 2002; Héritier 2003; Mair 2007; Puntscher Riekmann 2007).  
For a long time, the European project drew its legitimacy from its capacity to solve problems 
effectively, and the process of integration was accompanied by what has been called the 
permissive consensus (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). It was based on a consensus across 
the political mainstream that integration was desirable, and citizens permitted their political 
elites to pursue this course without much interference. But today there seems to be neither 
firm consensus nor much permissiveness. Until the early 1990s, the public could simply be 
ignored. Since then, however, ‘supranational and national executive elites are confronted 
with a reluctant public who increasingly shows signs of disaffection if not utter disapproval of 
European politics’ (Pollack & Slominski 2002: 3). Importantly, this growing public 
dissatisfaction with integration has also filtered through to party politics (Hooghe ed. 2007; 
Hooghe & Marks eds. 2007). The permissive consensus has thus given way to a 
‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks 2009), which can be seen as at least partly the 
result of a growing sense of alienation based on difficulties in understanding, let alone 
participating in, remote decision-making at the EU level and a fear of helplessness vis-à-vis 
political decisions that cannot be influenced or controlled.  
Within the debate on the democratic deficit, this has led to demands for more openness and 
transparency of European institutions. And the EU has indeed reacted, especially by using 
the Internet, to increase its transparency by providing more and formerly inaccessible 
information to citizens.4 Yet it remains rather questionable whether this provision of 
information – as welcome as it is – actually increases the legitimacy of the EU, given the 
highly technical nature of many of the documents available, as well as the sheer quantity of 
information leading to information overload (Curtin & Meijer 2006; see also the crucial 
distinction between transparency and publicity explained in the next section).5   
A different counter-argument has been famously provided by Moravcsik (2002: 615), who 
argued that ‘any effort to expand participation is unlikely to overcome apathy [since] the 
issues handled by the EU … lack salience in the mind of European voters.’ One has to 
wonder, however, if this is not more of a hen-and-egg question. Instead it can be argued that 
the low salience of European policy issues (as opposed to the more general integration 
issue) is a result of a lack of arenas for public contestation and thus at least partly the result 
of the failure of political actors to demonstrate the impact of EU decisions on high-salience 
issues such as health care, education, taxation, law and order, or pensions and social 
security policy, to their electorate (see especially Føllesdal & Hix 2006: 551). 
                                                     
4
 The EU’s website already contained six million pages and received 50 million consultations per month at the time 
of the launch of the European Transparency Initiative in 2005 (European Commission 2005: 4). 
5
 Curtin and Meijer (2006: 117) calculated that ‘if the access request numbers are used in relation to the population 
of the EU then one in thirty-three thousand citizens has exercised that right to date [2006]’. 
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Importantly, much of this debate focuses purely on the European level and the European 
institutions. The demand for transparency and information in EU issues, however, is at least 
as fundamental at the national level. That EU policy problems, solutions, alternatives, and 
conflicts are debated in public and that decision-makers be publicly held accountable for 
their decisions to allow citizens to exercise their control are fundamental pre-conditions for 
the legitimacy of domestic EU policy-making and thus the EU as a whole. Here, it has been 
argued that national parliaments are in a unique position to ensure that people are more 
connected with ‘Europe’ and its activities by serving as channels between citizens and the 
EU (Norton 2001). And by holding their governments accountable, that is by inducing them to 
explain European issues and decisions, to clarify European negotiation situations and to 
justify their negotiation behaviour, national parliaments are believed to contribute to raising 
public awareness for EU policies, and thus making the EU more visibly present in national 
politics and more accessible to and for their national public (Auel 2007). We have to be 
careful, of course, about assuming that greater information and public awareness will 
necessarily result in greater public support for the EU,6 but the expectation is that it will 
increase the democratic quality of EU governance, because it will give citizens greater 
awareness of and ownership over European decisions. In the short run, this may lead to a 
brake on further integration, but in the long run a more open debate could create a basis for 
a more democratic Union (Auel 2010, for a similar argument see de Wilde 2009). 
In this regard, the German Federal Constitutional Court argued in its Decision on the Lisbon 
Treaty (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009) that the democratic legitimacy of the EU was 
indeed guaranteed within the member states (at least as long as the EU did not become a 
state), because democratically elected national governments retain responsibility for 
European decisions, and are in this capacity accountable to their national parliaments. 
Crucially for the Court, governmental action is legitimised inter alia through continuous public 
discourse, fuelled by the opposition, in which such action as well as alternatives are openly 
debated. However, given the lack of (comparative) empirical studies on how parliaments 
connect with their citizens and fulfil their information and communication functions in EU 
affairs, we are hardly in a position to assess to what degree parliaments actually do serve as 
channels between the EU and the citizens. It may be true that ‘parliaments provide a major 
space for public debate and are thus the ideal arenas for the deliberation of important 
European issues and their national implications’ (Auel 2007: 498), but whether they actually 
do so remains unknown. Claims that all is well at the national level in terms of the democratic 
legitimacy of EU politics seem therefore rather premature (Auel 2010). 
Having thus outlined how national parliaments could contribute to the legitimacy and 
democracy of EU governance, the next section examines what channels domestic 
                                                     
6
 For example, Vliegenthart et al. (2008) found that news coverage of EU issues does have an impact on public 
support for European integration, but that this impact correlates with the framing of EU news in terms of benefit 
(increases public support) or conflict (decreases public support). 
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legislatures, political parties and individual MPs have for linking with the electorate in EU 
politics.    
2. The research question: Do national parliaments engage with the public in 
EU affairs?  
The research question of this Collection of Working Papers is how and whether national 
parliaments link with or represent their electorates in EU affairs. Considering that it consists 
for the main part of case studies of individual EU countries or of comparisons between 
selected member states, our modest but yet important goal is to provide the first empirical 
examination of this so far neglected question. It is also our hope that subsequent 
comparative research will provide more in-depth answers to the questions and hypotheses 
put forward in this collection of articles.  
By analysing the linkage between parliaments and their electorates in EU affairs, this 
Collection of Working Papers contributes to at least three areas of research. First, this 
collection of articles contributes to literature on Europeanization, a concept used primarily to 
examine the impact of European integration on national politics (Featherstone & Radaelli 
eds. 2003; Bulmer & Lequesne eds. 2005; Graziano & Vink eds. 2007; Ladrech 2010). This 
Collection of Working Papers not only analyses how parliaments deal with European 
matters, but also measures in a variety of ways the salience of EU affairs in national 
legislatures (Raunio & Wiberg 2010). Hence it will develop a better understanding of the 
extent to which domestic polities are Europeanised. Secondly this Collection of Working 
Papers will contribute to debates on the democratic deficit (e.g., Moravcsik 2002; Føllesdal & 
Hix 2006). The lack of domestic debates on EU is often seen as part of that deficit, and this 
project will provide empirical data about whether key institutions of European democracy, 
national parliaments, play their part in alleviating that deficit. Indeed, if national parliaments 
neglect the function of linking with their electorates in European affairs, then MPs 
themselves contribute to the elitist or technocratic image of EU governance. And finally, this 
Collection of Working Papers will increase our knowledge of the work of national 
parliaments. Specifically, there has been worryingly little research on how parliaments 
connect with or reach out to the public. While there is empirical data on the constituency 
work of MPs, the ‘public’ functions of legislatures have remained under-researched (Norton 
ed. 1997, 2002).  
Let us now discuss how national parliaments can engage with the public in EU matters and 
formulate some hypotheses about whether they can be expected do so. But first we must 
define what we mean by linking with or representing electorates in European matters. After 
all, MPs are always, at least in theory, representing citizens when performing various 
parliamentary activities. For example, MPs can be considered to be representing their 
constituents when scrutinizing EU legislation behind closed doors in EACs. Alternatively one 
can argue that plenary debates should be seen primarily as form of government scrutiny as 
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opposed to serving the function of articulating and representing societal interests. Various 
control instruments, such as confidence votes or parliamentary questions, can also be 
simultaneously construed as ways to hold the government accountable and as mechanisms 
for defending the interests of the electorate. It can indeed be impossible to measure from the 
outside whether parliamentarians perform various functions primarily in order to control the 
executive or to represent their voters.   
Considering these methodological difficulties, we have decided to choose an empirical 
criterion that emphasizes the ability of the electorate to follow parliamentary work. Hence we 
are interested in parliamentary activities that are accessible to the public – either in the form 
of live or media coverage (like plenary debates) or of the public having access to the 
documents (like parliamentary questions or the minutes of committee meetings or plenary 
sessions), or through direct contacts with the voters (MPs’ constituency work or parliaments 
or parties informing the electorate of EU affairs).  
Second, while citizen-related parliamentary activities are easily demanded and theoretically 
justified, the question remains: what are the incentives for parliamentarians and political 
parties to establish links with their electorates in EU affairs? The literature indicates a 
number of reasons why MPs may generally prefer to conduct their EU business away from 
the prying eye of the public. It is essential to emphasize that national parliaments are party-
political institutions, bringing together legislators representing different political parties. 
Government formation is based on bargaining between political parties, with the opposition 
parties trying to unseat the cabinet or increase their support in the run-up to the next 
elections. Parties are also responsible for setting the parliamentary rules of procedure: the 
agenda and powers of committees and the plenary as well as the rights of individual 
members and party groups are all decided by political parties. Most MPs in turn are primarily 
concerned about the goals of re-election, policy influence, or career advancement. Hence 
any realistic model of parliamentary activities must start with the incentives of parties and 
individual MPs. (Bergman et al. eds. 2000; Strøm et al. eds. 2003)  
In fact, one can reasonably argue that the incentive structure works against political parties 
or MPs emphasizing citizen-related activities in EU affairs. For most parties the costs of 
engaging in such public activities on Europe probably outweigh any potential benefits. 
Regardless of the data used, there is a consistent body of work showing that national parties 
across the EU are ideologically less cohesive on integration than in traditional socio-
economic issues that dominate domestic political discourse (e.g., Hix 1999; Marks & 
Steenbergen eds. 2004). Parties are also considerably more supportive of integration than 
their voters (Mattila & Raunio 2006), and this can impact negatively on their vote shares in 
elections (Hobolt et al. 2009). Avoiding public activities related to EU affairs can thus be seen 
as a logical response from parties aiming at electoral success.  
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Turning from political parties to individual MPs, when choosing what issues to focus on in the 
parliament, they probably make a rational calculus, weighing the costs and benefits of 
various parliamentary activities (Saalfeld 2003). Considering that re-election and policy 
influence are probably the primary goals of most MPs, focusing on EU matters may not be a 
very attractive option for most parliamentarians. In terms of re-election, EU policy can be 
important for the constituencies (e.g., in terms of attracting regional policy funds), but not 
necessarily for the voters who still base their voting choices primarily on domestic issues.7  
As for policy influence, the ability of an individual legislator to influence politics at the 
European level is probably close to zero, even when the MP is an influential figure in the 
main governing party and when the Council or the European Council decides by unanimity. 
Factors related to EU level bargaining may also impact on domestic parliamentary choices. 
Negotiations between the government and the parliament (and especially between the 
cabinet and its party groups) are clearly facilitated by closed doors. Publicity threatens to 
make divisions and conflict, within the (governing) party or parties, public and thus 
vulnerable to exploitation by the opposition or the media. Greater publicity could also make 
information on the government’s negotiation strategy available to other member states and 
thus weaken its bargaining position. Finally, the government’s bargaining position in Brussels 
could be weakened by public conflicts between the government and the parliament as other 
negotiation partners at the European level could easily point out that the government’s 
position is not even supported at home.  
There are thus various reasons why national parliaments, political parties or individual MPs 
may favour to keep a low profile on EU affairs and to have European matters processed 
behind the safety of closed doors. But under which conditions do parliaments decide to ‘go 
public’ rather than focussing on government scrutiny and oversight behind closed doors? 
When can we expect individual MPs and political parties to engage in publicly accessible 
parliamentary activities in EU affairs? Next we shall discuss these questions in relation to 
those forms of parliamentary work that are or can be accessible to the public: plenary 
debates, committee meetings, control instruments (particularly confidence votes and 
parliamentary questions), informing the electorate (by political parties or parliaments or by 
legislators through constituency work), and media coverage. 
2.1 Plenary debates 
Perhaps the most important way in which parliaments connect with citizens between 
elections is through plenary debates. As argued in the previous section, plenary debates 
may provide an effective forum for both articulating and representing societal interests and 
informing the electorate about issues on the political agenda. Indeed, much of the previous 
                                                     
7
 For example, in her case study on the Danish scrutiny system, Møller Sousa (2008: 441) shows how the incentive 
structure works against more active involvement in European affairs, with the MPs feeling that neither the media nor 
the voters are interested in EU matters. 
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literature has argued that plenary debates on Europe might generate more interest in 
European integration and hence bring EU closer to the citizens. However, such arguments 
can be challenged on three accounts. First, it is questionable whether citizens would follow 
coverage of debates on issues such as European integration if they are not salient to them. 
Related to this is the more general observation that it is uncertain how many European 
citizens follow parliamentary debates directly even in domestically salient issues. This again 
demonstrates the importance of the media. And thirdly, in countries characterised by broad 
consensus among the main parties over integration, such debates would hardly be very 
exciting. But at the very least plenary debates provide the electorate with the opportunity to 
learn about what is on the agenda of European politics and what are the positions of parties 
in these matters – particularly if the debates are covered by the media.  
Existing evidence, though very scarce, suggests that the role of the plenary tends to be 
rather limited in European affairs. Relying on the opinions of country experts, Bergman et al. 
(2003: 175) concluded that in no member state legislature of the EU-15 did the plenary get 
actively involved in EU matters, with plenary involvement categorized as ‘weak’ in thirteen 
countries and as ‘moderate’ in Finland and Italy. Case studies of individual parliaments also 
point in this direction (e.g., Raunio & Wiberg 2010). Indeed, the main difference between 
domestic and EU politics seems to concern the role of the plenary.8  Domestic laws and 
other nationally salient issues are normally debated in the full chamber while it seems that 
EU matters are only seldom on the agenda of the plenary. Most parliaments probably have 
debates about ‘high politics’ EU issues like Treaty reforms, financial frameworks, European 
Council meetings, or the current euro crisis and the associated bail-out measures. Regarding 
specific EU laws or policies, political parties may be more prepared to debate them in the 
plenary if such policies – such as the Services Directive (see the articles by Miklin and Auel 
and Raunio in this Collection of Working Papers) – can be incorporated into the cleavages 
structuring domestic party contestation (mainly the left-right dimension). 
This limited role of the plenary can probably be explained by a combination of institutional 
choices and the interests of political parties (which are obviously related). The establishment 
of EACs reduces the use of plenary, as the former coordinate parliamentary work in EU 
matters and are normally authorized to speak on behalf of the whole parliament in these 
issues. While MPs may defend committee deliberations behind closed doors with the need to 
further national interests and to allow confidential exchange of views between the 
government and the parliament, this mechanism clearly also serves the interests of the 
mainstream parties. Governing parties in particular may want to monitor the government 
behind closed doors without public criticism that might damage the reputation of the cabinet 
(Auel 2007). Indeed, main parties in several EU countries, especially in the Nordic region, 
have deliberately ‘depoliticized’ European integration through cross-party cooperation in the 
                                                     
8
 See Hegeland (2007) for an interesting analysis of how European matters fall somewhere between domestic and 
foreign policy in terms of the openness and transparency of the parliamentary decision-making procedures. 
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EAC with the aim of manufacturing consensus in national integration policy (Bergman & 
Damgaard eds. 2000). 
Considering that most of the main opposition parties are on average no more coherent over 
EU than governing parties or have similar preferences on integration, they are also unlikely 
to demand more plenary debates about Europe. Hence the only parties that probably would 
like to have debates about Europe are those that are more in tune with their electorate over 
Europe and internally cohesive about integration. These parties are normally either populist 
parties or parties located at the extremes of the left-right dimension that can for example use 
such debates to criticize the government for not defending the national interests well enough 
in EU negotiations (see the article by de Wilde in this Collection of Working Papers, also de 
Vries & Edwards 2009). Given that they are often relatively small parties in their respective 
political systems, they may not even have enough influence over the parliamentary agenda 
to force such debates to be held. Hence a plausible hypothesis is that plenary debates on 
Europe are more likely in countries with more Eurosceptical party systems or with more 
polarized or differentiated party preferences about integration. In such member states parties 
should have more to win by having public debates about Europe, either because they can 
thus challenge the governing parties or they can use the debates to send signals to their 
electorates.  
2.2 Transparency in EACs and specialized committees 
Whether or not committees meet in public can have a major impact on the ability of the 
electorate to follow parliamentary work. If the committees meet in public and/or provide 
verbatim accounts of their sessions, then the public can learn what was said and by whom. 
If, in contrast, the committees meet behind closed doors and do not provide minutes of their 
meetings, then the possibilities for voters to learn about committee proceedings are very 
limited. Hence, whether the EAC and specialized committees meet in public, when 
deliberating on EU affairs, is a very important choice that has significant effects on the ability 
of the electorate to observe the domestic handling of EU matters. 
As explained above, the centralization of EU matters to the EAC – as is effectively the case 
in the majority of national parliaments – is quite advantageous for most political parties. But 
interestingly, and partly against the reasoning above, despite significant cross-national 
variation the handling of EU affairs has gradually become more transparent and public in 
national parliaments. According to COSAC (2009), in around half of the lower houses of 
national parliaments (14/27) the EACs meet in public (Table 1). However, it is difficult to 
clearly distinguish between public and private EAC meetings. The main problem is that some 
do sit in camera, but publish the minutes on the web afterwards or allow the press to be 
present (e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, France and Spain). This means that information on the 
proceedings is basically public, even if the actual meetings are not. One could even argue 
I H S — Auel; Raunio / Introduction — 17 
that providing minutes or streams on the web may be more important as it provides regular 
information to a larger audience than attendance at meetings, which is necessarily limited.  
 
Table 1: Transparency of EU matters in national parliaments (2009).  
Member State 
(lower house) 
Are EU 
committee 
meetings 
publicly 
accessible? 
Are EU 
documents 
received by 
parliament from 
EU / government 
publicly 
accessible? 
Are EU 
documents 
produced by 
parliament 
publicly 
accessible? 
Are the meetings 
of other 
specialized 
committees 
publicly 
accessible? 
Austria Yes Yes (EU) /              
No (government) 
Yes No 
Belgium Yes No Yes Yes 
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyprus No No Yes No 
Czech Republic Yes No Yes Yes 
Denmark Yes  Yes Yes No 
Estonia No Yes Yes No 
Finland No Yes Yes No 
France No Yes Yes No 
Germany Yes (since 
2009) 
No Yes No 
Greece Yesa No No Yesa 
Hungary No No No Nob 
Ireland Yes No Yes Yes 
Italy No Yes Yes No 
Latvia Yes No Yes Yes 
Lithuania No Yes (EU) /               
No (government) 
Yes No 
Luxembourg No Yes No No 
Malta No Yes Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes No (EU) /              
Yes (government) 
Yes Yes 
Poland Yes Yes (EU) /              
No (government) 
Yes Yes 
Portugal Yes No Yes Yes 
Romania Yes Yes No Yes/Noc 
Slovakia Yes No Yes Yes 
Slovenia No No Yes No 
Spain No No Yes No 
Sweden No Yes Yes No 
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  
a) Possibly not open to public visits as such, but committee meetings are as a rule broadcast on 
Parliament TV. 
b) Open to the press. 
c) Contradictory information on Parliament website. Sources: COSAC (2009b), parliamentary rules of 
procedure and national constitutions. 
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In addition, it should be kept in mind that most EACs have the option to either close parts of 
their otherwise public meetings (such restrictive practices being normally used in connection 
with more sensitive EU matters, e.g. security policy, or when the minister appears in the 
committee before a Council meeting) or to hold occasional open meetings although they 
usually sit in camera. In Hungary, Lithuania, and Malta, for example, EAC meetings are 
generally public, but the meetings are always closed when the government position is 
discussed. In turn, the German EAC, for example, formally sits in private, but has recently 
made increasing use of its option to hold public meetings. Finally, most parliaments do not 
make EU documents, produced either by the Union or the national government, available to 
the public, but in most member states the public has access to EU material produced by the 
parliaments themselves – such as the opinions or reports of the EACs.9  Yet most 
parliaments have not established any specific offices or units for informing the public about 
the EU.  
With regard to cross-national variation, it has been suggested in the literature that EAC that 
are considered stronger scrutinisers prefer to hold their meetings in private, while weaker 
EAC may try to compensate for their lack of power with more public strategies (Auel & Benz 
2005; Auel & Rittberger 2006). However, it may not be so much the power of the EAC as 
such, but rather the question of what they focus their scrutiny on that is decisive. Following 
the eighth bi-annual COSAC report on EU procedures and practises (COSAC 2007), we can 
distinguish between document based and government position based scrutiny systems. 
Although in both cases the addressee of the scrutiny procedure is, in the end, the 
government, the two systems differ with regard to whether EAC scrutinise and draft an 
opinion on EU documents or the government position. The former gives parliaments the 
opportunity to address concerns with EU proposals without directly criticising or opposing 
their government and thus inviting party competition or intra-party conflicts. We could 
therefore expect that EAC emphasising document based scrutiny will find it easier to provide 
broader information to the public.  
The incentives of political parties may also explain decisions about transparency. Based on 
our reasoning above, we expect that mainstream parties will be more willing to provide broad 
access to EAC meetings and information if they operate in a system without either open 
party political contestation over Europe or a more Eurosceptic public. Finally however, we 
also need to consider that the degree of openness and transparency may be less a strategic 
decision than one that reflects broader parliamentary tradition or convention and is thus path 
                                                     
9
 The entries in Table 1 need to be treated with some additional caution. Often the replies from national parliaments 
to COSAC were quite unspecific and vague, and in such cases additional information was acquired from national 
parliaments. More importantly, in most instances there are exceptions to the general rule of providing or not 
providing access to EU committee meetings and documents. Furthermore, some parliaments make EU documents 
available to the public before they are processed by the legislature while others make them available ex post. For 
country-specific rules, please see COSAC (2009) and particularly the rules of procedure of the national parliaments. 
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dependent (Dimitrakopoulos 2001). In that case, EAC will simply provide similar access to 
their meetings and documents as the other parliamentary committees.  
 
2.3 Control instruments 
Parliaments have various tools for holding the government accountable. And in many ways 
parliaments have become better at controlling governments – they have reformed their rules 
of procedure and committee systems to facilitate oversight of the government, and MPs are 
also making more active use of various control mechanisms such as parliamentary questions 
and reporting requirements. The reforms and developments have primarily aimed at 
reducing the informational advantage of the government through investing more resources in 
committee work and demanding more regular information from the cabinet about its activities 
(Longley & Davidson eds. 1998; Strøm et al. eds. 2003; Baldwin ed. 2006). As outlined 
above, the literature has shown that similar developments have occurred in the field of EU 
affairs, with parliaments strengthening the role and powers of EACs and demanding more 
information from the executive in European matters.    
These oversight mechanisms can naturally also be employed to defend or represent 
constituency interests. While there is variation with respect to the openness of committees, 
confidence votes and parliamentary questions are accessible to public throughout the EU. 
Parliamentary questions are particularly interesting as they are multi-functional and MPs ask 
questions for several reasons. Among the most important are asking for information, 
committing the government to making a public formal statement and pressing it for action, 
defending constituency interests, and informing the policy-makers of problems they might be 
unfamiliar with. The attractiveness of parliamentary questions is enhanced by the fact that in 
their questions MPs can practically raise any issue they want. Parliamentary questions are 
used in every EU national legislature, but there is variation between the parliaments 
regarding both the types of questions used and the procedural details concerning the 
submission and answering of questions (Wiberg 1995; Strøm et al. eds. 2003; Russo & 
Wiberg 2010). 
Parliaments and specifically the opposition can also put forward motions of no confidence, 
the procedural rules of which vary between national legislatures (Strøm et al. eds. 2003). 
Confidence votes must normally be put forward by entire party group(s) or by a specified 
number of MPs. It is probable that confidence votes are seldom used in connection with 
European matters. This hypothesis is based on three factors. First, EU affairs may not be a 
very salient issue in the minds of voters in most member states, and hence the opposition 
might not benefit that much by resorting to that instrument. Second, the opposition would 
then be also forced to publicly defend its own policies, something that may not be in its 
interest for reasons explained above. And third, were the opposition to attack the 
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government’s European policy in such a public way, the prime minister might blame the 
opposition for ‘unpatriotic’ behaviour that undermines the success of the government (and 
the ‘national interest’) in subsequent EU negotiations (Benz 2004: 881; Auel & Benz 2005: 
379). It is also likely that the share of parliamentary questions on EU matters is low. This 
expectation is based on two factors: information on European matters is often available 
faster from other sources (direct contacts with ministries or with the European level), and as 
EU issues can be of low salience to most citizens, MPs may not consider asking questions 
on EU matters important in terms of credit-claiming or re-election.  
2.4 Informing the electorate  
One of the classic functions of parliaments is that of informing the public about societal 
affairs. For example, according to Bagehot (2009 [1867]) parliaments should perform the 
functions of ‘teaching the nation’ and ‘informing the people’. The citizenry can obviously learn 
about policy issues from coverage of plenary or committee debates, but a more explicit way 
of teaching or informing the people is achieved through direct contact. Parliaments as 
institutions can provide information about EU to the electorate, for example online or through 
their information offices. Political parties can cultivate support or understanding for their 
European policies through interaction with their voters, for example by debating EU matters 
in party bodies (especially the party congress where the local party branches are 
represented) or by emphasizing European policies in their programmes. 
But of special interest here is the work undertaken by individual MPs. When meeting voters 
in the constituencies, do legislators talk about EU affairs and do the citizens make specific 
requests or have questions regarding Europe? As explained above, available evidence 
indicates that voters across the EU are still primarily concerned about domestic issues – 
such as employment, taxation, health care or education policy. The opinion gap that prevails 
over the EU between parties and their supporters can also work against MPs focusing on 
European issues in their meetings with constituents. Hence we hypothesize that matters 
related to European integration feature rarely in MPs’ constituency work.   
2.5 Media coverage 
Finally, the distinction between two kinds of openness of a political system has to be 
considered: transparency and publicity (Hüller 2007). While transparency requires that 
information is publicly available, publicity is only achieved if citizens are actually aware of the 
information. While parliamentary information can, of course, be directly accessed (through 
print publication, the internet or parliamentary TV channels), most citizens experience politics 
primarily through the media. This raises the question to what extent the national media 
covers parliamentary activities in EU affairs or draws on parliamentary publications as 
sources of information.  
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In a famous quote, Herbert Gans (1980: 116) wrote that that the relationship between 
journalists and their sources ‘resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journalists, and 
journalists seek access to sources’. Thus, journalists and politicians are engaged in a 
‘negotiation of newsworthiness’ (Cook 1998: 90): politicians are in control of information and 
have the potential to grant legitimacy to news stories, but media representatives have control 
over the visibility, the attention as well as the tone or ‘framing’ of news stories. This raises the 
question of ‘news value’ from two perspectives: On the one hand, we need to ask whether 
and under what conditions MPs consider EU issues as valuable enough to seek the attention 
of the media actively. Generally, it can be assumed that ‘political actors have a vital interest 
to win (favorable) media attention for their issues and policy aims. In fact, having a voice in 
the media is a key political strategy to gain legitimacy and power in the political process’ 
(Tresch 2009: 67). However, as argued above, this may not be the case for EU issues, 
especially if MPs or parties have to weigh the benefits of seeking attention for EU matters 
against attention for other topics. On the other hand, the question is whether the media 
consider EU issues or events to be of any news value, and if yes, whether parliamentary 
activities dealing with then are newsworthy as well. Since the seminal study of Galtung and 
Ruege (1965), news value research focuses on the characteristics or factors that make 
events newsworthy. 
And while the literature has identified a large variety of factors that may influence news 
selection (for an overview see Eilders 1996; O’Neill & Harcup 2009), many scholars seem to 
agree that events that concern powerful or famous individuals (or organisations/institutions), 
have an entertaining, dramatic (negative and/or conflictual, involving winners and losers), or 
surprising element, are perceived as relevant to a significantly large audience, or fit the news 
organisation’s own agenda, are more likely to be selected than those not featuring one of 
these factors. While the selection of a specific European event or issue will thus depend – 
inter alia – on such factors, a plausible hypothesis is that media coverage in general 
depends both on the salience of “Europe” in the country (though not necessarily the degree 
of Euroscepticism, Brüggemann & Kleinen-von Königslöw 2009) and on the level of party 
competition over Europe – the more fiercely parties, and their prominent (famous) members 
in parliament in particular, fight (entertainingly) over the EU, the more the media should 
cover parliamentary involvement in EU affairs.  
The indicators introduced above were all chosen with future comparative research in mind: 
each of them can be applied to all or nearly all national parliaments in a functionally 
equivalent manner. The subsequent articles in this Collection of Working Papers will provide 
first evidence for or against the hypotheses put forward in this section. Before that the final 
section of this introductory article explains the structure of this Collection of Working Papers.   
3. The Structure of this Collection of Working Papers 
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This Collection of Working Papers starts by outlining the normative and theoretical 
arguments in favour of national parliaments ‘going public’ in European matters. In his article, 
Jürgen Neyer argues that national parliaments could and should become key mediating 
institutions between European citizens and EU decision-making. The multi-level nature of EU 
governance raises fundamental questions about democracy and the appropriate role of 
national parliaments, with individual domestic legislatures facing serious problems in holding 
their governments accountable in European affairs. Drawing on a concept of legitimacy that 
centres on the idea of justification, Neyer suggests that national parliaments should become 
more actively involved in the European constitutional process. Such a role could be achieved 
through transforming COSAC into an Inter-parliamentary Constitutional Assembly 
responsible for Treaty revisions.  
The remainder of this Collection is divided into three sections. The first section provides 
comparative data about EU plenary debates and the usage of the EU in domestic 
parliamentary discourse in select EU member states. 
Comparing parliamentary EU debates in Finland, France, Germany and the UK, the article 
by Auel by Raunio shows how institutional and party related factors impact the level and 
nature of the debates. The results confirm significant variation between both the four 
countries and different types of EU matters. Examining the parliamentary processing of three 
major EU issues, the European Arrest Warrant, the Services Directive, and providing 
financial aid to Greece in the spring of 2010, especially the latter produced colourful debates. 
Regarding the overall level of plenary debates on European matters, the Bundestag had by 
far the highest share of EU debates. The Bundestag was also the only legislature where 
standard EU legislation and policy are often debated on the floor. In contrast, the Finnish 
Eduskunta with its famous EU scrutiny model performed clearly worst, both regarding the 
overall share of EU debates and the three concrete EU issues.   
Comparing debates on investiture and national budgets in Italy and Spain from 1986 to 
2006, the article by García Lupato focuses on the overall salience of Europe and its usage 
by national parties. Europe was particularly salient in Spanish investiture debates, with the 
EU referred to to the same extent in budgetary debates in the two countries. García Lupato 
shows how both ideology and government-opposition dynamics affect the discourse of 
parties, with governing parties defending the EU and using it to legitimate their programmes 
and budgetary decisions. While opposition to Europe comes mainly from smaller and 
ideologically radical parties, especially in budgetary debates the EU is often seen as an 
external constraint and thus arguably contributes to the depoliticization of national politics.  
The second section of the Collection of Working Papers focuses on the impact of plenary 
debates and the interplay between parliamentary and media arenas of communication. In 
particular, the three articles indicate considerable variation in the politicization and media 
coverage of different types of European issues. 
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The article by de Wilde assesses the explanatory power of main European integration 
theories for the communication of EU issues in mass media and national parliaments. By 
comparing parliamentary debates and media coverage on the EU’s multiannual budgetary 
frameworks in The Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, de Wilde shows how the 
communication of Europe differs mostly between mass media and parliaments rather than 
across countries or over time. Visibility of the debates reflects more the national interests at 
stake and the contentiousness of EU when it comes to mass media coverage, while visibility 
of parliamentary debates is highly influenced by the organization of scrutiny procedures. The 
media focuses on the government in its coverage of the budgetary debates and frames EU 
budget negotiations as a zero-sum conflict between member states. These findings have 
clear lessons about the ability of national parliamentary EU debates to reach the public. 
Increasing the share of EU debates may not work unless the national media also changes its 
traditional logics of communication. 
Examining the parliamentary processing of the Services Directive in Austria and Germany, 
Miklin argues that domestic politicization of Europe may require policy proposals that 
polarise between centre-left and centre-right parties, with such matters facilitating 
parliamentary debates where parties provide citizens with choices in EU politics. Miklin also 
shows how this higher salience makes national parliaments pay more attention to the 
proposal, hence resulting in tighter scrutiny of the government. This reduces the risk of 
agency losses in Council decision-making, with ministers better aligned to the preferences of 
their parliamentary principals.  
Finally, the EU and its member states have in recent years made more active use of various 
‘soft law’ coordination instruments such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This 
has raised concerns about the potential exclusion of national parliaments from these 
primarily intergovernmental processes. The article by de Ruiter investigates whether British 
and Dutch opposition MPs ‘go public’ with information about the performance of their 
governments in six OMCs. The results indicate that Dutch MPs use more information from 
OMC reports to shame the incumbent government for its policies than British MPs. In both 
parliaments these shaming activities take primarily place in committees and have no link with 
newspaper coverage on OMCs. Hence activities of MPs aimed at going public with 
information from OMC reports established only a weak link between OMCs and the citizens. 
The third section broadens our approach by examining public parliamentary activities beyond 
plenary debates. Both articles also provide data about individual MPs, in addition to political 
parties and parliaments as institutions, that have received the bulk of attention in the other 
contributions. 
The article by Pollak and Slominski analyses the supply side of political communication – the 
extent to which the Austrian parliament and its political parties and MPs inform citizens about 
EU matters. Focusing on three consecutive Treaty revisions (Nice Treaty, Constitutional 
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Treaty,  Lisbon Treaty), Pollak and Slominski show how the parliament and party groups 
engaged in relatively modest efforts to inform Austrian citizens about these major European 
level processes. Perhaps more intriguingly, the authors suggest that individual MPs are 
reluctant to communicate with their constituents over Europe since it is an activity not 
rewarded either by their party organization or by voters. Taken together, all communication 
efforts are top-down in character and do not aim at any deliberative engagement with the 
citizens. 
In the final article of this Collection of Working Papers, Navarro and Brouard explore the 
Europeanisation of parliamentary questions in the French National Assembly (1988-2007). 
While the overall share of EU-related questions is very low and shows only very modest 
increase over time, there is interesting variation between the types of questions, political 
parties, and individual MPs. Questions to the government were much more Europeanised 
than written or oral questions, with these questions to the government utilized by MPs from 
the governing parties to control the cabinet, especially when the minister in charge comes 
from a different party. Europeanised oral questions, the most visible to the voters, deal with 
local district concerns. In terms of parties and MPs, Eurosceptical and opposition deputies 
were no more likely to ask EU-related questions than pro-European and governing party 
MPs.   
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What Role for National Parliaments? European Integration 
and the Prospects of Parliamentary Democracy1 
Jürgen Neyer 
 
Abstract 
The debate on the role and function of national parliaments in the European 
multi-level system has produced a number of important insights. The 
dominance of the member state governments and the limited effectiveness 
of parliamentary control mechanisms are relevant insights that foster a 
clearer conceptualization of the European multi-level polity and highlight the 
deficiency of its democratic credentials. They also emphasize the need to 
put national parliaments back into power by giving them a new competence 
to set the agenda of the European constitutional discourse.  
 
1. The Challenge 
National parliaments have for long-time been neglected in European studies. Most research, 
driven by an interest in the policy output of the EU, either analysed specific policies or 
focused on the workings of the European institutions, i.e. the Commission, the Member 
States or the European Parliament. Similarly, those who were interested in the legislative 
procedures, took a close view on the competences of the European Parliament, asked for 
the emergence of a European demos or the adequate application of the principle of 
subsidiarity. National parliaments, however, were again largely non-existent. It is only since 
the early 1990s that national parliaments have slowly started to move out of the corner.2  The 
Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and now Lisbon have given formal rights to national 
parliaments and explicitly stated that they have a legitimate role in European governance. 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides for expanded information and contestation rights to national 
parliaments and makes them guardians of the subsidiarity principle by introducing what is 
usually called the Early Warning System. The growing awareness that national parliaments 
deserve a more prominent role in European politics, has also been reflected in the German 
constitutional Court’s decisions on the Treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon. The Court has 
argued that national parliaments are the most important institutional sites for garnering 
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democratic legitimacy and that they must have an important role in European policy-making. 
According to the Court, it is national Parliaments and not the European Parliament that 
guarantee that democratic principles are respected. National parliaments thus have a 
political function, which cannot be substituted by the European Parliament or any other 
institution. Giving national parliaments a central role in the European institutional system is 
thus the conditio sine qua non of democracy in Europe and a matter of utmost importance to 
the integration process. 
Although most observers agree that national parliaments must be better integrated in the 
European multi-level system, there is no consensus yet of how to divide the “multi-level 
parliamentary field” (Crum and Fossum 2009) among the national parliaments, the European 
parliament and the Council. Whilst some observers claim that “parliamentary democracies 
and multilevel governance co-evolve in processes of mutual adjustment” (Benz 2011: 13), 
others (Herzog and Gerken 2007) question whether formally parliamentary systems like 
Germany still deserve that attribute. Integrating national parliaments into multilevel 
governance has proven difficult. Empirical studies show that parliamentary majorities are 
more than hesitant to use their control competencies (cf. Auel and Benz 2005). Most often 
national parliaments shy away from publicly scrutinising their government in European 
politics and are content to support them.  
European integration is thus faced with a pressing question: What to do with national 
Parliaments? What is their adequate place in the European multi-level polity and how can 
they be empowered to occupy that role? This paper approaches this question in three steps. 
The following section argues that the two most influential proposals have only limited 
normative appeal because they reflect an insufficient theoretical conception of European 
democracy. Section three submits an alternative approach, established on the idea of multi-
level governance and a concept of legitimacy that centres on the individual right to 
justification. The section argues that national parliaments could fulfil a most useful function if 
they were given a more active role in the European constitutional process. Such a role could 
be realized if the “Conférence des organes parlementaires spécialisés dans les affaires de 
l'Union“ (COSAC) were transformed into an Interparliamentary Constitutional Assembly that 
would act as a transmission belt between member state citizens and the European level.  
2. The debate  
The debate on the adequate role of national Parliaments in the European Union is still 
nascent. It is true that most observers agree in applauding the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
German Constitutional Court’s judgement for its emphasis on additional parliamentary 
control mechanisms. There seems to be a broad political consensus that national 
parliaments should have an important role in European politics and be equipped with the 
necessary legal and administrative resources. There is, however, hardly any explicit 
constitutional debate on the exact role of national parliaments in the European political 
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system that goes beyond a mere “more of the same”. This section is intended to introduce 
and criticize the two most prominent perspectives on the role of national parliament in 
European multilevel governance. Both perspectives will be presented in a somehow stylized 
manner to distinguish the arguments clearly and to lay the ground for a third perspective that 
combines the strengths of the two approaches without taking on board their deficiencies.  
2.1 Supranational Parliamentarism  
Supranational parliamentarism starts from the suggestion that the European Parliament (EP) 
is the legitimate institution for representing the European demos.3  It is the only directly 
elected European institution und thus in a superior position to connect the European citizens 
directly to the European policy-making process. For supranationalists, the EP should be 
treated on at least equal footing to the Council. It would be even more adequate to follow the 
example of most federal democracies and to make the EP the first legislative chamber and 
the Council the second. It also follows this line of reasoning to reject the refusal of the 
Member States to open the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy as well 
as home and justice institutions to full parliamentary participation. The more competencies 
the EP acquires, the more the European citizens will be represented and the higher will be 
the legitimacy of the EU.  
National parliaments have no important role in supranational conceptions of democracy in 
Europe. Most conceptions follow the logic of a European federal state in which the 
competences of regional (member state) parliaments are implicitly limited to issues of minor 
importance. National parliaments should have their legislative and control competences 
limited to domestic issues and refrain from getting involved in European affairs. The way 
ahead to a European democracy is via extending the EP’s competences with the ultimate 
goal of “a full parliamentarisation in a European federation” (Fischer 2000). From an 
orthodox supranationalist’s perspective, any specifically European activity of national 
parliaments distorts in the natural division of competencies between the European and 
national parliaments. European parliamentary involvement is to be conducted by the 
European parliament and must not be replicated by similar efforts on the part of national 
parliaments.  
Although the supranationalist’s conceptualisation of European parliamentarism has the 
benefit of simplicity, it is not without deficiencies. The major problem of applying standard 
concepts of democracy to the EU is that its very structure is built on the principle of 
difference, and not of equality, among citizens. The principle of degressive proportionality of 
Art.14 Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) provides that citizens from small states generally have a 
greater say than citizens from the bigger states. It is true that this critique applies to all 
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federal states with a chamber in which the states are represented according to the principle 
of one state one vote. The EU, however, differs from all federal states in that unequal 
representation is not only a matter of its second legislative chamber but is well 
institutionalized in both chambers, the European Parliament and the (European) Council. 
Difference, and not equality of citizens, is an organizing principle of the EU. Inequality thus 
not only constitutes a deficit in the organisational structure of the EU but also gives 
expression to an emphasis on intergovernmental equality, which is alien to the emphasis of 
democracy on individual equality. The EU thus is not undemocratic by mistake but 
deliberately violates one of the constituting principles of democracy. It is the price that is paid 
for the legacy of the European history and the resulting emphasis on protecting the small 
states against domination by the bigger ones. 
It is also a serious hindrance that the EU lacks a number of empirical pre-conditions that 
make democratic discourses likely. As has been repeatedly said, the European demos is 
strongly divided along national lines and non-expert cross-border political discourses are 
hard to find. Extending the EP’s competences would thus amount to a mere formal 
democratisation that lacks the underlying foundation of a vibrant political discourse. It would 
mean to empower an institution that is not accepted by the European peoples as the 
appropriate site for setting the European agenda. It would thus not reduce the democratic 
deficit of the EU, but risk adding to the already existing alienation between the European 
citizens and the EU.  
2.2 Intergovernmental Parliamentarism  
The intergovernmental interpretation of EU parlamentarism is directly opposed to its 
supranational counterpart. Intergovernmentalism assumes democracy to be a political 
practice that is closely tied to the nation-state. According to Scharpf (2009: 181), “the EU 
must be seen and legitimated not as a government of citizens, but as a government of 
governments”. Only the nation-state has the cultural heritage, the constitutional foundation 
and the institutional equipment to foster democratic practices. Thus, it is the member states 
that are the most important institutional sites for providing legitimacy to the EU. The major 
democratic problems resulting from European integration are the empowerment of national 
executives, the bypassing of national legislatures and the new opportunities for the 
governments to influence the domestic agenda (Moravcsik 1994). Europeanisation thus has 
important effects for the quality of domestic democracy and threatens to distort the balance 
of power between the executive and the legislative. Most intergovernmentalists would 
therefore subscribe to the statement that all political competences on the European level are 
– and must be – of an enumerated quality and closely limited to those areas where the 
nation-state is functionally deficient and where democratic societies are ready to pool 
political resources with other member states.  
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The implications for the role of national parliaments in the EU are straightforward. There is 
no way of accepting the claim that a supranational Parliament’s competences should be as 
broad as those of the democratic member states. Only the latter are fully democratically 
legitimated whereas the formers’ contribution to the EU’s legitimacy is of an only 
supplementary, if not negligible, nature. From an orthodox inter-governmentalist’s 
perspective, there can be no such thing as law above the nation-state, or, in our context, 
European law. Law proper is tied to democracy, and democracy is tied to the state. National 
parliaments thus may delegate norm-setting competences to intergovernmental bodies or 
supranational agencies but must at the same time institutionalise proper control mechanisms 
for safeguarding that those norms do not contradict national constitutional provisions and 
that the agents do not misuse their discretionary powers. The German Constitutional Court’s 
ruling expresses such an understanding of the adequate role of national parliaments in 
Europe. Its green-lighting of the Treaty of Lisbon was made conditional on a previous 
strengthening of the Bundestag whilst the expansion of the competences of the EP was 
understood to be largely irrelevant from the point of view of democracy.  
The intergovernmental perspective has much strength but is also not without deficiencies. 
Democracy in Europe can neither be adequately established at a purely national level nor 
can it be adapted to the complex interdependence of the European societies by simply 
adding an intergovernmental layer of governance. The arguments are well known (cf. 
Føllesdal and Hix 2006, Eriksen and Fossum 2011): National democracy has external effects 
on neighbouring states, is thus imposing own rules on foreigners, and is structurally 
handicapped in terms of input legitimacy. It is, furthermore, too small for coping with many 
cross-border challenges (environment, migration, security, etc.) and thus lacks output-
legitimacy. Simply adding an intergovernmental layer of governance on top of the nation-
state implies negative feedback effects on the domestic political setting (see above) and 
cannot solve the problems of democratic legitimacy either.  
3. Multi-Level Parliamentarism  
Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism are still dominating the constitutional debate. 
They figure prominently in the German Constitutional Court’s decision on the Lisbon Treaty 
and in most political debates on the future of the EU. They are not the only approaches, 
however. The academic debate increasingly turns to multi-level governance approaches for 
analysing the EU. Their starting point is to understand the EU as a form of governance that 
combines supranational, intergovernmental and domestic components (Hooghe and Marks 
2001, Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007, Benz 2010). This new type of order can neither be 
adequately described nor normatively assessed if not all three elements of governance are 
taken into account. It describes a form of government where authority has come to be 
dispersed across levels. The state is vertically and horizontally segmented and its role has in 
many areas changed from authoritative allocation of power to the facilitation of collective 
problem-solving.  
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The multi-level concept has recently been applied to European parliamentarism (cf. Benz 
2011). Crum and Fossum (2009) use the notion of a “multilevel parliamentary field”. They 
argue that the national Parliaments and the European parliaments cannot not be viewed in 
isolation from each other but that they together form a combined system of citizen 
representation. European citizens have some of their concerns being represented at the 
national level and some at the supranational level. Both levels of representation coexist and 
complement each other without necessarily having conflicting claims with a view to their 
competences. Accepting this concept as a starting point opens a helpful way of 
reconstructing the role of national parliaments in the European multi-level political system. 
3.1 Multi-Level Governance and Normative Theory  
The concept of multi-level governance has its strength in describing institutional 
complexities. It is rather weak, however, in guiding normative analysis. Recent assessments 
of the normative quality of multi-level governance are ambivalent. Papadopoulos (2010: 
1034-1039) argues that multi-governance is hard to reconcile with democratic principles. The 
network character of multi-level governance fosters a policy-making style that is “deliberately 
informal and opaque” with often unclear attributions of responsibility. Control on the part of 
national parliaments is difficult because the “length of the chain of delegation combined with 
the magnitude of administrative discretion makes their democratic accountability fictitious”. 
Networks are dominated by policy experts who “must be unaccountable to constituencies” in 
order to remain credible to their professional communities. Participating NGOs represent 
well-organized interests rather than the median voter, and their internal organizational 
structure hardly ever lives up to the standards of democracy. To be sure, all this does not 
necessarily imply that multi-level governance is illegitimate or unaccountable. It points, 
however, to a tension between two different types of accountability, namely horizontal and 
vertical accountability. Vertical accountability is the classical mode of garnering legitimacy in 
a democracy. It refers to the control of decision-makers by parliament and of 
parliamentarians by citizens. It is a mode of safeguarding accountability that is typical for 
formalized principal-agent relationships and often involves legal rights on the part of the 
principals and corresponding duties on the part of agents.  
Horizontal accountability works more indirectly and often without formal legal rights or duties. 
It is based on oversight by actors different from the delegating principles and uses “soft” 
mechanisms such as lending political support to actions or, conversely naming and shaming, 
peer review, media control, stake-holder participation, good administrative procedures and 
the withdrawal of political support in case of mal-performance. In networks, formal 
mechanisms of vertical accountability are often hard to employ because decision-making 
structures are informal and escape the logic of legal delegation. The literature on 
accountability in network governance thus often uses an understanding of accountability that 
goes beyond formal rights and duties. It refers more broadly to a type of social relation or 
mechanism that involves an obligation to explain conduct and give reason for the actions 
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taken. It involves “the provision of information about performance, … the possibility of 
debate, of questions by the forum and answers by the actor, and eventually of judgement of 
the actor by the forum” (both cites by Bovens 2010: 951).  
Accountability has become a new analytical focus for much of the literature because it 
promises to combine an emphasis on input-legitimacy without unduly limiting the problem-
solving capacity of the EU. It underlines the need for transparent decision-making, legal 
oversight and good administrative procedures without necessarily imposing participatory 
requirements that would endanger the efficiency of decision-making. It is, finally, a concept 
that is very much in accordance with the practices of the EU. Although the concept is clearly 
adapted to analysing EU practices, it also has its shortcoming. Accountability has recently 
been described as a “dustbin filled with good intentions… and vague images of good 
governance” (Bovens, 2007: 449). Bovens describes the contribution of accountability to 
democratic governance as “ensur(ing) that public officials, or public organisations remain on 
the virtuous path”; it may foster “public catharsis”, “identify and address injustices and 
obligations”, “establish public control”, “prevent and detect corruption and the abuse of public 
power”, “help creating checks and balances” and “induce reflection and learning” (Bovens 
2010: 955). Accountability matters to legitimate governance “because of the presumption 
that its absence means that those in power have the capacity to act without regard for those 
who authorize their actions and for those whose lives are affected by those actions” (Barnett/ 
and Finnemore 2004: 171).  
All this sounds good and is surely welcomed by any democratic process. What the concept 
lacks so far, however, is an explanation of its normative foundations. It is, in the words of 
Lord and Pollak (2010), an “unsaturated concept”. It does not answer the most pressing 
questions such as who should be accountable to whom, when or for what reasons. The 
approach most often used for finding an answer to these questions is principal-agent 
analysis (Auel 2007). According to principal-agent analysis, those who delegate power have 
the right (and the power) to demand accounts on the part of those actors or institutions to 
whom powers are delegated. Accountability is thus an element in a relationship between a 
sender and a receiver of political competences. An important strength of principal-agent 
analysis is its clarity and its parsimonious character. Political relationships are clearly 
structured and responsibilities are easy to locate. Political reality, however, is often too 
complex for easy analytical concepts. Principal-agent analysis systematically overlooks the 
possibility that actors who are commanding delegated competences might either deliberately 
or non-intentionally use them for negatively affecting the interests of third parties who have 
neither delegated nor received any competences. According to the theory, affected actors 
who have not delegated competences would have no right to demand and receive an 
account. In European politics, such situations are ubiquitous. The introduction of the Euro, to 
take a prominent example, was to a significant degree, motivated by the interest of the 
member states to curb the power of the German Bundesbank. Before the introduction of the 
Euro, the Bundesbank only took into account the concerns of the German economy. Due to 
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the dominant role of the Deutsche Mark as the strongest currency in the EU, the 
Bundesbank’s decisions had a significant effect on the currencies of all other member states. 
If the Bundesbank decided to raise or lower its interest rates, all other European central 
banks were de facto forced to follow its example, even if their domestic economic interests 
strongly differed. The decisions of the Bundesbank thus had a strong effect on third parties 
who, according to principal-agent analysis, would have neither the power nor the right to 
influence them. Similar examples could be taken from trade policy, migration policy and 
many other areas. All these examples point to the normative limits of principle-agent analysis 
and its structural negligence of the external effects of decisions on third parties. 
An alternative way of explaining the normative thrust of accountability is to contextualize it 
with a theory of justice that focuses on the right to justification (cf. Forst 2007; Neyer 2010). 
The idea of justice as a right to justification is established on the assumption that we have a 
human right to demand and receive justification from all those individuals or organisations 
that restrict our freedom. We, as the citizens and the ultimate bearers of the right to 
justification, are entitled to explanations and good reason-giving on the part of all political 
institutions that wield power. This does not necessarily imply that no limitations of our 
freedom by a government or by other political actors are legitimate. It only holds that the 
legitimacy of any such intervention depends on the reasons that are given to explain it. As a 
person (or organisation), I have the right to have any restriction of my individual freedom 
justified by whoever causes that restriction or has the intention to do so. This argument takes 
the freedom of the individual from domination as a starting point, and places all restriction of 
this freedom under the reservation of good reasons (cf. Neyer 2013, chap. 6). It is a 
procedural understanding of justice that emphasizes not only individual freedom but also the 
duty of the community to produce the material conditions under which individual freedom can 
exist.  
Understanding justice as the right to justification gives the notion of justice an intrinsically 
procedural and discursive character. Any question regarding the specific implication of justice 
in a given context is answered with reference to a normatively demanding discursive 
procedure. All parties concerned, be they individual or governmental, must be given the 
chance to voice their concerns and to have them properly respected in the formulation of 
binding rules. In this way, the search for justice becomes an inclusive, discursive and always 
only temporarily concluded project. Though those concerned by a regulation may temporarily 
agree upon a specific accord, they often will only do so with the reservation of possible later 
changes.  
3.2 Obstacles to Justification  
Norms and facts are unfortunately hardly ever identical. In an ideal world, all political actors 
would permanently justify their policies to all possibly affected parties and abstain from 
conducting any policy that cannot be fully justified or that has not yet been fully justified. No 
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implementation of policies would be realized before an inclusive debate on the merits and 
problems of policies is concluded. Critics would be invited to raise their concerns and be 
given opportunity to address them directly via policy-makers. The arguments brought forward 
would be weighed according to their relative merits. Policy would not follow interests but 
arguments. It will come as no surprise to the reader that real-world of politics in the EU – as 
everywhere in the world - is somewhat different. Justificatory relations are about 
relationships of power (Keohane, 2006). To demand justification is to ask someone to do 
something he or she would otherwise not do. Policy scrutiny might lead to additional 
opposition by revealing conceptual flaws in a policy or by pointing to its distributive effects. 
Justificatory discourses nearly always imply additional costs to a policy entrepreneur and are 
only sometimes beneficial from the point of view of the respondent. Thus, only very few 
political actors subject their own actions to the critical scrutiny of others where they are not 
forced to do so. 
It is also clear that the institutional order of the EU attributes asymmetrical power resources 
to different classes of actors. Governments, to start with, are the most powerful actors in the 
European multi-level system. They act as gatekeepers for political proposals and have a 
monopolistic say over the setting of the European political agenda via the European Council. 
Governments have huge informational advantages regarding the positions and scopes of 
action of other executives and are in a much better position than all other actors to identify 
what is politically feasible. Governments can finally influence the domestic political agenda 
via the EU. Many observers thus analyse the EU as a de facto intergovernmental regime in 
which the supranational institutions are servants of the member states rather than masters of 
the political discourse. As opposed to the member governments, individual citizens are often 
claimed to be the least powerful actors in the European multi-level system. They have only 
very indirect options for demanding justifications by either using the preliminary ruling 
procedure (that is after a policy has been adopted and implemented) or by trusting the 
European Parliament to adopt their concerns and demand the adequate reforms. The 
European Parliament, however, is equally remote from most European citizens and often 
represents well-organized interests rather than the concerns of the median-voter. It is true 
that the extension of the EP’s rights in the European political process has made an important 
inroad into the member governments’ former monopoly of demanding and receiving 
justifications. The EP has become an important co-legislator and today critically follows the 
Commission’s and the Council’s legislative work. The EP, however, still lacks the right to set 
the political agenda, it is only the second and not the first legislative chamber and it does not 
have the right to submit legislative proposals. The EU’s institutional system is thus strongly 
detached from the citizen level and is in need of new mechanisms for bridging the gap 
between the ultimate holder of the right to justification and the policy-making level.  
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3.3 Fostering Justification: Bringing National Parliaments Back in 
If all this is true then we are forced to diagnose serious obstacles to realizing the individual 
right to justification in European politics. Politics in the EU is about power at least as much as 
about arguments, and the most powerful actors’ activities are very difficult to scrutinize by 
citizens. There is no reason for complete disillusionment either, however. It was already 
mentioned in the introduction that the last years have seen a number of efforts to increase 
the role of national parliaments in the EU and thus to reduce the gap between the EU citizen 
and the EU policy-maker. It must be underlined that national parliaments are a very specific 
type of political institution. They are the only ones who combine a close attachment to the 
citizens of a polity with explicit legal rights to participate in policy-making. They are the locus 
in which the sovereignty of a people is institutionalized and the most prominent place where 
the people formulate their preferences and ideas in a politically effective way. National 
parliaments are thus the prime candidate and the most crucial element in the policy-making 
process for giving a prominent role to the individual right to justification.  
3.3.1 The Control Function  
The recent debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU reflects these insights. It 
builds on an understanding of the role of parliaments in the democratic process that centres 
on their function to represent the people and to take care that governments are actually 
doing what the people want. It is built on the idea of a linear stream of bottom up delegation 
and control that runs from the citizens to parliamentarians and from here to government. In 
this perspective, efforts at strengthening national parliaments would have to centre on giving 
them as many rights as possible to make governments accountable to parliamentary 
scrutiny.  
Most of the recent political innovations in the role of national parliaments in the European 
political process reflect this idea. The member states have adapted the ToL and implemented 
domestic legislation to ensure that national parliaments can better control their government’s 
activities in EU policy-making. The new provisions in the ToL stipulate in its protocol on the 
role of national parliaments in European the desire to “encourage greater involvement of 
national Parliaments in the activities of the European Union and to enhance their ability to 
express their views on draft legislative acts of the European Union as well as on other 
matters which may be of particular interest to them”. To implement that goal, all Commission 
consultation documents, draft legislative Acts and the minutes of Council meetings shall be 
forwarded to national parliaments. The national parliaments are also granted an eight-week 
period between when a draft legislative Act is being made available to national Parliaments 
and the date when it is placed on a provisional agenda for the Council.  
In addition, the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
stipulates that the Commission must review a proposal if reasoned opinions by a group of 
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Parliaments (quorum depending on the legal matter) claims the proposal to be violating the 
subsidiarity principle. The Commission must “justify why it considers that the proposal 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity” if it nevertheless decides to proceed with the 
proposal. It must also follow a procedure that opens further avenues for the Member States 
and the European Parliament to stop it.  
All of these changes in the institutional architecture are to be applauded for the new 
awareness that they attribute to national parliaments. It must also be said, however, that their 
effect will probably not reach far beyond political symbolism. It is difficult to imagine how a 
quarter or even a third of all national parliaments could, in less than eight weeks, formulate 
coordinated reasoned opinions. In most cases, it will take probably exceptional 
circumstances to overcome the costs of coordination between the parliaments. In addition, a 
clever timing on the part of the Commission might use the parliamentary breaks for making it 
even more difficult for national parliaments to achieve common reasoned opinions. 
The effort to strengthen national parliaments control competencies is not limited to the EU 
level but is shared by most of the member states. European Affairs Committees have been 
set up in all member state parliaments and most of them have been equipped with the 
necessary legal resources for scrutinizing their government’s policies (see the introduction 
by Auel and Raunio). The role model for many of these institutional reforms has been the 
Danish Folketing (Laursen 2001). The Folketing participates in governmental policy-making 
by tying the government to a mandate given in advance of intergovernmental negotiations. 
Before entering negotiations, the responsible minister has to present a proposal in person to 
the European Affairs Committee of the Folketing and must obtain a supportive majority. The 
members of the committee not only vote on the proposal but also have the right to propose 
amendments. The minister has no right to enter into any negotiations in Brussels if s/he fails 
to convince the majority of the committee of his/her proposal. Likewise, if the negotiations in 
Brussels make it necessary to change the Danish position, and if s/he wants to go beyond 
the authorisations given by the mandate, s/he must present new suggestions to the 
committee and wait for new instructions.  
The Folketing has also opened an EU information office open to citizens and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) for providing informational resources on European issues. A recent 
comparative study on consultation processes in the EU reports that CSOs’ representatives 
are systematically consulted by the European Affairs Committee (EAC) on all proposals of 
interest (Volonteurope 2010). The openness of the EAC to the public results in “a kind of 
common ownership of the EAC” (Volonteurope 2010: 20) that is shared between citizens, the 
parliament and the government. 
The Danish practices of making the EU an issue of public debate have been widely 
applauded in the literature.  Although some observers criticize that mandating may hamper 
the negotiation strategies of the Danish government, there is also a broad appraisal of the 
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public effect of close scrutiny. Observers have noted that the salience of European affairs in 
Danish domestic politics has been high if compared to other Member States. European 
politics in Denmark has become an essential part of domestic politics. It has moved out of 
bureaucratic interaction and entered the public discourse. Although this awareness may, 
from time to time, lead to a critical stance of the public towards the EU, it is attractive from 
the perspective of a justificatory discourse. Critical inquiries and public contestation force a 
government to explain its case, to respond to critiques and to justify its course of action. 
Policies become public and outcomes have a higher probability to reflect the variety of 
citizens’ concerns.  
It must be added, however, that the salience of European politics in Denmark is not only the 
product of the activities of the Folketing and its EAC. According to Art. 20 of the Danish 
constitution, all transfers of political competences to supranational institutions require a 5/6 
majority in the Folketing or a simple majority plus a referendum. In practice, all European 
treaties since the accession of Denmark to the EU had to pass through the bottleneck of the 
referendum and thus received broad public awareness. An equally important aspect is the 
fact that Denmark has since had long minority governments. Much of the salience of 
European politics in Denmark is explained by the fact that the opposition parties use the 
EAC for criticizing governmental policies and indirectly addressing the Danish public. The 
Danish case thus not only highlights the importance that a national parliament can have in 
processes of post-national governance, but also the difficulty to generalize from this case 
and to expect that its success story can be easily exported to other member states 
parliaments. It is not surprising, therefore, that many other member states have had less 
convincing experiences with strengthening the control competences of their parliaments. The 
Austrian example provides a telling case of a parliamentary European Affairs Committee that 
is equipped with strong control and monitoring competences but hardly ever uses them (See 
the contribution by Pollak and Slominski in this collection). It underlines that national 
parliaments are not only losers of the integration process but only too often “voluntary 
victims” (Auel). A most important reason for this political failure is that the majority of MPs in 
a parliamentary system, represent the same party as the government is composed of. They 
thus have few incentives to scrutinize their government’s activities. “The result would be 
similar to a defeat of a governmental bill, namely a public and therefore humiliating 
opposition to the government by its own parliamentary majority, something the majority will 
usually have no incentive to risk, because it may undermine their own political credibility“ 
(Auel 2007: 492). Strengthening the control competences of national parliaments might thus 
be simply the wrong strategy if the goal is to bind citizens and European politics closer to 
each other and to prepare the ground for an effective justificatory discourse.  
3.3.2 The Communicative Function of National Parliaments  
Control is fortunately not everything. An alternative option for increasing the role of national 
parliaments in the EU is to emphasise their communicative function. The so-called 
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communicative function of parliaments has since long been highlighted by classics such as 
John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, it is a most central function of the parliament to provide a 
space for debating politics. The parliament is not only the agent of the citizens and the 
principal of the government but a political space in its own right. It is a forum in which 
preferences and concerns can be voiced and differences articulated. It is towards parliament 
that the government must justify its policies.4  It is true that the communicative function of 
parliament and its role as a transmitter between governmental activities and citizen 
awareness has somehow lost in importance in domestic politics since the times of Mill. 
Newspapers and other media today closely watch all domestic governmental activities. 
Some observers al-ready describe the advent of a media democracy in which newspaper 
and television programs have adopted many of those functions that were formerly in the 
hands of parliaments. In European politics, however, things look quite different. Peter and de 
Vreese (2004) report that television coverage of EU politics takes place only sporadically and 
is of limited visibility. Newspapers are only slightly better adapted to European integration. 
Although Sifft et al. (2007) observe an intensifying scrutiny of EU politics by newspapers, 
they also conclude that most EU politics takes place unnoticed. Gerhards (2000: 294) adds 
that “European questions receive the lowest level of media attention in comparison to all 
other … issue-areas” and Risse and van den Steeg (2003:3) report that the European public 
discourse is “fragile, fragmented, and constrained to particular sets of issues”. The defect is 
the more serious as European news coverage is strongly biased towards governmental 
activities and by and large overlooks parliaments, party actors, and civil society (Koopmans 
2007). Inclusive and effective justificatory public discourses thus face serious obstacles.5  
Important reasons for this meagre role of the public discourse in European politics are 
probably that most citizens are already well-occupied with following national politics. Many 
citizens do not have the additional time and resources to get informed on the often very 
technical and complex details of European affairs and to gather the necessary information 
for formulating a well-reasoned opinion. In addition, many relevant political issues today 
have a level of complexity, which can be processed only by the average citizen if it is 
reduced to its most important ethical or redistributive implications. For very practical reasons, 
debates on nuclear energy, global warming, genetically modified organisms or the intricacies 
of health reform need to be simplified and organized into a limited set of options for making 
them accessible to the public discourse. An active role of parliamentarians is thus a 
precondition of reasonably autonomous decision-making by citizens. The need for 
parliamentarians to adopt an active role is aggravated by the fact that the media are often 
slow in reacting to real-world problems and operate according to own economic standards. 
Politically relevant topics are also often overlooked due to limited public interest or lack of 
                                                     
4
 A more recent formulation of the same argument is Norton (1996:1). According to Norton, parliaments are usually 
seen as ‘the means by which the measures and actions of government are debated and scrutinised on behalf of 
citizens, and through which the concerns of citizens . . . may be voiced. The extent to which they carry out such 
actions, and are seen by citizens to carry out such actions, may be argued to constitute the essential underpinning 
of legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of electors’. 
5
 For a recent excellent overview on the literature cf. Risse (2010). 
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expertise on the part of journalists. Relying on the media for facilitating discursive processes 
between government and citizens might thus be overly optimistic.  
A more promising way to revitalize the communicative function of national parliaments might 
be to awaken the EU’s sleeping beauty, the “Conférence des organes parlementaires 
spécialisés dans les affaires de l'Union“ (COSAC). COSAC is a body that brings together 
members of the committees of the national Parliaments of the Member States dealing with 
European affairs as well as representatives of the European Parliament. Their most 
important task is to promote the exchange of information and best practice between national 
Parliaments and the European Parliament. COSAC also has the right to submit non-binding 
contributions to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. COSAC thus 
serves as a kind of informational platform that organizes discourse among the European 
Affairs Committees of the national parliaments.  
Although it is true that COSAC today has hardly any significant effect on either policy-making 
in the EU or the development of its constitutional order,6 it is nevertheless an institution with 
a huge potential for giving effect to the right to justification. It combines all those aspects that 
the EU is in urgent need of. COSAC brings together national parliaments and can thus pool 
resources on the European level without further adding to the predominance of member 
state executives in the political process. COSAC, however, should not be involved with day-
to-day decision-making. That task is already well conducted by the European Parliament and 
there is no need for duplication. What is urgently needed, however, is a permanent 
constitutional body that overcomes the defects inherent in the treaty changing provisions of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The ambivalence of the Treaty in giving parliaments a role in the 
constitutional place reflects the EU’s international legacy and is hopelessly outdated today. 
COSAC should take the ambition of the EU to better integrate national Parliaments seriously 
and demand to be transformed into an Interparliamentary Constitutional Assembly (ICA) with 
the sole competence to propose treaty reforms. It should have the competence to review all 
practices and competences of the EU, to propose amendments to the Treaty or any other 
legal documents of the EU. The new ICA would safeguard that the EU’s constitutional 
development reflects not only intergovernmental bargaining but be via its members in 
permanent close contact with the national parliaments and thus the democratic sovereign of 
the member states. If COSAC were transformed into an ICA, the European Affairs 
Committees of the national parliaments would no longer only observe and eventually criticize 
governmental politics but become crucial actors in the EU. National parliaments would re-
adopt the role the constitutional importance as it is foreseen in national constitutions, is 
demanded by the German Constitutional Court and that is nevertheless so difficult to realize 
under the conditions of and the incentives set by domestic parliamentarism. It would also be 
an important corrective to the role occupied by the European Court of Justice. Turning 
COSAC into an ICA would be an important institutional reform for helping to justify European 
                                                     
6
 Good literature on COSAC is still hard to find. Overviews are given in O’Brennan/ Raunio 2007 and Raunio 2009. 
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structures of justification. These structures would no longer be unduly shielded from critical 
scrutiny by the requirement of intergovernmental unanimity but become subject to 
permanent critique and eventual reform. The ICA could propose a harmonization of 
corporate taxation, the introduction of a European tax for financing infrastructure, the fading 
out of the outdated structural funds, a balancing of the four freedoms with the social 
protection of workers, and many other projects that are today blocked by the opposition of 
single governments. The ICA would thus have the potential to move the EU a significant step 
closer towards a fully justified structure of justification. 
4. Conclusion and Research Agenda  
This paper has undertaken a – somewhat sketchy - tour de force through European 
constitutional thinking and a discussion of adequate normative standards. It has analysed 
difficulties to democratise multi-level governance systems and taken issue with the possible 
contribution of national parliaments to remedying normative problems of the EU. It has 
worked on the assumption that national parliaments are the institutional backbone of any 
proper working democracy. They are the mediating link between government and citizens 
and carry much of the burden of safeguarding responsible and responsive governance. The 
establishment of political structures above the nation-state and, by implication, beyond 
democratic governance is a serious challenge to the institutional order of democracy. It 
threatens to disable the parliamentary link between citizens and government and to open a 
window of opportunity for the de-coupling of governance from democracy. Parliaments today 
do not yet live up to the challenge of re-establishing their central role in the political process. 
Dominant incentive structures for most MPs militate towards downplaying and de-politicizing 
Europe domestically. Hardly any European parliament thus uses its legal competences fully. 
Most seem to be content with being the losers of integration and accept to be side-lined by a 
growing importance of the executive.  
Much of this discussion has been brief, lacks proper systematic evidence and must be 
preliminary. What the discussion should have been helpful for, however, is to situate the 
analysis of national parliaments in the EU in wider constitutional and normative debates and 
to identify important future research questions. We do not know, for example, too much 
about the practices of national opposition parties in bringing European topics closer to their 
domestic audiences. Where and when do they undertake such efforts and under what 
conditions are these efforts successful? Does the media listen to the opposition’s efforts to 
politicise European politics? When and how does that happen? What impact on the public 
discourse can additional mechanisms such as the Danish use of mandating and public 
relations offices have in other member states? Do national parliaments still have the capacity 
to mediate between citizens and European governance or are we forced to look for new non-
parliamentary means for legitimizing the EU? 
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How we answer these questions is important for understanding the future of parliamentary 
democracy in the EU and beyond. If (a) the EP remains for the foreseeable future too weak 
in terms of both competences and normative potential to compensate for the losses of 
domestic legislative power, and if (b) national parliaments face incentive structures which 
militate against taking their role in the European multi-level system seriously, then we are in 
the midst of a deep crisis of European parliamentarism. How this crisis will unfold depends at 
least to some degree on the creativity of academia to find convincing answers to the 
challenge of situating national parliaments in multilevel governance structures. 
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I. COMPARING PLENARY DEBATES ON EU ISSUES 
 
Debating the State of the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on 
EU Issues in Finland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
Katrin Auel and Tapio Raunio 
 
Abstract 
Over the last 20 years, the role of national parliaments in EU affairs has 
gained considerable academic attention. Much of the literature has focused 
on the parliamentary control function and shown that national parliaments 
are no longer docile lambs willing to be led to the European slaughtering 
block, but exercise tighter scrutiny of their governments in EU affairs. What 
tends to be overlooked, however, is that the parliamentary communication 
function is at least as important in EU politics. Yet while the literature has 
discussed reasons why MPs (or political parties) may prefer to ‘depoliticise’ 
EU issues by conducting their EU business away from the prying eye of the 
public, so far we have little empirical data on how parliaments communicate 
EU politics. The paper will therefore provide a comparative analysis of 
parliamentary debates on EU issues in the UK, Finland, Germany and 
France. The data consists of debates and documents on three major EU 
issues: the Services Directive, the European Arrest Warrant, and providing 
financial aid to Greece in the spring of 2010 (‘cash for Greece’). Moreover, 
we provide longitudinal data on the overall level of plenary debates on 
European matters in the four countries, with our findings demonstrating 
significant variation between both the four member states and different types 
of EU matters. 
 
1. Introduction 
Parliaments are multi-taskers. They perform a large number of functions, including the 
election or selection of the government, policy-formulation and legislation, controlling the 
government and holding it accountable, aggregating and representing the interests of their 
citizens and informing them on important policy issues. Among the most important means for 
parliaments to fulfil a range of these functions, and most importantly the information and 
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communication function, are public debates in the plenary or – to a lesser extent – in 
committees. Debates are vital elements of electoral competition as they provide for a public 
articulation of societal interests and the discussion of policies thus informing citizens about 
complex political issues. Without debates allowing the electorate to identify competing 
leaders and policy agendas it is difficult for them to assess the performance of the 
government and to hold it accountable.  
As mentioned in the introductory article, previous research has suggested that the role of the 
plenary has so far been limited in European issues (Bergman et al. 2003: 175). However, 
this comparative data is somewhat dated, and it is possible that the debates on transparency 
in EU affairs as well as on the role of national parliaments in EU governance have led to a 
greater involvement of the plenary. More recent research has at least suggested that more 
salient EU topics – such as financial frameworks (de Wilde in this Collection of Working 
Papers), Treaty reforms (Maatsch 2010), or European Council meetings (van de Steeg 2010) 
– do appear to trigger plenary debates (Zajc 2008; Raunio and Wiberg 2010). In addition, 
previous research has paid hardly any attention to the variation between legislatures or 
policy areas, nor to the relationship between parliamentary cultures and debates.  
Hence this article contributes to the literature through a comparative analysis of EU debates 
in four member states – Finland, France, Germany and the UK. In the next section we 
discuss both institutional and party-related factors that may impact the emphasis of 
parliamentary debates and introduce our hypotheses. In section three we justify our case 
selection and data, and provide an overview of the variation between the four legislatures. 
Section four contains the empirical analysis of the debates on three major EU issues: 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the Services Directive, and providing financial aid to 
Greece in the spring of 2010 (‘Cash for Greece’). In the fifth section we provide longitudinal 
data on the overall level of plenary debates on European matters in the four countries. We 
show how both institutional and party related factors impact the level and nature of debates, 
with our findings confirming significant variation between both the four member states and 
different types of EU matters. 
2. Institutional Context + Party Interests = Different Outcomes? 
Our basic premise is intuitively very simple: the institutional context, expressed through 
different parliamentary rules and cultures, should produce variation in our dependent 
variable – parliamentary debates on EU issues. While European parliaments perform largely 
the same set of functions in their respective national systems, previous literature has shown 
there to be significant variation between the legislatures in terms of which function is 
emphasised most (Döring ed. 1995; Norton ed. 1998; Strøm et al. eds. 2003; Arter ed. 
2006). ‘After all, the institutions provide venues for the interactions between MPs and 
ministers, rules for behaviour of participants and above all, role models for the “inmates” of 
the parliamentary/governmental complex’ (Andeweg & Nijzink 1995: 157). In addition, 
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national parliaments are party-political institutions, bringing together legislators representing 
different political parties. Government formation is based on bargaining between political 
parties, with the opposition parties trying to unseat the cabinet or increase their support in 
the run-up to the next elections. Parties are also responsible for setting the parliamentary 
rules of procedure: the agenda and powers of committees and the plenary as well as the 
rights of individual members and party groups are all decided by political parties. Hence any 
realistic explanation of parliamentary activities must also include the incentives of parties 
(Bergman et al. eds. 2000; Strøm et al. eds. 2003).  
2.1 Institutional Factors 
Turning to institutional factors first, a much-used distinction is that between ‘working’ and 
‘debating’ parliaments (Arter 1999: 211-217), or between ‘legislating’ and ‘deliberating’ 
parliaments (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979). Working parliaments are characterised by 
standing orders that emphasise committee work over plenary debates, with a parliamentary 
culture where MPs focus on scrutiny of documents in committees instead of grand speeches 
on the floor. As the name implies, in debating parliaments, on the other hand, the focus is 
more on plenary debates. In addition, debating legislatures are, on average, less 
consensual, with the opposition using plenary to criticise the government. The ‘ideal’ 
example of a debating parliament is arguably the British House of Commons, with the Nordic 
parliaments constituting typical cases of working parliaments (Arter 1984, 1999: 211-217; 
Bergman and Strøm eds. 2011).  
H1: Debating vs. working parliaments: the more the parliament resembles a debating 
legislature, the more we expect parliament to fulfil its communication function through 
plenary debates. 
It is plausible, however, to argue that participation in EU governance has contributed to all 
national parliaments becoming more committee-based. After all, all national parliaments 
have established one or more European Affairs Committees (EAC) for coordinating 
parliamentary work in EU affairs, and the specialised standing committees are becoming 
more regularly involved in EU matters in many parliaments. But parliaments differ with 
regard to the degree to which they have delegated EU affairs to committees. While in some 
parliaments the EAC (or the standing committees) regularly act on behalf of the whole 
parliament, for example when issuing resolutions on EU documents or mandating the 
government, others require or at least permit a vote on the floor of the house and thus the 
involvement of the plenary – even if this does not always include a debate.  
H2: Delegation to committees: the more EU affairs have been delegated to committees, the 
less we expect parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates.  
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This leads us to a third institutional factor. Even if the bulk of parliamentary work in EU affairs 
takes place in Committees, plenary debates may still take place, for example based on 
motions on EU documents, interpellations, topical hours etc. Thus, another factor is the 
ability of backbenchers to influence the parliamentary agenda, i.e. to initiate debates on EU 
issues. The easier it is for single MPs or groups of MPs to put EU issues on the plenary 
agenda, the more plenary debates we can expect. This is especially the case regarding 
opposition rights. In parliamentary systems of government, public assessment and criticism 
of the government’s actions is mainly the responsibility of the opposition, while we can hardly 
expect the majority party or parties to have a great incentive to engage in publicly 
scrutinising and much less criticising the government (Auel 2007).  
H3: Backbench Agenda Control: the greater the ability of backbenchers (and the opposition 
in particular) to influence the parliamentary agenda in EU affairs, the more we expect 
parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates. 
2.2 Party Strategic Factors 
Institutional factors, however, only provide or constrain opportunities for parliamentary 
activities. Whether these opportunities are actually used also depends on party political 
incentives. As mentioned above, we therefore expect party-related factors to play a decisive 
role regarding whether parliaments (or MPs) will emphasise the communication function and 
thus have an impact on the importance of parliamentary debates in EU affairs.  
In general, one can assume that where EU issues are electorally salient, parties have to 
compete publicly over these issues to address the interests of their voters. This is even more 
the case, where public opinion is unsupportive or sceptical of EU integration. In this case, 
parties have to assure their voters that they will defend their national interests at the 
European level. However, these general assumptions have to be qualified as it may not 
always be in the interest of parties to politicise EU issues. Where parties are internally 
divided over EU issues, and/or considerably more supportive of EU integration than their 
voters, this may in fact impact negatively on their electoral success (Hooghe and Marks 
2009). For them, EU issues are thus more of a liability than an asset, and we can assume 
they will focus on traditional socio-economic issues in public debate. Eurosceptical parties, in 
contrast, and especially those on the ideological fringes, have an interest in politicising EU 
issues to broaden their voter base, because their position on the left/right dimension is likely 
to limit their potential voter pool (De Vries and Edwards 2009). This leads us to the 
formulation of the following hypotheses: 
H4: EU-scepticism in public opinion: the greater the electoral salience and the stronger the 
EU-scepticism in public opinion, the more we can expect parliaments to fulfil their 
communication function through plenary debates. 
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H5: Distance: the greater the distance between parties and their voters regarding their 
support for EU integration, the less we can expect parliaments to fulfil their communication 
function through plenary debates.  
H6: Internal cohesion: the less parties are internally cohesive regarding EU, the less we can 
expect parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates.  
H7: Presence of anti-EU parties: the greater the share of Eurosceptical parties, the more we 
can expect parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates. 
3. Data and Case Selection 
The hypotheses developed above should be seen as neither complementary nor as 
necessarily competing. Rather, we investigate what factors and in which combination have 
explanatory value with regard to the degree to which parliaments fulfil their communication 
function through public debates. We have therefore chosen the parliaments of four member 
states: Finland (Eduskunta), France (Assemblée Nationale), Germany (Bundestag), and the 
United Kingdom (House of Commons). The case selection is primarily explained by 
institutional and partisan variation, with the parliaments differing from one another in terms of 
parliamentary rules, EU scrutiny models, and party politics (see below). Given the low 
number of cases, and the fact that some of the variables, especially the institutional factors, 
are difficult to quantify in a consistent and comparable manner, we do not attempt a 
quantitative analysis, but rather follow a qualitative-interpretative approach.  
With regard to the dependent variable, our empirical analysis is based on two sets of data. 
First, we examine the parliamentary processing of three major EU issues – the European 
Arrest Warrant, the Services Directive, and the decisions to provide financial aid to Greece 
through the establishment of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism in May-June 
2010 (‘Cash for Greece’). All three issues were undoubtedly highly salient, both domestically 
and at the European level. We are particularly interested in the public debates in the four 
parliaments, but also analyse how the issues were overall processed by the legislatures. 
Parliamentary scrutiny of the three cases can be divided into two stages: scrutiny of the 
initial EU level decision and scrutiny of the domestic laws implementing the European 
decisions (which necessitated parliamentary approval). We examine both stages with the 
exception of the Services Directive where we focus on the processing of the proposal for the 
directive, which was far more important and contested than domestic implementation. In 
addition, transposition in the case of the Services Directive was achieved through changes to 
a multitude of domestic laws (or executive regulations without parliamentary involvement), 
which makes it almost impossible to distinguish between EU-related and domestic debates. 
Our second data consists of a longitudinal comparison of the share or amount of EU debates 
in the four parliaments as well as the issues debated in the plenary to gain insight into the 
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general importance of parliamentary debates in EU affairs. In this context, we also examine 
whether the parliaments hold debates about European Council meetings (either ex ante or 
ex post).  This choice is explained by the role of the European Council, which ‘functions as 
the principal agenda-setter, the ultimate arbiter in decision-making, and the motor behind 
European integration’ (van de Steeg 2010: 118). For both data sets, we used mainly 
information resources the four parliaments provide via the Internet.1  
3.1 Institutional and Party-Related Factors in Finland, France, Germany and the UK 
Regarding the institutional factors, we can observe significant variation between the four 
parliaments. The Eduskunta and the Bundestag can be considered ‘working parliaments’ due 
to the central role of committees, with MPs clearly focusing on legislative scrutiny behind the 
closed doors of the standing committees. The role of the plenary is more limited in both 
parliaments, but particularly so in the Eduskunta, where the government also exerts firm 
control over the plenary agenda (despite it being the Speaker’s Council that formally 
determines the agenda). In the Bundestag, in contrast, the plenary agenda is decided by the 
parliamentary party groups in the Council of Elders, and all groups (but no individual MPs) 
have the opportunity to put their issues on the agenda. In terms of policy influence, the 
Bundestag and Eduskunta are also arguably the strongest of the four legislatures. 
The ‘rationalised’ Assemblée Nationale (Huber 1996), in contrast, has traditionally been a 
weak legislature under the Constitution of the 5th Republic, with limited policy influence and 
firm government control of its agenda (Kerrouche 2006; Meny 1996; Grossman and Sauger 
2007). The effects of the constitutional and procedural constraints were summed up by 
Frears (1990: 33): ‘complete executive supremacy in the legislative process, severely limited 
opportunities for general debates criticizing government, virtually no opportunities for 
scrutinizing executive acts and making the executive give an account of them […] executive 
power is a little too immune from proper scrutiny.’ Recent amendments to the Constitution 
(2008) and the Parliamentary Standing Orders (2009)2 have strengthened the role of the 
Assemblée and its committees, but the long-term impact of these reforms is not yet clear. 
The House of Commons, finally, can be categorised as a true ‘debating parliament’, where 
the role of the plenary is central to parliamentary business, at least in domestic affairs, while 
committee work plays a less important role in legislation. In addition, the government is in 
firm control of the parliamentary agenda, giving backbenchers little opportunity to shape the 
agenda more regularly outside of adjournment debates, opposition days or the topical hours 
introduced in 2007.  
                                                     
1
 In addition, we carried out interviews with selected MPs and parliamentary civil servants in the four countries. We 
are particularly grateful to Graham Ziegner and Peter Saramo for their generous help regarding the House of 
Commons and the Eduskunta data. 
2
 For details see Assemblée Nationale (2009a). 
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The four legislatures also differ regarding government-opposition dynamics. In the working 
parliaments relations between parties in general and between government and opposition in 
particular are more consensual. Clearly, the Finnish and German polities are dominated by 
strong coalition cabinets, but in both parliaments cooperation between policy experts from all 
parties in the standing committees is fairly common. In EU politics, in particular, the 
government-opposition dimension in the Eduskunta, but also in the Bundestag, is not as 
significant in EU affairs as in domestic politics (Auel 2006; Raunio 2007). In addition, the 
opposition enjoys strong control rights including the right to co-decide the parliamentary 
agenda (in the Bundestag) or to introduce bills, amendments and motions. The British and 
French systems, on the other hand, are more adversarial, with the government-opposition 
cleavage more prominent in parliamentary work. At the same time, control rights of the 
opposition are less pronounced in both parliaments. This applies especially to the ‘tribal 
politics’ of the House of Commons, which usually rules out cooperation between the 
opposing parties.  
A similar pattern can be found in EU affairs, where the Eduskunta has the strongest scrutiny 
system of the four parliaments due to its mandating system, the broad involvement of the 
standing committees3 and the early involvement in the European legislative process 
(Jääskinen 2000; Raunio 2007). Delegation to the EAC is extensive: The Grand Committee 
(the EAC) is the only parliamentary body that can issue a mandate. Overall, the processing 
of EU matters in Finland has been characterised by consensus and pragmatism, with little if 
any (public) conflicts between the parties or between government and opposition. This is, 
however, less due to a broad cross-party consensus on EU affairs (see below), but rather to 
a coordination system designed to manufacture national unanimity or at least broad 
agreement, which can arguably be translated into additional influence in EU level bargaining 
(Johansson and Raunio 2010). 
The Bundestag is also considered as one of the more powerful parliaments in EU affairs 
(Auel 2006) due to the formal responsibility of the standing committees for all EU policies 
except ‘high politics’ issues, which are dealt with by the EAC. Resolutions of the Bundestag, 
which can be introduced by a committee or by a party group, have to be voted on in the 
plenary. According to Article 45 of the German Basic Law, the EAC can adopt a resolution on 
behalf of the plenary – either if specifically authorised by the Bundestag or as long as none 
of the standing committees disagree - but it makes only rare use of this right. Formally, the 
government is able to decide against the opinion of the Bundestag where important foreign 
or EU affairs are concerned, but it must report on the reasons why it had to deviate from the 
parliamentary resolution – in a plenary debate if so demanded.  
                                                     
3
 The designated standing committees have an obligation to report to the EAC, but in less salient questions at least 
some committees just indicate their position briefly in the minutes of the committee meeting (for example, that the 
committee agrees with the government position) (Eduskunta 2010: 30). 
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The Assemblée Nationale, in contrast, is categorised as having a weaker EU scrutiny 
system, at least with regard to parliamentary influence (Nuttens and Sicard 2000: 61; 
Szukala and Rozenberg 2001: 229; Grossmann and Sauger 2007). The EAC is the main 
forum for EU affairs, but resolutions (proposed by the EAC or individual MPs) require the 
involvement of the Assemblée. The EAC can only formulate a proposal for a resolution, 
which then has to be sent to one of the standing committees. They can adopt the proposal 
as is, amend or reject it, and their final motion for a resolution can then be put on the agenda 
of the Assemblée upon the request of a party group, a committee chair or the government. If 
no such request is made, the text adopted by the standing committee is considered final and 
transmitted to the government. Resolutions, however, are explicitly non-binding and 
considered as having less of a politically binding effect as well. Assemblée Nationale 
(2009b). 
The House of Commons is also considered as weaker when it comes to actual policy 
influence. European documents are first transferred to the permanent European Scrutiny 
Committee (ESC) whose task is to examine their legal and political importance. Important 
documents are then referred for debate to an ad hoc European Committee4 or to the plenary. 
In either case, resolutions require a final vote on the floor of the house, but where debates 
have taken place in a European Committee, the plenary usually votes without further debate. 
The process is also completely controlled by the government (House of Commons 2010a): it 
not only decides whether a document will be referred to a committee or the plenary, it also 
formulates and puts down the final motion for the resolution in the plenary without having to 
take into account the view of the European Committee.  
Finally, the four parliaments also differ with regard to the party related factors. We base our 
assessment on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 and the European Election Studies 
(EES) 2004/2009 as well as the comparative project of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) who 
distinguish between three broad types of contestation: limited, open and constrained. The 
Chapel Hill data measures party positions and internal party dissent on EU as well as the 
salience of Europe for national parties, whereas the EES data is used to examine opinion 
congruence on the EU dimension between parties and their voters (see the appendix for 
details). 
According to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008: 351) ‘Germany provides perhaps the best 
paradigmatic example of a system of limited contestation’, with the main parties solidly 
supportive of further integration. Indeed, the German party system is overall the most pro-
European of the four countries with only one truly anti-European party, the Left List (formerly 
Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS). In addition, most parties experience little internal 
dissent over integration, the exception being again the Left List, curiously one of the very few 
                                                     
4
 Until 2005, the European Standing Committees had permanent memberships. Since then, a European Committee 
is appointed for each document referred for debate. 
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Eurosceptical parties in our sample not to be firmly united in their anti-EU stance. In 
Germany the gap between voters and their parties over EU is much smaller than in the other 
three countries. European issues also have a relatively low electoral salience, both for the 
parties and for public opinion, and ‘Europe’ has only rarely featured among the issues 
German citizens considered important (Auel 2006). Thus, overall Germany is still 
characterised by a relatively broad elite and public pro-European consensus, even though 
more recently first cracks have begun to appear.  In addition to the Left List, the Christian 
Social Union (CSU) has also adopted more cautious positions on Europe, not least 
concerning Germany’s contributions to the EU budget and enlargements.  
In the Finnish party system we also find a broad but less enthusiastic partisan consensus on 
the EU. Strong anti-EU sentiments have largely been confined to the The Finns (previously 
known as True Finns), which have significantly increased their support in recent elections. 
However, the Left Alliance as well as the Christian Democrats are also more neutral, if not to 
say lukewarm in their position on European integration. Yet as mentioned above partisan 
conflicts about integration are (intentionally) reduced through the consensual EU scrutiny 
system. As Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008: 352) point out, Finland is ‘an interesting case of 
limited contestation … conflict over the European issue is not absent and remains as a 
potential characteristic of party competition, but … the structures of Finnish politics limit its 
manifestation.’ Parties are also internally rather cohesive in their stance on European 
integration, with only the Centre Party and the Left Alliance experiencing some internal 
dissent. However, the commitment to integration, which prevails among the parties, is not 
shared to the same extent by the Finnish electorate, with a notable lack of congruence 
between the citizens and the political parties (Mattila and Raunio 2005, 2012). The opinion 
gap is most pronounced in the three largest parties: Centre, National Coalition, and the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP).  
In France, mainstream parties are also largely supportive of integration with anti-EU parties 
found mainly at the fringes, such as the Communist Party, the Front National and the 
Movement For France. European matters have, however, produced strong divisions in the 
main parties, especially in the Socialist Party and the Greens, but also in the centre-right 
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) (Bornschier and Lachat 2009). Opinion congruence 
between parties and their electorates over EU fell quite significantly between 2004 and 2009. 
However, the fluctuating nature of the party system together with highly contested 
referendums on Treaty amendments (1992, 2005) has contributed to Europe making 
occasional waves instead of constituting a permanently salient issue in domestic party 
politics. The same is true for public opinion. While the French public is in general pro-EU, 
anti-EU sentiment has occasionally flared up and made Europe much more salient. As 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008: 351-352) summarise: ‘despite Euroscepticism emerging 
throughout the party system, the dominant pro-European consensus means that it has not 
resulted in any of the major parties in the two blocks taking a consistently Eurosceptical 
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position, nor have European issues played a decisive role in determining domestic political 
outcomes.’  
The UK, finally, is the only clear case of open contestation, with Europe as an issue also 
causing severe internal divisions within the main parties. Euroscepticism is not confined to 
smaller parties at the fringes, such as UK Independence Party, but is also represented by the 
Conservative Party. And while competition over European issues now largely follows the 
pronounced confrontational two-party competition between the overall more pro-European 
New Labour and the Eurosceptic Conservatives, both large parties have been and still are 
internally divided over Europe. While the salience of European integration is not greater for 
British parties than for parties in the other member states (with the exception of the single 
issue UKIP), public opinion is traditionally rather sceptical of EU integration. The UK exhibits 
low levels of opinion congruence between parties and their supporters, with the British party 
system in fact having least opinion congruence in 2004 of all the EU member states. 
Particularly the Conservatives are out of tune with their electorate over integration. (Mattila 
and Raunio 2012) According to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008: 354-355) the ‘British case 
serves as the pre-eminent case of a party system in which Europe has featured as an issue 
of contestation and in which there has been a wide range of opinions on European 
integration …in terms of Euroscepticism, the UK has had it all: major party Euroscepticism, 
factional Euroscepticism within major parties, Euroscepticism within peripheral parties, 
Europe as an issue of importance in party politics, and single-issue Eurosceptical parties.’ 
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Table 1: Comparison of the Lower Houses of the Finnish, French, German, and UK 
Parliaments 
Parliament Parliamentary culture EU scrutiny system Party-related factors  
Eduskunta Working parliament: 
emphasis on legislative 
scrutiny in committees, 
firm control of 
government over 
plenary agenda 
Very strong scrutiny 
system, regular 
involvement of 
standing committees, 
extensive delegation: 
EAC acts on behalf of 
parliament (plenary 
cannot make 
decisions on 
mandate)  
Limited contestation (partly 
due to the consensual EU 
scrutiny model), small anti-
EU party, parties are 
internally divided over EU, 
larger opinion gap 
Assemblée 
Nationale 
(until 
2008/9) 
Until 2008/9: more 
debating than working 
parliament, more limited 
role for committees, 
almost complete 
government control 
over plenary agenda, 
weak opposition rights 
(until 2008/9) 
Weaker, regular 
involvement of 
standing committees, 
broad delegation: 
standing committees 
(but not EAC) can act 
on behalf of 
parliament, but any 
party group can 
request EU resolution 
be put on agenda 
Limited contestation, but 
main parties internally 
divided over EU, small 
anti-EU party, occasionally 
strong conflicts over EU 
issues, smaller opinion 
gap, but growing  
Bundestag Working parliament: 
emphasis on legislative 
scrutiny in committees, 
but parliament controls 
plenary agenda, strong 
opposition rights 
regarding agenda 
Moderately strong: 
standing committees 
have formal 
responsibility for EU 
policies, limited 
delegation: EAC can 
act on behalf of 
parliament under 
specific 
circumstances, but 
rarely does so  
Limited contestation: fairly 
solid pro-European 
consensus among the 
main parties, share of anti-
EU parties relatively small, 
parties are cohesive over 
EU, small opinion gap 
House of 
Commons 
Debating parliament: 
plenary in a central role, 
almost complete 
government control 
over the plenary 
agenda, weak 
opposition rights, main 
instrument: opposition 
days 
Emphasis on careful 
committee scrutiny of 
documents but weak 
influence, limited 
delegation: 
resolutions have to be 
voted on in the 
plenary, but usually 
without debate, 
process dominated by 
government 
Open contestation: strong 
Eurosceptic party, Europe 
features regularly in party 
competition and parties are 
internally divided over EU, 
large opinion gap 
 
The four parliaments and political systems thus exhibit significant variation regarding their 
institutional context or parliamentary cultures, EU scrutiny models, as well as electoral 
salience, public Euroscepticism and levels of party contestation over Europe (Table 1). At the 
same time we can see interesting similarities, especially concerning the increasing use 
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(except in the House of Commons) of standing committees in EU affairs. In the following 
sections, we test our hypotheses, with the next section examining our concrete cases (EAW, 
Services Directive, Cash for Greece) and the fifth section providing an overview of the share 
of EU debates in the four parliaments.   
4. Empirical Analysis of three EU issues 
4.1 European Arrest Warrant 
The European Arrest Warrant framework decision, adopted in June 2002, requires the 
judicial authorities of EU member states to recognise (with certain exceptions) requests for 
the surrender of a person made by the judicial authority of another member state. Through 
its principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions, the EAW hence brought to the fore the 
sensitive question about the division of competencies between the EU and its member 
countries, especially as the national criminal justice system has traditionally – but also very 
recently in the German Federal Court’s decision on the Lisbon Treaty – been considered a 
key area of statehood and sovereignty (Sievers 2008; Fichera 2009). Interestingly, however, 
the EAW did not produce much contestation in Finland, Germany or France, either in the 
society at large or in parliament.  
In the Eduskunta the EAW was not debated in the plenary at all. Two standing committees 
reported to the Grand Committee on the EAW, with the EAC basically just rubber-stamping 
the nearly unanimous opinion – only the The Finns recorded a dissenting opinion – of the 
committees without any real debate. The subsequent domestic law implementing the 
framework decision was again processed by two committees, with the plenary adopting the 
bill without debate.  
In France, the proposal for the EAW framework directive was dealt with in the EAC, which 
produced an information report and a favourable opinion, but did not deposit a proposition for 
a parliamentary resolution. As a result, there was no further deliberation in the standing 
committees or the plenary. The transposition of the framework directive into French law, 
however, made an amendment of the French Constitution necessary. Consequently, the 
constitutional amendment bill was introduced in a first reading in November 2002 and sent to 
three committees for further consideration. The Committees for Legal Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs and the EAC each produced a report in mid-December 2002, and the plenary debate 
took place on 17 December 2002. After the Senate had also ratified the amendment bill in 
early 2003, the final ratification took place on 17 March 2003 in the Congrès du Parlement 
(joint session of the two houses). The session included a statement of the minister of Justice 
on the EAW and the constitutional amendment, which was followed by a short debate in 
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which party representatives explained the motivations for their vote (‘explication des votes’). 
Only the Group Communists and Republicans voted against the bill.5   
In Germany, the Bundestag hardly noticed the Council framework decision of June 2002. 
The issue was transferred to two committees (EAC and Legal Affairs), which seem to have 
merely taken notice of the matter.6 The same is true for the first implementation bill: in the 
debate on 11 March 2004, only the MP from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) actually 
gave his speech, while the responsible MPs from the other four parties only submitted 
written statements which were added to the minutes. In the end the bill was approved 
unanimously despite the fact that some of the statements did express concerns about the 
framework. However, the Bundesrat vetoed the bill and called for the establishment of a 
mediation committee. After negotiations in the mediation committee failed, the Bundestag 
decided to treat the draft as an objection bill (Einspruchsgesetz), which enabled it to overrule 
the veto. The issue only became truly salient for the Bundestag when the Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) ruled the first transposition Act unconstitutional in July 2005. The 
renewed legislative process triggered two further debates: the first took place in January 
2006 based on a government report, which was followed by a plenary session in June 2006 
on the revised Act. However, both debates were rather short, and it is fair to say that if the 
Bundesrat had not exercised its veto and the FCC had not ruled the Act unconstitutional, the 
transposition would have happened almost unnoticed by parliament. When the framework 
decision was amended in 2009, on the initiative of – inter alia – Germany, the Bundestag 
again simply took notice of the decision in the committees without any further deliberation.  
In the UK, on the other hand, the EAW resulted in rather extensive debates, with both 
Eurosceptical and left-wing MPs criticizing the bill. Much of the debate focused on the 
differences between the common law system in the UK and the continental civil law systems. 
It had in fact been the Labour government that had initially suggested the principle of mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions as a way of preventing harmonisation in judicial matters. The 
ESC published three reports on the proposal for EAW, with the European Standing 
Committee B holding two public hearings with the minister responsible for the matter. In 
addition to committee deliberations, the plenary debated the domestic law, the Extradition 
bill, twice, with the second reading (9 December 2002) lasting around six hours and third 
reading (25 March 2003) over five hours. The parliament was very critical of the Extradition 
bill, with backbench Labour MPs demanding changes to the government’s proposal as well. 
                                                     
5
 Further transposition bills included a law on the adaptation of the justice system to development in crime (Loi n° 
2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité), which, however, 
concerned a large number of domestic changes unrelated to the EAW. This bill was extensively debated in May and 
November 2003, but in the debates the EAW was very rarely mentioned. 
6
 Since committee meetings are private, the parliamentary search engine does not give any information about the 
processing of the matter. Indeed, during the proceedings before the FCC, MP Kauder, the only speaker during the 
debate in March 2004, declared not to have been able to reconstruct the development of the framework decision 
(see the stenographic minutes of the proceedings in Schorkopf 2006: 43). 
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Parliamentary scrutiny of the domestic law EAW was stringent, with the Commons making 
several amendments to the bill (Sievers 2008: 117-118; House of Commons 2009a). 
4.2 Services Directive 
The Services Directive of 2006 aims at the removal of legal and administrative barriers to 
trade in the services sector. Thus it dealt with an issue of fundamental importance to 
Europeans, the delivery of public services, exposing a strong cleavage on the left-right 
dimension – or between regulators and liberals. Positions on the directive depended also on 
the goodness of fit between the existing domestic policies and the draft directive. Finland, 
France and Germany had in this sense more to lose, whereas the UK government was from 
the start more supportive of the proposal (Chang et al. 2010; Crespy and Gajewska 2010).  
The Eduskunta did not debate the directive in the plenary. This is highly interesting given the 
salience of the welfare state and the role of the public sector in providing public services. 
The directive did attract considerable media coverage throughout the Nordic EU countries, 
with especially left-wing parties and interest groups concerned about the impact of the 
directive on the Nordic welfare state model. None of the Finnish parties recommended that 
the directive should be debated in the plenary (the same applied to the EAW). The Services 
Directive was, however, discussed rather extensively in the committees, with seven standing 
committees (due to its horizontal nature the initiative belonged to the jurisdiction of several 
committees) reporting to the EAC, which in turn also debated the proposal quite thoroughly.  
In France parliament started to deal intensively with the directive in February 2005. The EAC 
deliberated the directive and published a report together with a proposition for a resolution in 
early February 2005. In addition, members of the Socialist Party (PS) submitted their own 
report and proposition for a resolution, which again triggered a third report and proposition 
for a resolution of the governing Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire, UMP) group. This report was nearly identical to the EAC report. The main 
difference between the EAC/UMP and the PS reports were the conclusions drawn: while the 
former demanded a thorough revision of the directive, the report by the socialists demanded 
its complete withdrawal. All three reports were subsequently sent to the Economic Affairs 
Committee, which adopted the EAC/UMP report and submitted the proposition for a 
resolution to the Assemblée. It was debated in mid-March 2005 in a very long plenary 
session, and the Assemblée finally adopted a rather critical resolution, which clearly stated 
that the parliament ‘considered the directive proposal to be unacceptable and resolutely 
demands its re-examination’.  
What raised the salience of the directive further is the fact that debates on the directive took 
place at the same time as the debates on the French referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty started to heat up. Not surprisingly, the left coalition against the Treaty used the 
directive in its campaign as the symbol for the social consequences of neo-liberal EU 
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policies (Crespy 2010: 10). March 2005, the month in which the Assemblée adopted the 
above-mentioned resolution against the directive, was the same month that also showed the 
first clear shift in public opinion against the Treaty. In 2006, the directive was again subject of 
a parliamentary debate. The group Communists and Republicans under Alain Bocquet 
submitted a report and proposition for a resolution, which was subsequently debated in a 
plenary session on 14 March 2006. The Communists severely criticised the government for 
not pursuing the concerns expressed by Assemblée a year earlier in the negotiations on the 
directive at the European level but rather ignoring the issue level as soon as the referendum 
had been over. In addition, the directive was one of the major topics in the June 2006 debate 
on the government’s European Council declaration. In both instances, the French left saw 
the referendum as a clear and binding verdict of the French people on neo-liberal policies in 
the EU in general and on the directive in particular.  
In the Bundestag, the first Commission draft on the Services Directive was merely taken note 
of in committee without further debate or report. It was only several months later and after 
massive protests by German trade unions that the Bundestag took notice of the issue. When 
in March 2005 the government submitted the first revised draft of the directive, it was 
subsequently sent to the Economic Affairs Committee (and 11 other committees in advisory 
capacity) for further deliberation. In late May 2005, the Economic Affairs Committee 
organised a first public hearing (with trade unions, employer associations and other interest 
groups and policy experts) on the issue, and in late June the committee issued its report and 
proposal for the parliamentary resolution, which was put on the plenary agenda for a short 
debate on the next day (30 June 2005). According to Crespy (2010: 11), the fact that the 
Bundestag did deal with the directive was mainly due to MP Siegrid Skarpelis-Sperk, a 
prominent left-wing figure in Social Democratic Party (SPD) and close to the services union 
federation Verdi. Skarpelis-Sperk was nominated as rapporteur for the directive in the 
Committee for Economic Affairs and was able to convince the main parties to ‘reopen’ the 
parliamentary process on the directive and to put it on the plenary agenda.  
Due to the summer recess and the general elections in September 2005, public debate on 
the directive reopened once the new grand coalition government had settled into office. In 
November 2005, the Left List had initiated a debate based on a major interpellation but since 
the interpellation was not put on the plenary agenda until December 2006, when the 
legislative process at the European level was finished, speakers from all parties merely 
submitted their statements to be added to the minutes. In January 2006, a larger debate took 
place on the basis of two opposition resolutions, which called for radical changes to (SPD-
Greens) and the complete rejection (Left List) of the directive, respectively. In addition, and 
as in France, several MPs used the opportunity of a government declaration on the 
European Council in March 2006 to discuss the directive. The final revised version of the 
directive, proposed in April 2006 by the Commission and adopted in December 2006, in 
contrast, was not subject of a debate. The Committee for Economic Affairs, however, 
organised a second public hearing in October 2006.  
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In the House of Commons the Services Directive enjoyed a much smoother passage than in 
the other three parliaments. The lack of any serious contestation is probably in large part 
explained by the above-mentioned domestic support for the proposal, with both the Labour 
government and the Conservatives in favour of the liberal draft Act. The ESC reported on the 
proposal four times, and while it did consider the directive as politically important the 
committee raised no serious concerns.7 Consequently, it did not recommend it for debate on 
the floor but in committee. The document was debated on 16 May 2006 (and thus far later 
than in the other three parliaments) in European Standing Committee B. During the meeting, 
which started with an evidence-taking session with the minister for trade, all parties 
expressed their support for the directive, but also their disappointment at the watering down 
of the first directive proposal. The directive was not debated on the floor, with the plenary 
'taking note' of the matter (deciding without debate) on 22 May 2006. 
4.3 Cash for Greece 
In what we have somewhat disrespectfully termed ‘Cash for Greece’ decisions, the Eurozone 
countries agreed in late spring 2010 to bail Greece out of its near-bankruptcy and to set up 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism.8  The total amount of the loan was 110 
billion Euros, with the Eurozone countries covering 80 billion and the International Monetary 
Fund 30 billion Euros. Germany (22.4 billion) and France (16.8 billion) were the largest 
lenders, with Finland contributing 1.5 billion Euros. The loan package was obviously a major 
financial and political commitment from the Euro countries. Considering the large sums 
involved, it is not surprising that the Greek crisis provoked throughout Europe serious 
debates about the fate of single currency, European identity and the solidarity of EU 
countries. As the UK is not in the single currency area, it did not take part in the specific 
rescue operation by lending money to Greece. However, given the salience of the Euro 
debate in the UK and the fact that – until 2013 – all EU member states including the non-
Euro countries, take part in the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (though not the 
financially far more important European Financial Stability Facility), it is well worth including 
the House of Commons in this case study as well.  
                                                     
7
 ‘As we noted previously, this is a proposal which could be of significant benefit to UK consumers and businesses’, 
Select Committee on European Scrutiny Third Report 2005, online at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmeuleg/38-iii/3803.htm, last accessed 18.03.2011. 
8
 In May 2010, the Council decided to establish (under Article 122(2) TFEU) a European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) for giving financial assistance to a member state in the form of loans or credit lines raised from 
capital markets or financial institutions guaranteed by the EU budget (up to 60 billion Euro). Additionally, a voluntary 
intergovernmental Special Purpose Vehicle, the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF), was established 
by and for Eurozone countries. The EFSF can issue bonds or other debt instruments on the market to raise funds 
(up to 440 billion Euros) needed to provide loans to Eurozone member states. The EFSF is to expire in June 2013. 
In late 2010, the European Council agreed to amend Article 136 TFEU in order to allow Eurozone member states to 
establish a permanent crisis mechanism — the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will replace both the 
EFSM and the EFSF after June 2013. 
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The financial aid package stimulated colourful debates in the Finnish, French and German 
legislatures. In Finland plenary involvement was obligatory for legal reasons, as lending 
money to Greece required an additional state budget and the establishment of the European 
Stabilization Mechanism necessitated the adoption of domestic laws. However, it is obvious 
that even without such legal imperatives the political pressure to hold debates was 
formidable. The Eduskunta debates were exceptionally colourful, with most of them lasting 
several hours each. It is fair to claim that no other EU matter has produced similar tensions 
in the chamber after Finland’s entry to EU and the Eurozone. In the debates, especially the 
more Eurosceptical parties (The Finns, Christian Democrats, Left Alliance) and the main 
opposition party, SDP, attacked the government, with the Social Democrats adopting a highly 
publicised position against lending money to Greece and the opposition parties in general 
voting against the aid measures.  
While the opposition parties, as well as a notable share of individual backbench MPs from 
governing parties, were clearly aggravated by the EU's response to the Greek crisis, it is 
clear that the debates were also strongly influenced by the upcoming Eduskunta elections 
scheduled for April 2011. The support of the SDP had, according to public opinion surveys, 
declined rather drastically, and this probably explains in part the aggressive strategy of the 
party. Many representatives also emphasized the problems involved in adopting such 
decisions with potentially significant long-term implications without sufficient time for proper 
parliamentary deliberations.9 But whatever the reasons behind party behaviour, the ‘Cash for 
Greece’ debates were in many ways the first time when the government really was forced to 
justify and defend its EU policies in the plenary – and when the opposition truly attacked the 
cabinet publicly over the handling of EU matters.10    
In the Assemblée Nationale, the budget revision necessary for the aid package was 
introduced rather early, on 21 April 2010, which gave parliament more time to deliberate the 
measures. The Committee for Economic Affairs, Finances and the Budget issued its report 
on 28 April 2010 and organised a hearing with the Minister for the Economy and the Minister 
for the Budged on 3 May. On the same day, the Assemblée debated the European financial 
stabilisation measures in one very long debate (5h 30 min) on the Revised 2010 Budgetary 
Act (‘projet de loi de finances rectificative pour 2010’) followed by final ratification in which 
party representatives explained the motivations for their votes in short statements. During 
the heated debate, strong criticism was expressed by MPs from the left wing groups 
                                                     
9
 Subsequently the issue became one of the main themes of the spring 2011 Eduskunta elections, this being the first 
time that European matters feature prominently in parliamentary elections. The opposition, led by the Left Alliance, 
also tabled an interpellation (VK 6/2010 vp) on government positions regarding the financial stabilization measures 
in March 2011. 
10
 In fact, a rare piece of drama was seen in the debates held on 9 March 2011 on the stabilization of the European 
economy when PM Mari Kiviniemi accused the opposition of ‘regrettable and unpatriotic behaviour’. The PM and the 
government also stressed that Finnish positions and bargaining strategies should be discussed in the EAC and not 
in the plenary (PTK 168 2010 vp).     
64 — Auel; Raunio / Debating the State of the Union? — I H S  
 
Democratic and Republican Left11 and Socialist, Radical, Citizen and Miscellaneous Left12, 
but in the end the Act was adopted with only the GDR voting against it. Four weeks later, on 
31 May and 1 June 2010, the Assemblée debated the measures regarding the European 
Stabilisation Mechanism. The debate was continued on the next day with short statements of 
group representatives outlining the motivations for their vote. The bill was supported by all 
groups except the Democratic and Republican Left and the New Centre.13 As in Germany 
(see below), the Assemblée was not involved in the European Financial Stability Facility 
Framework Agreement. 
In the Bundestag, the extensive parliamentary debates (almost nine hours in all) took place 
amidst heated discussions in the media14 as well as the public. The debates started on 5 
May 2010 with a declaration of the chancellor on the stabilisation measures and the special 
meeting of the Eurozone countries on 7 May, followed by a high-profile 90-minute debate 
with party group leaders as speakers. In addition, the first reading of the ‘Act on Financial 
Stability in the Monetary Union’ (Währungsunion-Finanzstabilitätsgesetz, WFStG), was 
introduced in first reading and transferred to the Budget Committee and several other 
committees, including the EAC as advisory committees. On the same day, the Budget 
Committee held a public hearing on the Act. The second long debate took place on 7 May 
2010. During the debates, all parties except the Left List supported the measures, but the 
government was severely criticised by the opposition for the late involvement of the 
Bundestag that now had to pass the measures under immense time pressure.  
Debates continued in mid-May (19 May 2010) with a declaration of the Chancellor on the 
measures to stabilise the Euro and the introduction of the Act on the European Stabilisation 
Mechanism. In addition, the Budget Committee held a second public hearing on the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism on the same day. A second debate (second and 
third reading of the Act) followed on 21 May. In this case, the government lacked the support 
of SPD and Greens who abstained in the final vote. In addition, six members of the 
governing coalition voted against the Act, among them CSU MP Gauweiler, who later filed a 
constitutional complaint against the Stabilisation Mechanism. Finally, in July conflicts arose 
in the Bundestag over the lack of parliamentary involvement regarding the European 
Financial Stabilisation Facility Framework Agreement of 7 June 2010. On 8 July, the Greens 
                                                     
11
 In the 13th legislative period, the parliamentary party group Democratic and Republican Left (Gauche démocrate 
et républicaine, GDR) consists of the MPs of the Communist Party, the Greens and further small left-wing parties. 
12
 In the 13th legislative period, the parliamentary party group Socialist, Radical, Citizen and Miscellaneous Left 
(Socialiste, radical, citoyen et divers gauche, SRC) consists of the MPs of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) as 
well as a number of smaller left-wing parties. 
13
 The New Centre (Nouveau Centre) is the main successor of the liberal Union for French Democracy (Union pour 
la Démocratie Française, UDF). 
14
 The mass tabloid BILD was especially hostile towards any financial help for Greece, famously demanding in early 
March 2010 that ‘if we have to help them with billions of Euro, they should give us something in return – for example 
some of their beautiful islands’. ‘Verkauft doch eure Inseln, ihr Pleite-Griechen ... und die Akropolis gleich mit!’, BILD 
4 March 2010, online at http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/wirtschaft/2010/03/04/pleite-griechen/regierung-athen-
sparen-verkauft-inseln-pleite-akropolis.html, last accessed 18.3.2011. 
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introduced a bill on the Agreement, which was delayed until the fall and voted down without 
debate in October 2010. 
In the House of Commons the situation was different as UK is not in the Eurozone. Hence 
the financial crisis touched the country less directly as Great Britain did not lend money to 
Greece. However, while the Greek bankruptcy and the problems facing the Euro were not 
debated as topics of their own, the issues did nonetheless surface in the plenary several 
times during spring and summer of 2010, for example in connection with debates on the 
European Council meetings held in March and June. The elections held on 6 May 2010 also 
complicated the situation as the Commons was dissolved on April 12 and returned to work 
only in late May. However, subsequently in late 2010 and early 2011 the European Stability 
Mechanism and more broadly the challenges facing Euro were debated quite extensively in 
the plenary and in the committees. Overall the tone of the debate has nonetheless been 
quite different given the partly ‘outsider’ status of the UK. In particular, the debate has not 
been characterised so much by a government-opposition cleavage as the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition did not need to justify its decisions to the same extent as the 
Finnish, French or German governments. Hence the debates have focused more on the 
overall effects of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and associated 
measures.15   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15
 This may be in part explained by the fact that it was the Labour government which agreed in May 2010 that the 
UK would take part through the EFSM in subsequent bail-outs. Hence the decision to lend money to Ireland, which 
also included a bilateral loan from the UK, was attacked and defended by both the opposition and governing party 
MPs. 
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Table 2: Parliamentary EU debates in the four parliaments (2002 – 2010) 
 
 
 
Eduskunta Assemblée Nationale German Bundestag 
House of 
Commons 
Overall 
share of 
EU 
debates 
 
 
Focus on high 
politics issues, 
EU laws have 
been debated 
only twice 
during EU 
membership, 
no debates on 
European 
Council 
2002-7: 30/577 
5.2% 
2007-2010: 32/467 
6.8% 
Focus on high 
politics issues, but 
also debates on 
EU laws, ex ante 
debates on 
European Council 
2002-5: 39/187 21% 
2005-9: 44/233 19% 
2009-10: 27/82 33% 
Both high politics 
and normal EU 
matters are debated, 
ex ante debates on 
European Council 
0,4 % of floor time 
(1997-2010) spent 
on EU documents, 
i.e. between 1 and 
4 debates per year 
Focus on high 
politics issues, but 
also debates on 
EU laws, rarely 
debates on 
European Council, 
short oral 
statement by PM   
EAW No plenary 
debate 
No debate on 
original framework 
decision, one long 
debate on const. 
amendment for 
transposition 
(17.12.2002), short 
debate in Congrès 
du Parlement 
(17.3.2003) 
No debate on 
original framework 
decision, committee 
simply took note. 
Three plenary 
debates on 
implementation Act: 
11.3.2004, 
25.1.2006, 
29.6.2006 
Two long plenary 
debates 
(9.12.2002, 
25.3.2003) 
Public hearings in 
European Standing 
Committee B 
(3.12.2001, 
10.12.2001) 
Services 
Directive 
No plenary 
debate 
No debate on initial 
proposal, later two 
plenary debates 
(15.3.2005, 
14.3.2006), also 
debated in several 
debates on 
broader issues 
 
No debate on initial 
proposal, later two 
debates 
(30.06.2005, 
26.1.2006), also 
debated in several 
debates on broader 
issues 
Two public hearings 
in Committee for 
Economic Affairs 
(30.5.2005, 
16.10.2006) 
No plenary debate 
Public hearing in 
European Standing 
Committee B 
(16.5.2006) 
‘Cash 
for 
Greece’ 
Several long 
debates 
(4.5.2010, 
12.5.2010, 
8.6.2010, 
16.6.2010, 
21.6.2010, 
23.6.2010, 
30.6.2010) 
Two long debates 
(3.5.2010, 
31.5.2010 followed 
by explanation of 
votes on 1.6.2010) 
 
 
Several long 
debates (5.5.2010, 
7.5.2010, 19.5.2010, 
21.5.2010) 
Two public hearings 
of Budget 
Committee 
(5.5.2010,19.5.2010) 
No actual debates, 
but the issue did 
surface in other 
debates 
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5. Overall Share of EU Debates 
Before proceeding to our analysis, it is necessary to emphasise that the four parliaments 
have rather different procedures regarding plenary involvement and how the role of plenary 
is recorded in parliamentary documents and search engines. For example, EU matters can 
officially be on the plenary agenda even if the full chamber only sends the proposal to a 
standing committee or approves it without debate or vote. Moreover, European matters are 
often introduced in parliaments as domestic bills (for example for the transposition of 
directives or other EU decisions), and hence these may not even be identifiable as EU 
debates. In the Bundestag and the Assemblée it is relatively straightforward to calculate the 
share of EU debates. Both parliaments provide a list of what they regard as their ‘EU 
debates’ on their websites for the last three legislative periods. And while these may not 
include all debates that have an EU focus, one can argue that these are the debates both 
parliaments advertise as their important debates on European issues. Yet given the 
differences in terms of number of sessions per year, the number of issues debated per 
session and in the length of the debates for each topic, it is almost impossible to calculate 
the precise share of EU debates out of all debates. In the case of Germany and France we 
therefore resorted to calculating the share of plenary days with a major EU debate out of all 
plenary days. Both the Eduskunta and the House of Commons, in contrast, do not provide 
such information on their websites, and identifying EU debates would require going manually 
through the minutes of all plenary sessions.16 Hence the analysis of Finland and the UK is 
based on multiple sources of parliamentary documents as explained in the text. 
5.1 Finland 
In the Eduskunta, plenary involvement in European matters has so far been limited. While 
data problems do not allow us to calculate the percentage of EU debates out of all debates, 
analysis of plenary records between 1995 and 2011 shows that the share of European 
debates has been very small, and most likely below that found in the Assemblée and House 
of Commons (see below). Debates have almost exclusively focused on ‘high politics’ matters 
such as Treaty amendments, Finland’s EU presidencies, single currency, and security and 
defence policy. The Eduskunta does not debate annual EU budgets or European Council 
meetings, with the latter on the plenary agenda basically only when the European Council 
has convened to amend the Treaties. Proposals for European laws have only twice featured 
on plenary agenda, in 2008 when three EU draft acts dealing with energy and environmental 
policies were debated in the same plenary session (the debate preceded the European 
Council meeting that discussed the proposals), and in late 2010 when the chamber debated 
the Commission’s legislative package for strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact. 
                                                     
16
 Both have a search engine that allows for the search according to specific key words (such as European Arrest 
Warrant), but without going through the debates manually it is impossible to distinguish between debates on the 
issue and debates where the key word was simply mentioned in the context of the debate on a different matter. 
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5.2 France 
In the Assemblée topics are usually debated only once, but in rather long sessions. The 
share of ‘European’ debates has averaged 5-7 % of all debates between 2002 and 2010 . In 
particular, plenary debates on parliamentary resolutions have decreased over the years: the 
Assemblée adopted 74 resolutions in the 10th, 51 in the 11th, 41 in the 12th and 32 
resolutions in the current 13th legislative period. Of these, only 33 were debated in the 
plenary during the 10th, 8 during the 11th, 6 during the 12th and 2 (both by individual MPs) 
during the 13th legislative term (Assemblée Nationale 2010). In France, EU debates have 
largely focused on ‘high politics’ matters, but also select European laws (including annual 
debates on the EU budget) are debated on the floor. European Council meetings are 
debated ex ante in the plenary. 
5.3 Germany 
In the Bundestag, issues are often debated several times, for example in a short debate 
before and a longer debate after the committee stage. At the same time, debates are usually 
shorter than in the other parliaments, between 30 minutes and two hours, which allows the 
Bundestag to deal with more issues. Approximately 20 % of the debates in the 2002-2005 
and 2005-2009 legislative periods were designated as ‘EU debates’, with the share reaching 
over 30 % in the current electoral term since 2009. The high number in the current term is 
partly due to a number of debates on legislation concerning the involvement of the 
Bundestag in EU affairs. Still, as indicated by this much higher share of European debates, 
the Bundestag plenary has debated EU laws and other ‘normal’ European matters more 
often than the other three parliaments. With very few exceptions, these debates also concern 
‘genuine’ EU-matters rather than domestic implementation laws. European Council meetings 
were debated ex post until the 15th legislative period, but since then the debates have been 
held before the meetings.  
5.4 United Kingdom 
The ESC has the right to recommend EU documents for plenary debate, but the government 
decides which topics are debated on the floor – and indeed sometimes the cabinet does not 
follow ESC’s recommendations. The number of documents recommended by the ESC for 
plenary debate varies, but since the 1997-98 session on average five documents per year 
have been considered salient enough by the ESC to warrant plenary debate. The highest 
figure has been 11 (2001-02, 2007-08) and the lowest one (1998-99). Between 2002 and 
2009, only between one and four documents were actually selected for a debate on the Floor 
(House of Commons 2009b). On average, 0,4% of annual plenary time was taken up by 
such matters between the 1997-98 and 2009-10 sessions (high of 1 % in 1997-98 and low of 
0,02 % in the 1999-2000 session). These EU affairs range from individual directives and 
policy questions (such as EAW) to the EU budget and broader questions such as economic 
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governance in the Union. It must be remembered that according to parliamentary standing 
orders these debates can only last for an hour and a half, with longer debates taking place 
only if agreed to by the government. However, this share does not include European matters 
that are debated in the plenary in the form of government bills (such as domestic 
transposition laws or Treaty reforms). Nor does the figure include so-called ‘opposition days’ 
during which the opposition can introduce debates on topics of its own choice. However, the 
opposition has only very occasionally wanted to debate EU issues during these sessions.17  
‘High politics’ European issues, are normally debated on the floor, with particularly Treaty 
amendments inspiring long debates in the chamber. Finally, the prime minister also gives an 
oral statement in plenary on European Council meetings (often both ex ante and ex post), 
but debates on the meetings are very rare. When all these various forms of European 
debates are combined, it seems that the share of floor time spent on EU matters is roughly 
similar to the situation in the Assemblée.   
To conclude, it must be emphasised that we have focused on actual plenary debates only – 
both regarding the three concrete cases and in our longitudinal analysis. All of the three 
cases, in particular the Services Directive and the decision to lend money to Greece, have 
also been mentioned or debated shortly in connection with other matters. This is especially 
true for the Greek crisis which surfaced repeatedly in subsequent debates on the financial 
crisis. These issues and other European matters also surface in oral parliamentary 
questions, but we have excluded them from analysis as question times typically contain a lot 
of questions from a broad range of policy areas. The impact of Europe or the EU framework 
also often features, or forms a part, of a question on a domestic matter. Hence it can be very 
difficult to separate EU issues from domestic matters, a topic that we shall return to in the 
concluding section.   
6. Concluding Discussion 
This article has compared parliamentary EU debates in four member states. The analysis 
has been guided by a number of hypotheses explaining variation between the legislatures 
with both domestic institutional and party-related factors. Our results provide support for our 
hypotheses, but we can also observe interesting deviations that deserve further research.  
Analysis of the three highly salient EU issues – EAW, Services Directive, and Cash for 
Greece – showed clear differences between the four parliaments. While all three issues were 
debated at some length in the Bundestag and the Assemblée, the Eduskunta only debated 
the financial loan to Greece in the chamber, while the House of Commons debated only the 
EAW. The loan to Greece, in particular, was the subject of heated debates, with Finnish, 
French and German MPs engaging in wide-ranging and colourful debates that touched on 
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 A list of Opposition Day debates since 1997 can be found at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/ 
commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03190.pdf, last accessed 19.3.2011. 
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fundamental questions about European identity and the future of integration. That the House 
of Commons did not debate the Cash for Greece decisions can be explained both with the 
limited involvement of the UK and the fact that the general elections took place precisely at 
the same time.  
As regards the general data on plenary EU debates, the Bundestag had by far the highest 
share of EU debates. It is also the only legislature where standard EU legislation and policy 
are often debated on the floor. European matters features far more rarely on the agendas of 
the Assemblée, the House of Commons and especially the Eduskunta. In the Assemblée and 
the House of Commons, select ‘normal’ EU issues are debated in the plenary, though very 
infrequently. In the Eduskunta, finally, essentially only ‘high politics’ EU matters are debated 
in the chamber, while normal EU policies are dealt with exclusively in committees.  
We believe that our results are primarily explained by party politics. Institutional factors do 
play a role, but only insofar as they serve either the interests of the government (especially in 
the UK) or the main party groups. In particular, our findings suggest that the general 
distinction between working and debating parliaments seems to have little explanatory value 
in EU affairs. This is especially true for the Bundestag, which is the most active when it 
comes to plenary debates on EU affairs, and the debating chamber House of Commons, 
which clearly emphasises committee work in EU affairs (see also Neuhold and de Ruiter 
2010). 
In Germany, parties are clearly more cohesive in their pro EU stance than parties in the three 
other countries, and given the rather broad support for European integration in the public, 
parties do not have to fear a serious electoral backlash due to anti-EU sentiments. In 
addition – and in contrast to the other parliaments – the government has a more limited 
control of the parliamentary agenda with all party groups, including the opposition, having the 
opportunity put their issues on the agenda. As the lists of EU debates in the Bundestag 
show, opposition motions feature prominently on the agenda. This does not, however, 
translate into heated party competition over EU issues given the overall broad support for 
integration. While parties differ on specific EU policies, all have an incentive to demonstrate 
that they are ‘good’ Europeans. Even the Left List, the only Eurosceptic party in the 
Bundestag, is not united in its opposition. Hence in the Bundestag both the government and 
the main parties have less reason not to debate EU policies in the plenary, and both 
government and opposition groups use the opportunities to put EU issues on the agenda. 
In the other three parliaments, party politics clearly work against a politicisation of EU issues 
through plenary debates. This is especially the case in the House of Commons where the 
Labour government had few incentives to politicise EU affairs. This was not only due to their 
internal division over Europe potentially triggering criticism from their own backbenchers, but 
also because public debates would have given the Eurosceptical Conservatives the 
opportunity to accuse the government publicly of ‘selling out to Europe’ and to score points 
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with the Eurosceptic public and media. It is therefore hardly astonishing that British 
governments prefers to ‘park’ EU issues in the European Committees whose 
recommendations and opinions the governments can also safely ignore. While the European 
Committees meet in public, it is obvious that similar criticism in the plenary would attract 
much more (media) attention that might cause serious problems for the cabinet. Thus, in the 
UK, the Labour government used its firm control over the agenda to keep EU issues out of 
the plenary. And considering the internal splits of the Conservatives, even the main 
opposition party had fewer incentives to engage in public debates about Europe. It will be 
interesting to see whether this changes under the current Conservative-Liberal Democrats 
coalition. The very high level of internal dissent in the Conservatives over the EU and the 
fact that conservative EU-sceptics and the pro-EU Liberals have to work together, however, 
lead us to believe that great changes are unlikely. 
In the Assemblée, proposals for resolutions can be put on the agenda by party groups, and 
government control of the plenary agenda is therefore somewhat less tight in EU than in 
domestic affairs. Reasons for the small share of EU debates thus lie not only with the 
governing parties but also with the opposition. Here, the internal divisions of the main parties 
over the Europe also provide a strong disincentive to politicise EU issues. This is especially 
the case for the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party, which is characterised by severe 
internal dissent over EU. In addition, the gap in support for European integration between the 
parties and the public has widened over the last years. Thus, even though in opposition, the 
Socialist Party may have little to gain from initiating public debates outside of their traditional 
issues which also touch French voters’ sensitivities regarding neo-liberal EU policies such as 
the Services Directive. Expressing their position on EU affairs is generally difficult for the 
Socialists, which have been accused of both selling out socialist values to an increasingly 
neo-liberal Europe or of getting into bed with anti-EU extremists. The two anti-EU right wing 
parties, the Front National and the Movement for France, finally, have little direct influence 
on the plenary agenda, although they do, of course, influence the French debate on the EU. 
While the Front National is not represented in the Assemblée at all, the Movement for France 
has currently only 2 MPs, which leaves the small Democratic and Republican Left as the 
only united Eurosceptic parliamentary party group in parliament. 
The share of EU debates is lowest in Finland. Here, institutional factors do play a larger role 
since according to the constitution the plenary can debate EU matters but is not entitled to 
take decisions on such issues (with the exception of those questions that specifically require 
parliamentary ratification). This contributes to the Eduskunta essentially only debating ‘high 
politics’ EU matters in the chamber. The Eduskunta is also exceptional as it is the only 
parliament where European Council meetings are never debated on the floor. Plenary 
debates are thus less attractive, as Finnish MPs clearly do not like to just ‘talk’ about matters 
– regardless of whether they are domestic or European issues. However, the decision to 
delegate EU affairs almost completely to the EAC and other committees is, of course, an 
intentional decision of political parties who have designed a scrutiny system for EU affairs 
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which aims at the effective scrutiny of the government and is geared towards achieving a 
broad domestic consensus behind closed doors rather than making EU affairs a matter of 
public party competition.18 One of the reasons is that for a smaller EU member state 
speaking with a strong and united national voice at the European level (arguably) 
strengthens their bargaining position at the European level – which is less of a worry for the 
other three more powerful member states. In addition, parties are not only internally divided 
over Europe, the gap in opinion between the parties and their voters also presents a problem 
especially for the main pro-EU parties.  
Our findings are also interesting in terms of evaluating the involvement of domestic 
legislatures in EU affairs. The powerful Finnish EU scrutiny model, based on the famous 
mandating model of the Danish Folketinget and adopted by many of the newer member 
states, performs clearly worst in our comparison. The Eduskunta is actively involved in EU 
affairs, but essentially all of this involvement takes place behind closed doors. The 
Eduskunta has argued that the confidentiality of committee deliberations facilitates 
government accountability, but it also means that the electorate receives very little 
information about European matters.19 Considering the limited role of plenary debates in 
European matters, citizens and the media have – beyond access to documents – hardly any 
possibilities to follow parliamentary activities in EU affairs. Although the Assemblée Nationale 
and the House of Commons did not fare that much better with regard to plenary debates on 
EU issues, both provide at least much better access to committee meetings and information. 
Although the Eduskunta is the only parliament in our sample with a mandating system, which 
makes generalisations difficult, our findings do suggest that strong parliamentary influence 
and a system geared towards mandating the government’s negotiations position may come 
at a cost regarding transparency. 
However, perhaps the most important result of this article concerns the methodological 
difficulties involved in separating EU affairs from other matters handled by national 
parliaments. While certain matters such as Treaty amendments, the EU’s budget and other 
laws can be categorised rather easily as European issues, more typical are cases where EU 
and domestic spheres become so intertwined that ‘isolating’ the EU dimension is very 
challenging. This applies particularly to policy-related questions (e.g., agriculture, economy, 
environment), regardless of whether the matter is of European or national origin. Not only 
does an increasing share of matters formally decided at the national level have a European 
                                                     
18
 Interestingly, when Finnish and Swedish MPs were asked in a survey carried out in 2001/2002 who should have 
influence in domestic EU decision-making, Swedish MPs placed the electorate in second place (together with the 
cabinet) after the parliament, whereas Finnish MPs placed the electorate in the eighth position after the various 
national political institutions (Ahlbäck Öberg & Jungar 2009). 
19
 This lack of openness was noted by a visiting delegation from the House of Commons. According to Matthew Kirk, 
the UK ambassador to Finland, the visitors had been particularly struck by the strong consensus among Finnish 
politicians, the broad cooperation between the government and the opposition in EU affairs, and the fact that in an 
otherwise transparent society such a high share of parliamentary work is conducted behind closed doors. See 
Annamari Sipilä, ’Suomen eduskunta antoi briteille mallia EU-asioiden käsittelyssä’, Helsingin Sanomat 23.3.2005. 
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dimension, but also debates on EU laws or European level processes can be dominated by 
domestic issues. This was certainly the case in each of the four parliaments analysed in this 
article – and there is no good reason to expect the situation to be any different in the other 
member states. This interesting finding is also in line with multi-level governance theorizing 
according to which integrative Europe is characterised by growing inter-connectedness of 
national and EU agendas.  
Finally, as our study has been limited to four parliaments, we must also underline the 
preliminary nature of our findings. However, we believe that our results and the hypotheses 
informing our article can be utilized in subsequent research on other national legislatures. 
The picture painted by our limited investigation so far is rather bleak. Over the last two 
decades, parliamentary attention for EU issues has clearly increased, and national 
parliaments now also provide more information on EU politics and their own activities to their 
electorates, for example through the access to documents or minutes of committee 
meetings. While this may have increased the transparency of EU politics at the domestic 
level, it has not, however, led to a greater politicisation of EU politics or increased party 
competition over EU issues. On the contrary, the comparison suggests that plenary debates 
are more frequent only in the absence of party political conflict and Eurosceptic public 
opinion. While specific and very controversial EU topics and decisions are being debated, so 
far most parliaments do not live up to their task of bringing ‘Europe’ closer to the citizens or 
enabling them to make informed political (electoral) choices and to exercise democratic 
control on EU affairs.  
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7. Appendices 
7.1 Appendix 1 - Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 Data 
Country Party Position Pro-anti Salience Dissent 
Finland Social Democratic Party 6.17 3 2.75 2.80 
 National Coalition 6.67 3 3.25 1.03 
 Centre Party 5,75 3 2.75 5.00 
 Left Alliance 4.50 2 2.45 4.64 
 The Finns 1.64 1 3.64 .55 
 Swedish People's Party 6.33 3 2.91 1.73 
 Green League 5.67 3 2.82 3.09 
 Christian Democrats 4.00 2 2.27 2.73 
Germany Christian Democrats 6.36 3 3.00 1.90 
 Christian Social Union 5.36 3 2.73 2.80 
 Free Democrats 6.27 3 2.45 1.80 
 Social Democrats 6.00 3 2.55 2.60 
 The Greens 5.82 3 2.73 2.70 
 Left List/ PDS 3.27 1 2.00 3.86 
France Extreme Left 5.33 3 2.44 2.86 
 Communist Party  2.11 1 3.00 2.44 
 Socialist Party 5.00 3 3.11 8.67 
 The Greens 4.78 3 2.44 5.44 
 Union for the French Democracy 6.33 3 3.33 1.22 
 Union for a Popular Movement  5.67 3 2.67 4.00 
 Front National 1.00 1 3.22 .22 
 Movement for France 1.38 1 3.38 1.00 
UK Conservative Party 2.56 1 2.56 6.22 
 Labour Party 5.22 3 2.33 4.00 
 Liberal Democratic Party 6.22 3 3.00 1.89 
 Green Party 3.78 2 2.33 4.00 
 United Kingdom Independence 
Party 
1.00 1 4.00 1.44 
Position: overall orientation of party leadership towards EU integration from 1=strongly opposed to 
7=strongly in favour. Q1 in questionnaire: How would you describe the general position on European 
integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2006?. Pro-anti: recoding of position on 
trichotomous variable: 1=anti (3.5 or less), 2=neutral (3.51 – 4.5), 3=pro (greater than 4.51). Salience: 
relative salience of EU integration in the party’s public stance: 1=no, 2=little, 3=some, 4=great. Q2: 
Over the course of 2006, how important was the EU to the parties in their public stance? Dissent: party 
unity/dissent over European integration: from 0=completely united to 10=extremely divided. Q3: What 
about conflict or dissent within parties over European integration over the course of 2006? The CHES 
dataset is available online at: www.unc.edu/~hooghe. See also Hooghe et al. (2010). 
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7.2 Appendix 2 - European Election Survey 2004 / 2009 Data 
Country Party EES 2004 EES 2009 
Finland Social Democratic Party 1,68 1,46 
 National Coalition 1,76 1,89 
 Centre Party 1,53 1,95 
 Left Alliance 0,75 0,01 
 The Finns 0 0,32 
 Swedish People's Party 1,01 0,45 
 Green League 0,44 0,9 
 Christian Democrats 1,4 1,19 
Germany Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) 0,97 (CDU), 1,23 (CSU) 1,48 
 Social Democrats 0,36 0,55 
 Free Democrats -0,48 0,65 
 The Greens 0,68 0,34 
 PDS / The Left List -1,53 0.84 
France Extreme Left  0,05 
 Communist Party 0,1  
 Socialist Party 0,64 0,7 
 The Greens 0,35 1,24 
 Democratic Movement  2,87 
 Union for the French Democracy 0,55  
 Union for a Popular Movement 1,13 1,31 
 Movement for France 0,08  
 Front National 0,42  
UK Conservative Party 2,29 2,28 
 Labour Party 0,94 1,34 
 Liberal Democratic Party 0,98 1,3 
 Green Party  0,14 
Respondents were asked to place both themselves and the parties in their respective countries on the 
EU dimension, which was operationalised in the questionnaires as a 1–10 scale measuring 
respondents’ attitudes towards European unification. The exact wording of the question was: ‘Some 
say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your 
opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point scale. On this scale, 1 means unification “has 
already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best 
describes your position?’ This question was followed by several questions where the respondents were 
asked to indicate, using the same scale, where the main parties of their countries were located. The 
entries in the table report the difference between the average party position and the average voter 
position per party. Positive values indicate that parties have more pro-integration stances than their 
voters. For details, see Mattila and Raunio (2012). 
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Competition in Italy and Spain (1986-2006) 
Fabio García Lupato 
 
Abstract 
The EU's influence, pressure for adaptation exercised on domestic political 
institutions and actors, has been studied in different and complementary ways. 
Regarding political parties and party competition, the analyses have been mainly 
centred on electoral competition, while studies on parliaments have focused more 
on institutional adaptation, the development of European committees and other 
control mechanisms. However, in addition to this more technical role, parliament 
also plays an important role as an institution for debating political and policy 
alternatives. The relevance of the parliamentary arena is even more important 
when dealing with the EU and how parties and leaders ‘domesticate’ and use 
European opportunities and constraints. The increasing European competences 
and their growing relevance for an increasing number of policy domains means 
that references to EU's processes and decisions have become almost unavoidable 
for presenting coherent and feasible political and policy proposals, which is a 
crucial and distinctive aspect of the parliamentary arena.  
In this article, rather than focusing on specific European issues (such as treaty 
ratifications or government conclusions on Council meetings) the analysis will be 
centred on general policy debates analysing the role that the EU plays in parties’ 
and leaders’ discourses. This approach can be useful in different ways. First, in 
contrast to elections, some parliamentary debates are held annually, which is 
crucial when dealing with a time sensitive issue such as integration and its policies. 
Second, strategies and issues may vary between the electoral and the 
parliamentary arena, where certain debates may be unavoidable and parties have 
to take a more or less clear position. Third, parties’ and leaders’ strategies may 
vary depending on their role on the system and whether they are in government, in 
opposition or supporting the incumbent party. Thus, political competition dynamics, 
the role of “Europe” on parties’ and leaders’ discourses and the way they 
conceptualise it vis-à-vis the citizens can be different than in electoral competition, 
providing us with new and complementary insights in the ways parties adapt and 
react to integration. The article therefore analyses the usages of “Europe” in 
parliamentary debates in the two largest Southern European countries Italy and 
Spain, including 13 parties/coalitions covering the whole political spectrum. Two 
broad and relevant types of debates have been selected, investiture debates and 
budget debates covering a long time span (1987-2006). The comparative research 
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design, analysing different parties and debates in a 20 year period, allows us to 
observe whether the EU is gaining importance over time (or not), the impact of 
Europe on parliamentary competition, the evolution of parties’ position towards the 
EU and, more generally, the consequences of integration for parties and citizens. 
1. Introduction 
The European Union’s (EU) influence, pressure or impact on domestic political institutions 
and actors has been studied in different and complementary ways. Regarding political 
parties and political competition, the analyses have normally been centred on the electoral 
arena, while studies on parliaments have focused more on institutional adaptation, the 
development of European committees and other control mechanisms. However, EU’s 
importance for political competition is not just restricted to elections, as parties also compete 
in the parliamentary arena. The Parliament’s role regarding the EU and its policies is not 
limited to the more technical scrutiny role within specific commissions or debates on 
European issues, as it plays an important part for understanding how the EU plays a role in 
domestic systems. For understanding the EU’s relevance we should move from specific and 
technical debates to those with a more general scope, especially debates with a high 
salience and impact on public opinion, normally broadcasted and with a wide newspaper 
coverage. The relevance of the parliamentary arena is even more important when analysing 
how parties and leaders internalise and use European opportunities and constraints. With 
the growing European competences, their “objective” relevance is increasing in a wider 
range of policy domains, which are becoming more communitarised. This implies that 
references to EU processes and decisions are almost unavoidable for presenting coherent 
and feasible proposals in almost all domestic policies. In contrast to elections, where parties 
can strategically downplay certain issues, the parliamentary arena does not, in many 
aspects, allow avoiding, crucial issues, especially if parties want to present feasible policy 
proposals.  
The aim of this article is to analyse the importance and usages parties make of the European 
context and its policies in parliamentary debates. To do so, this article is focused on the most 
important national-based debates for observing the relevance, usages and interiorisation of 
European opportunities and constraints in domestic political competition, Investiture and 
Budget debates. The former presents the government programme for the legislature, while 
the latter concerns what is probably the most important law approved by the Parliament each 
year and makes reference to economic policy. Both debates have a very high salience in 
public opinion and the media. Furthermore, as the scope is to analyse how parties internalise 
the EU and its policies and why they stress these during parliamentary debates, I will use a 
comparative research design analysing the two biggest Southern European countries, Italy 
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and Spain, and 11 parties over a broad time period (1986-2006)1. This research design 
allows both a synchronic and diachronic analysis and can provide a wide range of cases for 
analysing parties’ usage of Europe. 
The focus on the usages of Europe in parliamentary debates in two countries and for several 
different parties can provide us with new and alternate insights in the way parties stress the 
European issue, how they internalise it and why they do it. In addition, this focus helps us to 
understand the ways parties’ adapt and react to European integration and its consequences 
for domestic political competition. In undertaking such analysis, this article is structured as 
follows. The following section contains a brief account of the different theories for 
understanding the relation between European integration, domestic political competition and 
the role of national parliaments. Then, the case selection and methodology will be dealt with. 
Following this, the empirical analysis will be done in two steps, the first one focusing on the 
importance of Europe in both types of debates and the second on the usages of Europe. The 
final section discusses the findings and concludes. 
2. Political competition, parties and the EU: New insights from a different 
perspective  
Without denying the importance of elections, campaigns or manifestoes, parliamentary 
competition provides, in a certain way, a far more realistic, clear and constant position of 
political parties. Is more realistic because parties have to present and explain specific 
policies, to defend their ideas and position on issues that are sometimes impossible to 
downplay. Equally, as the debates almost always include a final vote, parties have to explain 
the direction of their vote in a clear way. Finally, this position has to be sustained over a 
certain period of time, being therefore more constant. Consequently, the analysis of the 
parliamentary arena provides different insights on how parties and leaders react to, 
interiorize and use Europe in domestic political competition. Moreover it can help to 
overcome some of the problems that arise if we just focus on the electoral arena. Notably, 
three main problems are important: declared salience, because parties emphasise positive 
and cohesive issues during elections; dissent, minimised within the party during campaigns; 
and timing, as elections are held only every four or five years, which is especially relevant in 
a time-sensitive issue such as European integration (Marks et al. 2007). The analysis of 
parliamentary competition helps to reduce these problems, and provides new perspectives 
for analysing the impact of, reaction to and interiorisation of Europe by political parties. 
In the analyses of Europeanisation of political competition, scholars have normally focused 
on direct impacts. However, this perspective implies certain limitations and some scholars 
have pointed out the existence of indirect impacts, such as the reduction of policy 
                                                     
1
 Contrary to elections, where, since 2001, parties are present under coalition labels presenting a unique electoral 
programme (Casa della Libertà and L’Ulivo), in the parliamentary arena each party has its own parliamentary group, 
helping to disentangle the different positions of each party of the coalition. 
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decidability or the disempowerment of election and voters (Mair 2001, Hix and Lord 2001, 
Bartolini 2005), but few empirical analyses have been conducted to demonstrate them. For 
the purpose of this article, the focus on indirect impacts is crucial and the notion of usage is 
fundamental. 
For analysing the usages of Europe, different theories and concepts need to be addressed. 
In the first place, the way the European environment is conceptualised is relevant. Normally, 
studies on Europeanisation tend to conceptualise European integration as a fixed and given 
exogenous environment. However, in this article this environment is assumed to be 
endogenous, that is, parties and leaders help to construct it for adapting the European 
context to match their values, strategies and preferences. The idea that parties help to shape 
their environment has been a matter of discussion between party politics scholars 
(Panebianco 1988; Deschouwer 1992; Harmel and Janda 1994). The nature of the 
environment in which parties operate is crucial when dealing with the consequences of 
European integration because, as some scholars have correctly argued, domestic 
institutional settings and context are essential to understanding how parties react to the 
external environment (Garret 1998; Rosamond 1999; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and 
Smith 2005). As Garret claimed in his analysis of the relationship between partisan politics 
and globalisation “one cannot accurately delineate the impact of market integration on the 
political economy of the industrial democracies by assuming that globalization has been a 
process that has affected all markets and all countries equally” (Garret 1998: 24). Indeed, 
domestic political actors can enact these external factors in different ways and use them for 
different means, shaping the environment in which they act.  This argument is consistent with 
the idea that European integration is not an external and uniform constraint for all Member 
States, and therefore “[t]he question of intentionality is here crucial. It is important, at the 
outset, that we differentiate between the internalization of a discourse of globalization as an 
accurate representation of the relevant ‘material’ constraints and the more intentional, 
reflexive and strategic choice of such a discourse as a convenient justification for policies 
pursued for altogether different reasons (Hay and Rosamond 2002:150, cursive in the 
original).  Again, domestic political actors can use these external factors in different ways 
and for different purposes. As Hay and Rosamond argue, in many EU countries, European 
integration acted as a substitute for Globalisation as the cause for ‘painful’ economic and 
social reforms. Consequently, the integration process is not an external and uniform context 
that affects all countries and all parties in the same way. Indeed, institutional, economic, 
social and cultural factors play a role in the conceptualisation of European opportunities and 
constraints. That is why “there is no single unifying discourse of globalisation and/or 
European integration; rather such notions are appealed to in different ways in different 
contexts. This highlights the need to map and compare the appeals to discourses of 
globalisation and European integration in different national settings” (Hay and Smith 2005: 
125). Thus, European integration cannot be considered as an objective and uncontested 
exogenous process.  
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This idea is relevant in understanding the importance of the usage political actors can make 
of perceived opportunities and constraints, making it necessary to turn our focus to the 
notion of usages. This concept derives from sociological institutionalism, because parties are 
actors and institutions that operate in the domestic political system. New institutionalism 
offers certain insights (Hall and Taylor 1996) but, with some limitations for explaining how, 
why and when parties internalise the new European polity as they deal more with continuity 
rather than change (Blyth 1997, 2002, Schmidt 2002). In this debate, some scholars turned 
to ideas for explaining change. In this sense, Schmidt considers that communication is the 
missing link because just with discourse alone, defined as “whatever policy actors say to one 
another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy programme” 
(Schmidt 2002:210), change is sometimes possible to explain. And, as discourse is 
elaborated within certain institutional patterns, she speaks of discursive institutionalism 
(Schmidt 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). It is in this sense, as argued above, that the 
notion of usage is crucial. Jacquot and Woll (2003: 4) define usage as "practices and political 
interactions which adjust and redefine themselves by seizing the European Union as a set of 
opportunities, be they institutional, ideological, political or organisational". It has to be 
intentional, they continue, because “whatever might be the nature of specific opportunity […] 
actors need to seize them in order to transform them into political practices. The whole 
process of transforming resources or constraints into political practices constitutes a usage” 
(ib: 4). So, to sum up, “political usage describes the mediation done by an actor to transform 
a material or immaterial resource provided by the European institutions into a political 
action”. (ib: 6).  
Finally, Jacquot and Woll (2003) elaborate a classification of usage according to their 
functionality: a) Strategic Usage, b) Cognitive Usage, and c) Legitimising Usage. The first 
type of usage, strategic, is the most common and implies the transformation of certain 
resources into political practices to pursue a specific and clearly identifiable goal. Cognitive 
usage is more related to public policy interpretation and persuasion and makes reference to 
the diffusion of ideas to understand and deliberate over certain policy issues. In this case, 
policy discussions may lead to the adoption or the rejection of new policy interpretations or 
definitions. The final type of usage, legitimising, is closely related to the political process and 
basically "the reference to Europe as a way of legitimising national public policies” (Jacquot 
and Woll 2003: 7). It is specifically used by governments to stress the opportunities and 
constraints derived from European integration (in similar ways as discussed by Rosamond 
1999; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005). Based on this definition and the 
different interpretation and perception of opportunities and constraints offered by the 
European context, some possible usages of Europe have been selected. Europe can be 
conceptualised as an incentive or constraint for action, for legitimising some policy options, 
for evaluating positively or negatively some European policies or simply for using Europe as 
a frame of reference to compare policy performance. Equally, and as European policy 
outcomes are not ideologically-neutral, different parties with different ideologies, in 
government or in opposition, may use Europe and its policies in different ways and, so, the 
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politicization of Europe and its policies can play a role in parliamentary competition. 
Therefore, is necessary to focus on political parties, their relation with European integration 
and their own competition strategies. 
According to Bartolini (2005), national political parties face serious challenges when dealing 
with European integration. On the one hand, with the growing visibility of the EU, anti-EU 
positions can be a common denominator in discontent parties. On the other hand, national 
parties and elites are less able to meet these new challenges posed by European integration 
than when the frame of reference was a clearly bounded national territory. Thus, some 
issues are no longer under national control. Domestic political elites are less proactive in 
dealing with integration issues and in incorporating them within their programmatic profiles 
and competition. Thus, they tend to collude and to neglect those issues that are not under 
national control (Bartolini 2005: 319-320). In this sense, Bartolini distinguishes four main 
models for analysing national parties’ attitudes towards the EU: a) The Geopolitical Model; b) 
The Institutional Model; c) The Partisan Model; and d) The Genetic Model. As he argues, all 
these models have some truth even if the partisan and genetic approaches are the ones 
used to explain the difficult relationship between national parties and European integration. 
The Geopolitical Model “assumes that support/opposition is mainly determined by national 
specific features or geopolitical interests”, including state formation, contestation of national 
unification, the existence of centre-periphery conflicts and different cultural factors. (Bartolini 
2005: 321). In this case, differences in support/opposition among national parties should be 
less significant than the differences across nations. Some clear examples support this 
approach, for instance Great Britain’s and France’s ‘national independence’ position, as well 
as  the generally supportive position of countries such as Germany or Italy due to their 
problematic national unification, and finally, Southern European countries’ support for 
integration due to their peripheral status.  
The Institutional Model “explains attitudes to the EU as a function of the parties being in 
government and opposition at the national (and therefore European) level” (Bartolini 2005: 
321). This model suggests that parties in government are generally more supportive of 
European integration than those in opposition, and that those parties, whether in government 
or in opposition, that belong to the EU-level coalition tend to be more supportive. An 
institutional factor can identify ‘pre-post’ membership attitudes or national alliance change of 
attitude while in government.  
The Partisan Model “interprets orientation to the EU of national parties on the basis of the 
main dimension of competition prevalent at the national level” (Bartolini 2005: 321), such as 
left-right, libertarian/authoritarian or materialist/post-materialist. In this model, in contrast to 
the geopolitical one, variation within a party family in different European countries should be 
reduced, while variation among different national parties’ families should be much higher.  
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Finally, the Genetic Model “interprets party orientation towards European integration as 
shaped by or related to their original national cleavage position. Mapping parties according 
to their genetic cleavage produces hypotheses about the level of internal tensions that the 
integration process creates within them” (Bartolini 2005:321). A strict Genetic Model 
approach starts from an objective definition of the main EU features (Centralisation, 
bureaucratisation, economicism/national regional independence, resistance to market 
economy and globalisation) and then relates them to domestic cleavages. The problem is 
clear: opposition lines that were historically bridged and integrated successfully at the 
national level by party organisations, may become the source of internal problems in relation 
to the integration process. This is because some combinations that are compatible at the 
national level (liberal pro-market non-urban or rural and right wing) are incompatible at the 
European level as pro-market is positive and rural negative in support towards European 
Integration (Bartolini: 324-325). 
For our purposes, Bartolini’s models can help us trace some important variables for our 
analysis, such as the relevance of domestic consensus on the benefits of EU’s membership, 
the relevance of government/opposition status or the importance of ideology for 
understanding the way parties conceptualise, internalise and use EU’s outcomes on 
parliamentary competition.  
Consequently, one last aspect has to be addressed, that of parties’ strategies. Shifting the 
focus on how parties compete stresses the relevance on how parties frame the European 
context with different cultural, institutional and ideological factors and how they adapt their 
strategies for their own purposes and goals. Normally, political competition is explained by 
theorising parties’ strategies at the electoral level. However, if we consider that parties 
compete in the parliamentary arena as well, we can also translate these strategies to this 
level. Firstly, it is useful to consider the distinction between vote-seeking, office-seeking, 
policy seeking and cohesion-seeking strategies and their relevance in the parliamentary 
arena (Strøm 1990; Steenbergen and Scott 2004).  Vote-seeking strategies consider that 
parties try to maximise their votes, and therefore we can assume that these parties follow the 
median voter theory and present broader (and, in some sense) less clearly ideological policy 
positions.  The second possible strategy, derived from coalition studies, considers parties’ 
aim to control office, rather than votes. The third focuses on those strategies aimed to 
maximise their effect on public policy and the fourth strategy, especially relevant for our 
purposes, comprises cohesion-seeking approaches. In this case, party leadership may 
downplay some issues to avoid party splits. Hence, the usage of Europe may be influenced 
by the strategy a party aims to pursue: if Europe or notably some policy outcomes are 
negative for a specific country or group (and leaders perceived constraints that may affect 
their domestic performance), the issue can be politicized by one party. Furthermore, Europe 
and its goals, especially in intense periods of integration building, can be a cohesive 
objective that helps to build political coalitions (as was the case, in Italy and Spain, with the 
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creation of the EMU and the launch of the Euro) or, conversely, a problem for intra-party or 
intra-coalition consensus.   
Secondly, another set of strategies is relevant when shifting to the European level whilst 
maintaining influence in the domestic one. In this sense, some scholars have adapted the 
notions of Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cotta 2005). The first and most drastic option is exit. 
While total exit has never occurred, partial exit from a specific policy or opting out from a new 
one is quite common and has its domestic benefits (keeping control of certain policy tools) 
even though some problems may be present. The second option available is Voice, which 
consists of defending domestic interests and claims at the European level and of trying to 
influence European policy outcomes in order to have favourable domestic effects. It can 
have some benefits, that are impossible to achieve at the national level, but also come with 
costs, as agreements may imply different trade-offs that can be used by domestic 
oppositions. The last option, Loyalty, instead of being a proper strategy, emphasises the 
relations between leaders and the EU. Loyalty strategies imply adopting European policies 
even if they do not represent domestic elites’ preferences, therefore demonstrating a high 
degree of pro-Europeanism even where the consequences may be negative. At the domestic 
level, these three strategies can produce different usages of Europe. If a party or leader 
follows an ‘exit’ strategy, they will demand to opt-out from a specific European policy 
emphasising constraints or negative effects for Europe. If parties use Voice, this implies a 
mixed account of positive as well as negative references.  Finally, if leaders follow a Loyalty 
strategy, they will use Europe for legitimating certain policy decisions at the domestic level, 
even if they have some possible negative consequences. 
From the previous discussion we can affirm that the interiorisation of the European 
environment relies on different, although interrelated, factors such as national 
characteristics, domestic institutional factors (government/opposition status; majority/minority 
relationship), the type of party system and the relationships within the system, especially the 
relevance of the predominant cleavage, the position of the party on the overall political 
system (mainstream/non-mainstream position), and internal party features such as ideology, 
party position towards European integration, party strategies and the role of leaders in 
adapting and constructing their discourse.  Hence, the European dimension can be 
subsumed in domestic political competition, allowing us to analyse the impacts of Europe, 
whether direct or indirect. Therefore, we can elaborate the following working hypotheses: 
H1. The EU’s importance and relevance in domestic debates should increase with time, due 
to the growing European policy competencies. In addition, European integration timing will 
be important.  
H1.1 The political and economic context, perceived differently by each country, 
should have an impact on the way European opportunities and constraints are 
perceived. In countries with high economic growth, European outcomes should be 
less contested than in countries with low or inexistent growth. 
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As hypothesised, the increasing EU’s competencies in growing policy domains make the 
European issue increasingly relevant for domestic politics. This rising importance is even 
more relevant due to the different political and economic contexts, making European 
incentives and constraints, different in each country. 
H2. Usages of Europe vary depending on the type of party. 
H2.1 Parties in government, that are also part of the European majority, present 
more positive usages than parties in opposition. In turn, opposition parties can 
present negative accounts of European developments and policies and use the EU 
as another tool for criticising the government. 
H2.2 Larger parties with vote-seeking strategies use Europe in a more positive way 
than smaller and policy seeking parties, who will use more negative accounts. 
Furthermore, in two mainly pro-European countries, larger parties tend to be pro-
European while smaller ones can present a more critical position on integration. 
H3. Indirect impacts: The EU, reduces policy decidability for those policies that are 
substantially communitarised. 
These hypotheses deal with the different incentives parties have for stressing European 
outcomes in a more positive or negative way such as institutional factors, ideology or 
position in the party system. 
3. Case Selection and Methodology 
Three aspects are especially relevant in this analysis: country, parties and debates selection. 
In this project, two countries, Italy and Spain, and eleven parties have been selected. 
This selection has been made for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Italy and Spain joined the EU 
in different periods. Italy was a founding member while Spain entered in the third 
enlargement round, and some scholars agree that the longer a country is an EU member, 
the more ‘Europeanised’ it should be (Pennings 2006). Secondly, their party systems are 
different, with diverse institutional settings, party system dynamics, and effective number of 
parties or degree of polarisation. Equally interesting, both countries experienced a 
reconstruction of their party system. On the one hand, Spain reconstructed and consolidated 
its party system after almost 40 years of authoritarian rule, while Italy suffered a major party 
system change in the beginning of the 1990s. In both cases, the European Union was 
already a developed political entity, and may have played a role in the redefinition the new 
parties’ policy priorities. Thirdly, Spain and Italy are the two biggest Southern European 
countries, with similar European interests and where Europe has been traditionally 
conceptualised as an opportunity for modernisation in order to overcome domestic 
constraints. However, over the past years and related to the growing policy competences of 
the EU, European integrations has started to become politicised, showing potentially 
negative effects and an end to the traditional permissive consensus, especially among 
parties and certain sectors of the electorate. Hence, unlike other major European countries, 
where the EU was already a contested issue, Spain and Italy’s problematisation may be 
88 — Garcia Lupato / Talking Europe, Using Europe — I H S  
 
starting now, as the consequences of further integration are increasingly perceived as 
negative by relevant sectors of society, resulting in greater incentives for some parties to 
politicise it. Therefore, change in the conceptualisation of the EU seems to be taking place. 
Finally, both countries differ regarding economic performance. Even though Italy and Spain 
faced serious constraints and pressures to adapt their economy to fulfil the Maastricht 
criteria, only Spain was successful, taking advantage of the new opportunities offered by the 
Single Market, while Italy seemed to be struggling with its adaptation, as statistics in 
economic growth and public debt control demonstrate2. This different success in their 
adaptation to European policies is also interesting for analysing the perceived consequences 
and usage of Europe in national political parties and competition. 
As mentioned above, party systems are different. To cover the broadest examples, different 
parties have been selected, including both government and opposition parties, vote- and 
policy-seeking ones and parties that represent the different cleavages at work, especially the 
ideological and centre-periphery ones and those with a different position towards integration 
including more Eurosceptic ones (see Table 1 below). Interestingly, whereas in Spain there 
are only one-party governments, in Italy the governments are supported by electoral 
coalitions that include both in their centre-right and centre-left governments, Eurosceptic 
parties. 
Finally, the selection of the debates is crucial. Taking into account the purpose of this article, 
two prominent types of debates have been selected. The first are Investiture debates, where 
the new government presents its political programme for the entire legislature.  The second 
are Budget debates, which produce the most important law approved each year as well as 
Economic policies that are increasingly influenced by the EU, notably by the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) ant the European Central Bank’s (ECB) role in monetary policy. 
Consequently, there is a possible reduction on the policy tools available for governments.  
Both debates are transversal, presenting a great number of political issues. Due to their 
relevance, interventions are usually made by the party leader. For this analysis, the first 
intervention of each party’s representative has been selected and, in the Italian case, the 
vote declaration of the most prominent political leaders. Each intervention comprises the unit 
of analysis and has been codified following a specific codebook that includes different 
variables. Due to the purpose of this article, the time span is also relevant. As we want to 
study the evolution and interiorisation of the EU and its policies, we have considered the 
Maastricht Treaty as a “critical juncture” in the process of European integration3. Hence, the 
selection of investiture debates starts in 1986 for Spain and 1987 for Italy, while the analysed 
Budget debates cover a period from 1990 to 2006.  
                                                     
2
 For example, Economic growth, measured by real GDP growth rate shows that in the period 1992-2007, Spanish 
mean growth was 3,24 while Italian was 1,41. Since the adoption of the Euro (1999) to 2007 the mean rate has 
been 3,74 and 1,46 for Spain and Italy respectively.   
3
 Scholars agree about the importance of the Maastricht treaty as a qualitative step forward in the integration 
process, with growing European competences in key policies (see Hix 2005: 20-21). However, some scholars 
consider the Single European Act as the critical point (Ladrech 2002: 393) 
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This leads to the final aspect regarding methodology. A specific codebook has been built to 
track down different usages of Europe in domestic debates. On the one hand, it provides 
structural information (party, year, government status, party family). On the other hand, the 
following specific variables and usages have been selected: a) Importance of Europe, that is, 
if Europe is important or not in each intervention; b) Impact of Europe on domestic politics, 
where specific European policy outcomes can be considered either as opportunities (with 
positive domestic consequences), constraints (with negative ones), mixed accounts, and no 
references; c) Domestic action, implying that the European context and debates can be 
conceived as incentives (for helping to foster domestic action), constraints (representing 
different limitations for domestic political action), mixed accounts or no references; d) 
Legitimation, with or without mention of Europe, that legitimises political action (or non-
action) or that shows the importance of implementing a certain policy; and e) Evaluation of 
European policies, where leaders evaluate European policies as either positive (stressing 
the benefits of certain EU’s policies for the country), negative (where the stress is related to 
the negative impacts of European policies for domestic interests), use mixed accounts or 
make no references.  
Table 1: Parties’ and Parliamentary Debates’ Selection 
PARTIES ITALY SPAIN 
Left Rifondazione Communista (RC) Izquierda Unida (IU) 
Centre-Left Democratici di Sinista (DS) Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE)  
Centre Democrazia Cristiana (DC), La 
Margherita 
 
Centre-Right Forza Italia (FI) Partido Popular (PP) 
Right Alleanza Nazionale (AN)  
Ethoregionalist Lega Nord (LN) Convergència i Unió (CIU), Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (number of debates analysed) 
Investiture 
Debates 
(Years) 
91 
(1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 
2004) 
30 
(1987, 1988,1989, 1991, 1992, 
1994, 1995, 1996, 1998,1999, 
2000, 2001, 2006) 
Budget 
Debates 
(years) 
108 
(yearly since 1990 to 2006) 
80 
(yearly since 1990 to 2006) 
 
To sum up, the selection of two countries, a wide range of parties and two prominent 
parliamentary debates, as well as a focus on usages and internalisation of European 
policies, can provide new insights into the role of Europe in domestic political competition 
and its effects on parties’ proposals, and shed more light on the relationship between the 
European and the national arena and the role of domestic parliamentary competition in this 
relationship. 
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5. The importance of Europe on Investiture and Budget Debates 
Before looking at the way in which parties’ and leaders’ use and internalise the European 
context, it is central to analyse the importance attributed to Europe, (understood in very 
broad terms including integration, policies, regulations, institutions such as the ECB, etc.), in 
leaders’ political discourse. Is it relevant or marginal? Furthermore, do all leaders stress it in 
the same way or do some relevant factors play a role, such as governmental status or 
timing?  
The following graph provides data on the relevance of Europe in domestic debates highlights 
certain factors: the difference between countries and debates, the relevance of governmental 
status and the importance of the timing of European integration.  
Graph 1: Importance of Europe in Investiture and Budget Debates4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the data, we can observe the varying importance of Europe depending on the 
country and the debates. Even though Italy joined the EU well before Spain, Europe is, 
generally speaking, more important in Spain than in Italy, especially regarding Investiture 
debates (in 40% of the Spanish interventions, Europe is important while it is important in only 
18% of the interventions in Italy) while regarding Budget Debates, the importance of Europe 
is similar in both countries (25% and 24% for Spain and Italy respectively). In the latter case, 
the difference can be due to the diverse nature of both debates. This is because European 
relevance is less stable in the more concrete economic domain, whereas opposition parties 
                                                     
4
 All the data, in this and the following graphs, present the percentage of interventions that are included in each 
category. 
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have a nationally based strategy, making the government itself responsible for possible 
dysfunctions, rather than blaming the EU or other international factors. This makes the EU’s 
issue less appealing for competition. However, while the importance of Europe is similar in 
Budget debates, it is very different during Investiture debates.  
Why is there this huge difference? In this case, we have to take into account certain 
systemic factors such as the type of party system and the way parliaments work. Regarding 
the party system, Spain can be conceptualised as an example of “imperfect” bipartisanship, 
with an electoral law that benefits the two largest parties, while in Italy the effective number 
of parties (both electoral and parliamentary) is much higher.5  Furthermore, certain aspects 
of the Spanish electoral law, especially the blocked-list system, grants great powers to the 
party in central office, making party cohesion almost “perfect”. Meanwhile, Italy, with its 
diverse electoral formulas (both majoritarian and proportional), open lists, weak 
institutionalised parties, parties splits, electoral coalitions but different parliamentary groups 
(with a de facto two party system, Bardi 2006), has less cohesive parties. Consequently, 
Spanish governments are stronger and more stable than Italian ones. Indeed, while Spanish 
governments tend to fulfil their terms or anticipate elections for strategic reasons6, Italy is 
probably one of the clearest examples of government instability. In the period under analysis 
(1987-2006), there have been 6 elections and 13 governments, including the all-time longest 
government (Berlusconi II, 2001-2006). So, governmental strength can be an important 
factor for explaining the importance of Europe in investiture debates. This is because Europe 
is much more relevant in debates held after elections than in those held in the middle of the 
legislature, after a governmental crisis. Why is this so? In the case of a new government 
being invested after winning the election, its electoral legitimacy marks the type of debate, 
and so can present a coherent and broad political programme for the entire legislature. In 
contrast, Investiture debates held after a political crisis are normally focused on the 
legitimacy of the specific government that does not have an explicit electoral support. In such 
cases, governmental and opposition parties face the debate in a different way and with 
different strategies and incentives. In the case of opposition parties, their interventions are 
focused more on systemic issues (the working of the political system) and on the 
governments’ legitimacy (government cohesion and other related issues). In Berlusconi’s 
words, after the 1998 centre-left new government led by D’Alema: 
(…) a government that births not from the votes but from the fear of the vote, does not have 
democratic legitimacy, and can be defined just as the usual cheat. ‘Cheat, again’ was the title of the 
Times. (Berlusconi 1998) 
 
                                                     
5
 The effective number of parliamentary parties in Spain goes from 2, 85 (in 1989 elections) to 2, 53 (in 2004 ones) 
while in Italy is stable around 5,77 (in the 1992 elections) to 5, 06 (in 2006 ones). Source, Michael Gallagher. 
Available at  ttp://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/EISystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf 
6
 Even with minority governments as it was the case in González IV (1993-1996), Aznar I (1996-2000), Rodríguez 
Zapatero I and II (2004-2008 and since 2008). 
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Hence, the importance of Europe diminishes, indeed it disappears in opposition parties 
(where Europe is important in 0% of their interventions) as their main focus is not on the 
government’s political programme but rather on its legitimacy and the necessity to call new 
elections. Consequently, European issues (among others) are completely downplayed in 
their interventions. However, while opposition parties tend to completely neglect the 
European issue when a new government is formed in the middle of the legislature, the 
incentives are different for the new government. As shown by the data, the importance of 
Europe in government interventions is higher in this situation, rising to 35%, compared with 
the mean importance of Europe in these debates (24%). How can we explain this increasing 
importance? Again, the incentives are different, and for governmental parties the EU 
legitimises their incumbency by providing different arguments for the need of a new 
government and their political programme. As D’Alema (DS) claimed in his programmatic 
declaration in the 1999 Investiture debate: 
I have never thought that the alternative advocated with strength by the opposition of Polo della 
Libertà, to call new elections, was inacceptable.  It is evident that, in the case that there was not a 
majority in this Parliament, it should have been compulsory. But in the current Italian situation it is 
not convenient. Not because of formal prejudices, but for concrete and substantial reasons, starting 
with a fundamental one: new elections, as it is known, would have prevented from approving a new 
Budget law […] with negative repercussions not just on our country’s image and credit but also, in a 
period in which the introduction of the Euro is approaching, for the concrete interests of millions of 
Italians. This fundamental worry […] has pushed for an alternative and political solution, as an act 
of responsibility towards our country and its interests. (D’Alema 1998: 7) 
So, current European developments, such as the creation of the Euro, create a structure of 
opportunity for the new government, as there is no time for calling elections and, indeed, a 
strong government is needed. This leads directly to governmental status, which is a second 
important factor for explaining Europe’s importance. Parties in government, both in Italy and 
Spain and in both debates, accord Europe a higher importance than opposition parties. This 
is due to different reasons. Notably, the incumbent Prime Minister presents the government’s 
political programme, and Europe is important in two ways. On the one hand, it is relevant as 
an issue per se, referring to the process of European integration.  As Felipe González 
claimed in his 1993 Investiture debate: 
“…the programmatic offer that I present is centered along four main axes: the first one, to overcome 
the economic crisis and to impulse the economy; the second, the democratic impulse; the third, the 
regional development; the fourth, foreign policy and the impulse towards the European Union”. 
(González 1993: 2) 
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This issue is common to all governmental parties, as European integration will be a relevant 
aspect of their government priorities. Equally, as I will show below, the EU, its policies and 
timing represent an opportunity for justifying domestic governmental action. For example, it 
helps to explain why Europe is indeed important in the Italian Prime Minister’s programmatic 
declaration after a governmental crisis, as it helps to justify the need for a new government 
and their political action for fulfilling European policies and deadlines, while opposition 
parties are merely focused on the new government’s lack of legitimacy, completely 
neglecting the European issue. Equally, governments benefit of their key role at the 
European level, having more information on key European policy debates, while opposition 
parties are less active and represented in key European institutions, such as the European 
Council, making their strategy and discourse more nationally based and consequently 
downplaying European importance. The Spanish case shows another interesting factor 
related to the fact that Spanish governments have always been a one-party government. In 
the case of minority governments, they rely on the external support of smaller parties, 
notably the ethnoregionalist ones (CIU and PNV) that supported, in different periods, both 
Socialist and Conservative governments. Indeed, it seems that Europe plays a key role in 
their support, both in Investiture and Budget debates (European issues are important in 43% 
and 40% of their interventions, respectively). It seems that the process of European 
integration has helped to construct stable governments and that Europe is used to justify that 
support. The analysis of usages will provide a more in-depth investigation of this possible 
“coalition-building effect”. 
A final important aspect is European integration timing. While elections are held every four or 
five years, Budget debates are held annually and so leaders’ reaction to European issues is 
quicker. In this case, the European integration’s timing is important for understanding its 
salience in domestic debates. The period under analysis was characterised by the approval 
and implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the adoption of the 
Euro. As a result of the Maastricht Treaty (1991-1993), governments faced the need to adapt 
and implement different reforms to comply with the so-called Maastricht criteria (on budget 
deficit, government deficit and inflation) and with a clear deadline of 1999. These reforms 
were difficult and unpopular in both countries, implying privatisations, public expenditure 
cuts, the “freezing” of public servants’ wages and other reforms affecting the welfare system. 
Thus, we should expect a high importance of Europe during the crucial years of EMU’s 
implementation, between 1994 and 1999. As Graph 1 shows, the importance of Europe in 
Budget debates is indeed higher in the 1994-1997 period (60% in Spain and 28% in Italy). 
The EMU played a key role, especially for governmental parties, as they had to implement 
difficult policies, not only due to European opportunities but also to constraints, in a short 
period of time. However, Spain and Italy differ in the importance attributed to Europe after 
the introduction of the Euro. While its saliency sharply declined in Spain (10% importance in 
the 2002-2005 period), in Italy its importance was sustained over time and even increased in 
the last period, almost to the levels of the crucial 1994-1997 years. What explains this 
divergence? In this case, we have to take into account the fact that the political context and, 
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notably, economic performance, vary greatly between both countries. While Spain was 
considered as a successful case in the adaptation to the Euro, which was accompanied by 
strong economic growth during the 1995-2007 period, the Italian economy was characterized 
by high public debt and slow economic growth7. Again, the opportunities and constraints 
posed by European policies did not affect the two countries (and its parties) in the same way. 
This helps to explain why the salience of the EMU issue declined in Spain, while it grew in 
Italy. Perception of political and economic constraints aroused not only opposition and 
minoritarian parties in Italy, but also governmental ones, as they were forced to accept 
suboptimal performances at the domestic level (Cotta 2005).  
In short, the importance of Europe in Investiture and Parliamentary debates relies on four 
factors: a) country; b) type of debate, c) governmental status; and d) timing of European 
integration. However, the analyses focusing only on the salience of Europe, shows some 
limitations. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the idea of usages. How do parties conceive 
European opportunities and constraints? Why do they conceptualise EU policies in a certain 
way? 
5. Using Europe in domestic debates  
For a deeper understanding of the EU’s influence on parliamentary and political competition 
at large, we have to turn to the idea of usages. What are the usages parties make of the 
European environment? Factors such as country, context and governmental status are 
obviously important, but other ones, such as ideology, come into play, because, as argued 
above, European opportunities and constraints do not affect all countries in the same way. 
Some European policies, like the EMU, are closer to some parties’ ideas than to others. 
Hence, the perception of opportunities, constraints, evaluation, and so on, should also be 
dependent on parties’ ideologies.  
5.1 A general overview: Positive or negative usages?  
As we have seen in the previous section, the importance of Europe depends on different 
factors. However, when it is important, what kind of conceptualisation do parties and leaders 
have of European opportunities and constraints? Is it positive or negative? Generally, we can 
observe that both countries present a clearly positive conceptualisation of the European 
arena and policies as fostering political action or as an incentive for the adoption of certain 
policies, both in Investiture and Budget debates. As we can see in Graph 2, usages of 
Europe are mainly positive, while we find fairly few negative accounts. Europe is 
conceptualised as an opportunity (67% and 63% of interventions in Investiture and Budget 
debates in Spain and 22% and 28% in Italy) rather than as a constraint (10% and 7% in 
                                                     
7
 Furthermore, ECB monetary policy, limited to inflation control, suited Spanish economic needs while penalized 
Italian need of economic growth with low inflation. See footnote 2 for GDP growth during and after Euro 
implementation. 
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Spain and 6% and 4% in Italy). In a similar way, Europe is internalised as an incentive for 
domestic political action (63% and 46% in Spain and 28% and 30% in Italy). Furthermore, 
the EU and its policies are conceived as a source to legitimise certain policy preferences in 
both Investiture and Budget debates (respectively, 60% and 50% in Spain and 34% and 31% 
in Italy). In addition, the evaluation of European policies at the domestic level is mainly 
positive (60% and 39% in Investiture and Budget debates in Spain and 22% and 17% in 
Italy), while a negative evaluation is still rare. Logically, due to the higher importance of 
Europe in the Spanish case, these usages are higher than in Italy. And not surprisingly, due 
to the pro-European position of most parties under analysis, the negative usages are less 
relevant. However, a more in-depth analysis qualifies this general picture, showing the 
increasing relevance of negative, and especially mixed, accounts on the effects of European 
policies on domestic competition. This is true for opposition parties, in particular, especially in 
Italy, where governmental parties are starting to criticise some European outcomes and 
limitations. Hence, we can see a loyalty strategy being partly transformed into one of voice. 
Graph 2: Impact and Domestic Action and Reaction to Europe8,9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
8
 The two categories do not sum 100%. For clarity in the presentation of the data, “Mixed” and “No Reference” 
categories have been omitted. Most of the missing data belong to the “No Reference” category. In just two cases (in 
Budget Debates - In Government in both Italy and Spain) the percentage the “Mixed” category is over 10%. 
9
 For Impact of Europe, the classification is Opportunity or Constraint. Meanwhile, for the usage of Domestic Action 
and Restriction, the classification is Incentive for Action and Restriction.   
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Graph 3: Europe as Legitimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.  Evaluation of European policies 
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5.2 Government Status and the perception of European opportunities 
Governmental parties place more stress on the opportunities derived from the EU (90% and 
27% in Investiture and Budget debates in Spain and 42% and 27% in Italy) and, even more 
interestingly, no negative perceptions are present (see Graph 2). This positive position is 
reinforced by the widespread use of Europe as a source for legitimising policy decisions. 
This is especially clear in the Spanish case (in Investiture and Budget debates, with 60% and 
50% respectively) and more so in governmental parties (100% of cases in Spain and 51% in 
Italy in Investiture debates), although we can observe an important difference regarding 
Budget debates (81% in Spain but just 41% in Italy). The logic seems clear. Governments 
are part of the European consensus participating with other European governments in 
specific negotiations in different Councils. Then those regulations approved at the EU level 
are subsequently adopted or inspire domestic ones. So, EU regulations are conceived as a 
positive impact, fostering domestic action with legitimating effects. Finally, governmental 
parties have more information on European issues, implying a better knowledge of European 
process than opposition parties (Raunio 2002). Consequently, it will be very difficult to vote a 
European law and then reject it at home. This would imply a lack of credibility both at the 
domestic as well as the European level. As a result, governmental parties pursue a loyalty 
strategy, reinforced by the widespread pro-European consensus in each country. Opposition 
to European regulations and consequences is mainly left to opposition parties. In both 
countries, these parties monopolise the negative perceptions of European outcomes. In 
Spain, a mere minority of interventions criticise the EU, however, while in Italy criticism is 
much more evident in both debates. Another interesting aspect is shown by the positive 
conceptualisation of Europe by external supporters to the Spanish governments, especially 
the PNV and CIU. Does Europe play a role in explaining these parties support of the 
government? Which parties criticise Europe and in what ways? And, even more importantly, 
are negative perceptions of Europe evolving from the politics of opposition to parties in 
government? In answering these questions, we have to focus on an analysis of each party. 
5.3 Parties’ ideology and position in the party system 
This poses the question of how Spanish and Italian parties use Europe? In the Spanish 
case, we can observe that all parties analysed, except the United Left, present positive 
usages and furthermore do not, with few exceptions, have negative usages. Whether in 
government, in opposition or acting as external supporters, negative accounts are not 
present. The two vote-seeking parties, PP and PSOE, are part of the European coalition and 
play an active role at the EU level. In both cases, Europe is used for legitimising their policy 
options and for stressing the positive impacts and incentives for action that European 
policies imply. Indeed, they do not present any negative perception of Europe, either in 
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government or opposition10. Moreover, they have been able to adapt their proposals 
(especially in economic policy) to make them coherent with European policies, facilitating 
their implementation and reducing potential stress between EU policies and their domestic 
proposals. Equally, CIU and PNV have played an active role in this implementation, acting as 
external supporters for the socialist and conservative governments11. As we can observe in 
our data, external supporters to the government (in our case, mostly CIU and PNV) show 
this positive position in our different usages12. The fear of Spain not being able to join the 
Euro helped the possibility of supporting the Socialist party, as the CIU did in the 1993-95 
period. In that last debate, the PSOE minority government was not able to get the new 
budget approved. The CIU speaker was clear: 
We understand, Mr. Minister, and we share your demands for 1996 not to be a lost year in the 
process towards the EMU. It is true that from this year depends, in a good measure, the fact that 
Spain may be able to join in 1999 the third phase of the Monetary Union. But, do you really think, 
Mr. Minister that you have to remind it to us that, for that powerful reason and against our 
parliamentary custom […] we have supported your Government’s budget during the last two years?  
(Molins 1995: 9522). 
Using similar terms, the PNV justified their support for the first Aznar government (1996-
2000): 
Facing this situation, no country that aims to be in the single currency in 1999 can allow to rule 
without a budget, nor bear the situation of incertitude that will provoke in the international markets 
this situation. Even if we consider that this budget law [...] can be improved, we think that political 
responsibility and the common good of all the citizens of this State demands an effort by political 
forces to give preference to this rather than partisan or strategic issues. (Zabalia Lezamiz 1996: 
1401). 
Therefore, the process towards the single currency downplayed parties’ strategic positioning 
in political competition. We can observe how parties took into account national interests, 
rather than mere partisan ones, when deciding to support minority governments in achieving 
political and governmental stability during this crucial period.  In this case, the positive 
position of both parties towards the EMU fostered this support. If we take into account their 
                                                     
10
 The data of parties in government reflect their position, as all Spanish governments have been single-party 
governments, both from the Socialists (1982-1996 and 2004-2008) and Conservatives (1996-2004) regardless they 
had an absolute majority or just a relative majority of seats. 
11
 CIU supported the Socialist government during the 1993-1995 period and CIU and PNV, with other minor parties, 
the conservative government in the 1996-2000 legislature. 
12For example, they conceptualise Europe, as external supporters to the government, as a positive impact in 
Investiture and Budget Debates (86% and 53% respectively), as an incentive for domestic action (86% and 67%), or 
evaluate, positively, European policies, 53% in budget debates (and no negative account) showing their positive 
stance on the EMU. As the PP and PSOE, they do not have almost any negative or mixed perception of European 
impacts. 
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positive stance towards this specific European policy, as shown in their budget interventions 
as external supporters (see Graph 4), the clear objectives stated by the Stability and Growth 
Pact along with the consequent reduction of policy instruments and manoeuvrability, it can 
be expected to lead to a collusion between parties on their economic policy proposals. This 
is clearer in the speaker interventions, such as that of the PP’s Minister of Economy Rodrigo 
Rato: 
[...] there is no doubt that we are all conscious that during the last year an important consensus has 
been adopted, an important convergence in the position related to political economy; on the one 
hand, with a wide majority of this Chamber supporting European integration, since the process 
started in 1986, the Single Market, and afterwards, the processes of convergence derived from the 
European Union Treaty. (Rato 1996: 1320). 
Or the socialist speaker, Josep Borrell, who demonstrated this common understanding of 
economic policy priorities: 
Hon. Member, I will like to be clear with the Government that we agree with the macroeconomic 
objectives of inflation reduction and the deficit you are proposing. They were also our objectives. 
They are ambitious and difficult to obtain, but they are necessary.  (Borrell 1996: 1333). 
Therefore, some European policies, especially those that are more communitarised, such as 
monetary policy, reduce governments’ policy manoeuvrability and policy instruments, 
resulting in a decrease in decidability, especially with the main opposition party. The 
consequences are manifold. Firstly, the reduction of policy options produces less variety in 
policy proposals and as a consequence, a disempowerment of voters (Mair 2001; Bartolini 
2005). Secondly, the collusion of mainstream parties leaves opposition to the EMU to policy-
seeking parties that may, however, play a role in governmental stability as external 
supporters (such as in 1993, 1996 and 2004). Thirdly, and taking into account the equally 
positive interiorisation of European opportunities by the two leading ethnoregionalist parties, 
we can conclude that the EMU has facilitated the stability of governments.  
Thus, the IU is the only party analysed that presents negative and mixed conceptualisations 
of the impacts, constraints and consequences of European policies. Indeed, with very few 
exceptions, all the negative usages in our data reflect the IU’s position. For example, the IU’s 
speaker in the budget debates stressed the negative impact, the restriction of action, and a 
negative evaluation of the EMU during the crucial years of the Euros implementation (1994-
1997). This position, rather than being labelled as mere Europesceptic, is more of a 
principled criticism, not against the process of integration per se but based on the democratic 
but for the democratic deficit, the mainly economical approach and lack of social policies 
produced by the Union. As the IU’s leader, Julio Anguita, claimed in the 1996 Budget debate: 
 
100 — Garcia Lupato / Talking Europe, Using Europe — I H S  
 
In other words, do the Spanish people, through their Members of Parliament’s debate, have 
sovereignty to discuss about economy? Or that sovereignty has already been given? One part of it 
is already outside national frontiers. In other words, for what is useful this debate? Do we have 
decision powers after the vote if there are some criteria and deadlines of Maastricht convergence 
that influence this debate we are having? We will celebrate the debate of national sovereignty or we 
will held the debate of something that comes from outside? And naturally, and who is speaking to 
you, in name of the federal group, supports European construction. But, Hon. Members, if the 
convergence criteria mark the limits of this debate, the political force I am representing in this 
moment does not agree with the content and the instruments that the Government is handling, nor 
with the objectives that the Socialist party shares with this political force. We, opposite, do not share 
the objectives or the instruments, we do it from an alternative philosophy, from another view of 
European integration. (Anguita 1996) 
In this intervention we can observe the relevance of ideology in understanding the way 
parties conceptualise European opportunities and constraints and the way in which parties 
internalise European policies.  
The Italian case differs slightly from the Spanish one. As we claimed above, for 
governmental parties Europe is conceived more as an incentive for action, where positive 
impacts are stressed together with a positive evaluation of European policies. On the other 
hand, opposition parties tend to neglect Europe in their interventions, enhancing the idea of 
the de-politicization of the European issue (Mair 2001). For example, opposition parties do 
not use Europe for legitimising their positions in 80% of Investiture debates or 78% of Budget 
ones (see Graph 3). However, we can observe a new and different trend. As Graph 1 shows,  
in Spain the importance of the European issue declined once the country joined the Euro, 
whereas in Italy the opposite occurred.  For Italy, the period 2002-2005 presents almost the 
same percentage of interventions where Europe is important as that during the crucial years 
of the Euro’s creation (27% and 28% respectively, see Graph 1). This could be due to the 
perceived negative consequences and limitations for domestic performance that the Euro 
implied for Italy and its economic performance. As a consequence, more parties, notably 
governmental parties and even the main party of the centre-right, present mixed or clearly 
negative positions and accounts of European policies. This is clear in our data, especially in 
Budget debates. As Graph 2 shows 10% of their interventions in these debates consider 
Europe as a restriction for domestic action or, in Graph 4, 14% of their interventions present 
a mixed evaluation of European policies, that is, both positive but also negative accounts, 
implying a growing perception of constraints and limitations rather than opportunities and 
incentives for action. So two questions now arise: Is the loyalty strategy of governmental 
parties changing, due to the perceived negative consequences of the increasing European 
competences for Italy, especially in the economic domain? What are the specific usages of 
Italian parties in the specific debates? In trying to answer these two questions, we must now 
turn to the analysis of single parties. 
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Regarding the two largest parties, we can observe a clear difference between the DS and FI. 
The DS, together with the once predominant DC, has a very positive conceptualisation of 
Europe, with no negative references to Europe in either budget or investiture debates. 
Therefore, in their evolution from the PCI, the DS seems to have internalised Europe as an 
incentive for action and a legitimising factor, which helps to adopt unpopular decisions, 
especially for a centre-left party. As Morgando’s budget debate intervention clearly shows, 
there is a link between Europe and domestic reform: 
If we want to consolidate our European prospective we have to start a period of reforms that 
reshapes our Welfare state. (Morgando 1996: 4). 
On the other hand, FI has a more critical and ambivalent position due to different factors, 
such as the perception of European constraints, their coalition partners (with contrasting and 
even very negative European positions), and other political factors. The latter is especially 
relevant. Italy joined the Euro, against all expectations, under Prodi’s and D’Alema’s centre-
left coalition governments. Hence, for the centre-left it was a major political success and a 
political asset. Indeed, in the 1996-2001 period, when they were in government, they 
evaluated European policies positively (when they went back into opposition, they made no 
reference in their interventions). However, it was FI and the centre-right coalition that gained 
office when the Euro was adopted in 2001 and experienced its policy limitations. 
Consequently, their position is different to the centre-left one. Then, even if the usages of 
Europe in Investiture Debates are neglected or a loyalty strategy is adopted, the focus 
should be on the possible benefits rather than criticising any possible negative effects. In 
Budget debates the position is much clearer, showing how European economic constraints 
and domestic suboptimal performance are present13. As Gianfranco Conte claims: 
We do not have to forget that, while we, as government and as country, are trying to follow the 
commitments adopted in the European Union, countries economically much stronger than us, such 
as France and Germany, have remarkable problems to maintain the stability pact and many support 
that, finally, something has to be revised.  (Conte 2001: 4). 
Therefore, from the idea shared in the 1990’s, where it was a matter of national interest to be 
part of the EMU, the strict measures of the Stability and Growth Pact posed a limitation on 
government performance, implying a more critical vision and demand to reform it, fostering a 
strategy of voice.  As Guido Crosetto (FI) said in the 2004 budget debate: 
In fact it is undeniable that, after the adoption of the Euro, the limits and the structural weakness of 
our economic system are now manifest with evidence never seen before. The Italian economy has 
not the instrument of competitive devaluation, very used in the past,, precisely when the 
                                                     
13
 With 3, 7% of mixed impacts of Europe, 2, 8 % of restriction for action and 4, 6% of mixed evaluations. 
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competition challenge, often disloyal, of some emerging countries is more obvious. (Crosetto 2004: 
43). 
A second interesting aspect concerns the number and type of parties with negative 
perceptions of Europe: AN, LN and RC, all with different ideologies, share a more negative 
account of Europe and its policies. The RC offers a good example of a negative position 
towards the EU’s current developments, and how ideology plays an important role in 
explaining their position. After the Euro implementation, it conceives the EU and the 
Maastricht Criteria as a negative impact, especially evident in their Speaker’s Budget debate 
speeches during the 2001-2003 period. Notably, they criticise Europe on the same grounds 
as the Spanish IU, showing the relevance of the Partisan model14. As Russo Spenna (RC) 
claimed in the 2001 Budget debate: 
Not by case our primary objective, our amendments to this budget law tend to break down the 
European Stability Pact, straightjacket I think, against the proletariat, against the demands of the 
society for creating a macroeconomic context favouring a qualified expansive policy. This is the 
philosophy of our alternative project regarding the budget law proposed by the Government. We try 
to operate, through our amendments, a great redistributive operation that we also propose to the 
centre-left. (Russo Spenna 2001: 29) 
In the case of the conservative, post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale, the most interesting fact is 
the way the European issue is constantly neglected. In parliamentary debates the 
importance and role of Europe in the AN’s interventions is minimal with none of the 14 
interventions under analysis presenting an assessment of European policies. The ethno-
regionalist Lega Nord, offers us a good example of an evolution from Functional 
Europeanism to a soft or even hard Eurosceptic position (Conti and Verzichelli 2003). Until 
the mid 1990s, LN’s support for Europe and the EMU was based on their idea that only 
Northern Italy could fulfil the Euro criteria and hence, a consensual division of Italy should be 
possible, with the rich North joining the Euro without the South.  This idea coincided with the 
party’s goals, and thus the Euro and the necessary reforms had the LN’s complete support:  
The best laws approved by the Parliament in the last years have been those that have taken in 
European directives and the great opportunities we have missed refer to the missed reception of 
European principles. (Pagliarini 1996: 5084). 
Even more clearly, Pagliarini argued: 
The monetary union will give a great contribute to the feeling of belonging, of being part of a unique 
entity of European citizens [...]. Surely the participation in the single currency means to definitively 
                                                     
14
 No positive references and 2, 8 % of impact of Europe as a constraint and restriction for action and 3, 7% of 
negative evaluations of European policies. 
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lose the possibility of currency devaluation, but it also means, above all, to eliminate the risk of 
value change and the differential interest rates. (Pagliarini 1996: 5085). 
The idea of the Italian division in joining the Euro is clearly stated in the same debate: 
[...] is necessary to save Southern Italy and to face the unemployment problem. Well, the only way 
to achieve this objective is to make a consensual split-up. In Padania we will use the Euro as 
currency, because we will use the European currency, while our fellow European citizens of 
Southern Italy will use the European single currency only some years latter: before they will have to 
improve their economic, productive and financial system. (Pagliarini 1996: 5087). 
The Euro provided the perfect opportunity for pursuing the party’s final goal, to divide Italy 
into two autonomous entities. Therefore, once Italy as a country joined the Euro, the 
incentives for supporting Europe disappeared, and so did the LN’s positive European policy.  
In contrast to other explanations of this U-turn offered in the literature, the LN’s change in 
this policy is not due to office seeking motivations but due to their functional support of 
European integration15. Thus, as soon as there were no incentives for support, they 
completely changed their position. As Giancarlo Giorgetti explained in the 1999 debate, once 
Italy was part of the Euro, what had been best for the Italian economy three years prior had 
now become a problem:  
The choice of the Euro has been, for us, in a certain way conditional. Today, a posteriori, we are 
able to understand how have been paid [...]. To whom observes the acquisition of the big credit and 
assurance groups, of some national air company, he will not miss that the interlocutors are part of 
those countries that at the time put a lot of obstacles to the entrance of the lira in the Euro and that 
miraculously have changed idea. […] Now the problem, joining the green grassland of the Euro, is 
the one of a global economy in which, paradoxically, goes in contradiction with an economic system 
based in the small enterprises, but also of big enterprises that, at least in the domestic market, were 
the masters; now, even these enterprises are too small in the global scenario and the whole 
mechanism by which the fragile Italian economy relied risks to enter in a crisis. (Giorgetti 1999: p. 
26-27). 
The LN clearly exemplified the idea of Functional Europeanism until 1998, and then moved 
to a Eurosceptic position once the EU was not functional anymore (Conti and Verzichelli 
2003). Considering the more critical position of FI, the AN’s low European usages and some 
mixed accounts, along with the positive position of the UDC, we can get a good idea of how 
Europe can be a divisive issue within the CDL coalition. Furthermore, it helps the DS-Ulivo 
strategy as their main rivals from the right and left have a more negative and/or conflicting 
position. 
                                                     
15
 For a contrasting view see Chari, Iltanen and Kritzinger (2004). 
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6. Using Europe in the Parliament – Some conclusions 
The analysis of the usages of Europe in parliamentary competition has proved useful and 
has provided us with complementary insights into the analyses of salience. Furthermore, this 
analysis has given empirical backing to some of the consequences theorised by scholars, 
especially those regarding impacts. This article has analysed the usages parties make of the 
EU and its outcomes. So, why do parties use Europe and what can we learn by focusing on 
the parliamentary arena? 
In the first place, it is important to take into account that European opportunities and 
constraints are not the same for countries and parties. Thus, the European context is not an 
exogenous environment that provides equal pressures or opportunities, but is, in a way, 
endogenous, as each party can pick those parts that better suit their ideology, interests or 
political needs. Hence, depending on the political and economic context, party position in the 
party system, governmental or oppositional status and party ideology help us to understand 
how and why parties consider the European arena important and internalise it in the way that 
they do. Italy and Spain provide two divergent examples of economic performance. While 
Spain adapted, joined and implemented the Euro in a period of high economic growth, Italy 
did so during a period of low growth. As a consequence, the two biggest parties in Spain did 
not have any incentive to stress the EMU’s possible constraints (especially the loss of 
monetary policy and the role of the ECB), whereas in Italy the issue gained salience, as 
those constraints were clear and influenced government performance. Therefore, in the 
Italian case we are starting to observe a growing politicisation of European outcomes and, 
remarkably, not only in policy-seeking and small parties but also in governmental and larger 
parties, such as Forza Italia. Mixed and negative usages, focusing on policy constraints and 
limitation for action, are starting to become present in the political discourse, and criticism of 
the EU is starting to arise.  
Secondly, government status plays a key role in showing the importance of the Institutional 
Model (Bartolini 2005). When government parties do not criticise the EU and its outcomes, 
they present a loyalty strategy stressing opportunities, incentives and positive evaluations 
and use Europe to legitimise their political and policy decisions. Meanwhile, parties with a 
more critical position towards European integration - when in government - downplay the 
issue in their interventions. However, as shown above, this is starting to change. 
Therefore, we have observed that party ideology is important in understanding the different 
ways in which parties conceptualise the EU. In the two strongest parties with larger 
parliamentary groups, the position tends to be positive, stressing incentives for action, 
legitimation and the positive evaluation of European policies. Where the position is negative, 
usage of Europe tends to be mixed. This makes sense because they are the parties that, 
when in government, participate in the European decision-making process, and presenting 
opposing discourses at the European and at the national level is difficult to maintain.  Thus, 
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real opposition to European outcomes comes from smaller parties that, however, may still 
play a role in government formation, especially in Italy. The role of ideology is especially 
evident for communist parties, both in Italy and Spain. Their political discourse is remarkably 
similar, showing the importance of ideology for conceptualising the European environment as 
well as the value of the Partisan Model (Bartolini 2005). The Lega Nord case shows us two 
further important aspects. Firstly, it demonstrates the way in which the EU can be used to 
pursue a specific political project, and the analysis of parliamentary debates has offered us a 
good explanation of the U-turn in their European position. Secondly, it stresses the 
importance of parliamentary debates. If we take into account that 1996 was the last election 
where the LN participated alone (since then, it has been part of the Casa delle Libertà 
coalition), the analysis of electoral programmes does not allow us to see and understand 
such a specific and radical change. 
The analysis of the usages of Europe has also helped to overcome some of the limitations of 
focusing purely on electoral competition or salience. In particular, it has shown the 
importance of indirect impacts of Europeanisation such as the reduction of policy decidability 
and the disempowerment of elections, the de-politicization of the European issue and even 
other effects, such as the coalition-building effect (Mair 2001; Bartolini 2005). The reduction 
of policy decidability is clear in Spanish Budget debates as both PSOE’s and PP’s speakers 
state that they pursue the same economic goals. When there is a substantially 
communitarised policy, with clear objectives, deadlines and goals, the room for manoeuvre 
by governmental parties is reduced. Therefore, successive governments have to implement 
the same policy, with little room for different proposals. The idea of de-politicization is also 
clear, especially, but not only, in Italy. Parties in government tend to stress European 
opportunities and incentives while opposition parties tend to neglect them. As some scholars 
have shown, this can be due to the asymmetry of information and the government’s role in 
European negotiations, where the opposition is absent (Raunio 2002). This “one-way” 
importance implies that there is not a real debate on European issues in general 
parliamentary debates. This de-politicization can, especially if we take into account the 
growing European competencies, produce a clear deficit in the relation between the 
parliamentary debate, political competition and the voters. Finally, the Spanish way of 
adopting the Euro with minority governments has demonstrated the EU’s role in fostering 
government stability with a coalition-building effect. CIU and PNV supported different 
governments (socialist and conservatives) to assure Spain’s success in joining the Euro. 
These two ethnoregionalist parties have a positive position towards the EU, and their support 
was oriented towards the final goal of joining the Euro.  
To conclude, the analysis of the usages of Europe in parliamentary debates shows the 
importance of dealing with this other crucial area of parliamentary competition. Indeed, it 
complements other types of analyses and provides diverse evidence of both direct and 
indirect impacts of European integration on domestic systems. Context, timing, governmental 
status, ideology or type of party and party systems are all important factors for understanding 
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why and how parties internalise Europe along with its multiple consequences for political 
competition, voters and the process of European integration at large. 
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II. PLENARY DEBATES AND THEIR IMPACT 
 
The Operating Logics of Weak and Strong Publics and the 
Communication of Europe 
Pieter de Wilde 
 
Abstract 
This contribution assesses the explanatory power of European integration 
theory for the communication of EU issues in mass media and national 
parliaments. By comparing debates on the EU budget in The Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland, on three different budget negotiations, in newspapers 
and in plenary parliamentary sessions, a rich picture is presented of how 
visible the EU is, who communicates and how EU issues are made sense of. 
The comparative framework allows for the isolation of the effects of different 
national interests, the contentiousness of European integration and 
institutional operating logics. Institutional operating logics clearly affect the 
actors dominating the debates and the way budget negotiations are framed, 
whereas a combination of national interests, contentiousness of issues and 
institutional operating logics accounts for the visibility of the negotiations in 
both media and national parliaments. The importance of operating logics in 
explaining communication patterns draws attention to both parliamentary 
scrutiny mechanisms and media logics of news value criteria. Theoretically, it 
is demonstrated that different European integration theories can be fruitfully 
combined to increase our understanding of how EU issues are 
communicated in the public sphere. 
 
1. Introduction 
The emphasis this Collection of Working Papers lays on the communicative function of 
national parliaments in the European Union (EU) (see also Auel, 2007; Raunio, 2009) 
highlights their importance as ‘strong publics’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002). They form a part 
of the public sphere (Habermas, 1991). This public sphere is a key forum for democratic 
legitimacy of modern polities where collective will-formation takes place through the 
exchange of arguments in front of a wider audience. The public sphere ought to be an arena 
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where everyone has access to present and follow arguments and where authority is forced 
to account for its actions in front of the wider audience. Through rational debates, arguments 
are tested, gain legitimacy, are improved or discarded. As a result, a collective will flows from 
this practice of discourse that provides the basis for democratic rule. The most accessible 
arenas for public debate in modern Western democracies are constituted by mass media. 
These ‘weak’ or ‘general’ publics (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002; Fraser, 1992) are accessible 
to all citizens and present a key channel for political communication between representatives 
and represented. Yet, mass media are not directly linked to binding decision making, hence 
the label ‘weak’. In contrast, parliaments – especially plenary sessions – perform the key role 
of linking public deliberation to the making of binding decisions. The power this implies is 
captured in the label ‘strong publics’. Taken together, mass media and parliamentary debates 
provide the core infrastructure of European public spheres. As such, they are indispensable 
to both the formation of collective will as well as the translation thereof into policy. They stand 
at the core of the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007; Lord and 
Beetham, 2001). 
Breaking new ground in the literatures on EU communication and the role of national 
parliaments in the EU, this contribution aims to explain communication on EU issues in both 
mass media and national parliaments. It does this through a comparison of plenary debates 
and media coverage. Drawing on European integration theory for its explanatory framework, 
the extent to which the communication of Europe adequately reflects political decision-
making in the EU is highlighted. Three alternative theoretical perspectives are outlined and 
then combined to present a rich understanding of communication of Europe. In the first 
liberal intergovernmentalist perspective (Moravcsik, 1993; 1998), EU politics reflects the 
uploading of national economic interests to the supranational level. Its explanatory power 
would be reflected in strong differences in the communication of Europe across countries, 
depending on the different national interests at stake. In the second functionalist perspective 
(Haas, 2004; Schmitter, 1969), the increasing pooling of sovereignty in European integration 
becomes reflected in increasing awareness, mobilization and polarization over EU issues, as 
the EU has gradually become ‘politicized’ (De Wilde, 2011c; De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The functionalist expectation would thus be that communication 
of Europe in both media and parliaments increases or alters over time, rather than across 
countries. The third institutionalist perspective (March and Olsen, 1984; Olsen, 2007) 
understands European integration as a continuously evolving system of interacting political 
institutions, partially in symbiosis and partially in competition with each other. These 
institutions have a profound effect on human behavior, as political actors adapt their behavior 
to the operating logics of their institutional environment. According to the institutionalist 
perspective, the largest difference in operating logic is between national parliaments and 
media, rather than across countries or over time. This third perspective thus predicts 
differences between these two publics to dominate communication of Europe. 
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This public sphere perspective points us to several key questions concerning the 
communication of Europe. These include: 1) how much communication is taking place, or 
how visible Europe is in the public sphere (De Vreese, 2001; Koopmans and Statham, 2010); 
2) how inclusive is the public sphere, or who are the dominant actors making arguments 
about European integration and the EU (Koopmans, 2007; Meyer, 1999; Statham, 2010); 3) 
and how are the process of European integration and the EU polity made sense of through 
the practice of framing issues (De Vreese, 2007; De Vreese and Kandyla, 2009; Diez 
Medrano, 2003; Gamson, 2004; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). 
Interestingly, studies focusing on the communication of European integration have 
predominantly targeted the reporting of EU issues in mass media (De Vreese, 2001; 2007; 
Koopmans, 2007; Koopmans and Statham, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2007; Semetko and 
Valkenburg, 2000). In addition, there are studies on the communication strategy of EU 
institutions, and the European Commission in particular (Meyer, 1999; Michailidou, 2008). So 
far, few studies exist taking a public sphere perspective to include both mass media 
coverage and national parliaments’ involvement in European affairs in an encompassing 
research design (De Wilde, 2011a; 2011b). As a result of including both weak and strong 
publics, a rich understanding of communication patterns on EU issues is generated and 
differences and commonalities between mass media and parliamentary arenas, between 
countries and across time become apparent. 
2. National Interests, Contentiousness, and Institutional Operating Logics 
What might explain the communication of Europe in strong and weak publics? To answer this 
question, the present contribution draws upon the European integration theories of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, (neo- and post-) functionalism and institutionalism. These theories 
have been designed to explain the politics of European integration, rather than its 
communication. In extending their use to explain public communication, this contribution 
breaks new ground. As will become clear, these theories are not fully excluding each other 
as their premises focus on different dynamics that can coexist in practice. Thus, it is here 
argued that they should be understood as alternative vantage points or theoretical ideal 
types (George and Bennett, 2005) from which to make sense of observed communication, 
rather than as mutually excluding explanatory theories to be tested. As Puchala (1972) 
noted, individual theoretical vantage points from which to study European integration only 
create partial pictures of reality. He compared EU studies to blind men studying an elephant. 
The man touching the elephant’s trunk concludes the beast is slender and tall. In contrast, 
the man touching the elephant’s ears concludes the beast is flat and oblong. To gain a more 
complete understanding of the nature of the beast, we need to study it from multiple vantage 
points. That there is added value in shifting theoretical ‘frames of reference’ to generate a 
more complete understanding has been demonstrated in Allison’s (1971) study of the Cuban 
missile crisis. Heeding Puchala’s call by using Allison’s method, the aim of this contribution is 
to evaluate the explanatory power of each theoretical perspective individually as well as to 
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generate a rich understanding of communication of Europe by complementing the 
perspectives with each other. Each perspective is brought to bear on the visibility, 
inclusiveness and framing of communication of EU issues respectively. 
In the first, liberal intergovernmentalist, perspective, national interests may be understood as 
key to communication of the EU budget. According to Moravcsik (1993; 1998) major steps in 
European integration since the 1950s can be understood as compromises between national 
governments based on economic interests. The premise is that member state governments 
are and remain in control of the integration process. Economic interests are aggregated at 
the domestic level and at the same time negotiated among national governments in ‘two-
level games’ (Putnam, 1988). If the communication of Europe would reflect such 
intergovernmental politics based on economic interests, we may expect visibility to be 
highest in countries with clear economic interests at stake on the issue in question. These 
countries will be more forceful in negotiations within the EU framework and this will be 
reflected in more heated debates. In terms of inclusiveness, this first perspective expects the 
dominance of national executives over supranational institutions and domestic interest 
groups. Finally, framing according to the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective emphasizes 
conflict between member states especially, and conflict between domestic interest groups to 
a lesser extent. The issue in question would be presented as a zero-sum game, where 
negotiations and compromises determine who gets what. 
In the second, functionalist, perspective, communication of the EU budget may be a product 
of the extent to which European integration as a political process and the EU as its 
intermediary result are controversial within the national context. As European countries have 
increasingly pooled sovereignty, expectations and orientations of citizens and interest groups 
are directed at the supranational level (Haas, 2004). Whereas the early neo-functional 
theorists expected these reorientations to be positive and demand more integration, recent 
post-functionalist theorists emphasize the rise of Euroscepticism, as national identity 
perceptions foster negative opinions towards supranational governance (Hooghe and Marks, 
2009). It is well known that some Member States feature more Euroscepticism than others 
(Harmsen and Spiering, 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). That is, Member States such 
as the UK have traditionally been ambivalent to EU membership. Its citizens and political 
parties, generally oppose further steps in integration which is clearly reflected in national 
discourse (Diez Medrano, 2003). Other Member States, such as Belgium or Germany, have 
traditionally been much more ‘pro-European’. Yet, the attitudes of citizens, positions of 
political parties and national discourse are not static. According to Hooghe and Marks 
(2009), European integration has become markedly more controversial since the late 1980s 
throughout the EU. National interests have been more prominently articulated and defended 
in EU framework as political elites increasingly feel pressure from public opinion not to 
proceed further with integration and not to compromise on key national concerns. Referenda 
on Treaty changes may have brought European integration as a politicized issue to the fore 
and amplified contentiousness within the Member States that have held referenda in the last 
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two decades (Hobolt, 2009). Based on this second perspective, we may expect 
communication of Europe in mass media and parliaments to become more visible over time 
and well as more inclusive as EU politics feature a ‘widening of the audience or clientele 
interested and active’ (Schmitter, 1969, p. 166). Framing is likely to portray EU politics as 
increasingly conflictual over time, particularly with regards to questions of further pooling of 
sovereignty. In addition, EU issues are likely to be particularly contested in countries with 
Eurosceptic populations, a history of referendums or where referendums on EU issue have 
recently taken place. 
The third perspective may be labeled an institutional perspective (Jupille and Caporaso, 
1999; Pierson, 1998). According to Olsen (2007), the European political order has been 
transformed through the creation and subsequent evolution of a variety of institutions. These 
include, in particular, the institutions of the EU – especially the European Commission, the 
European Parliament etc. – but numerous others as well at both national and supranational 
level. Once created, institutions develop operating logics, and societal actors’ behavior follow 
a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1984) which is constrained by these operating 
logics. Thus, parliaments have developed into arenas for party competition (Burns, 1999; 
King, 1976; Strøm et al., 2003). Members of Parliament (MPs) group into party factions and 
these parties compete with each other in elections for office. Parliamentary proceedings in 
between elections are dominated by continued partisan conflict, particularly between 
government and opposition. On the other hand, mass media follow a media logic structuring 
what to report on and in what way. This media logic includes the reporting of personalized 
conflict and topics of particular relevance to the national audience (Altheide, 2004; Bennett 
and Entman, 2001; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Both parliamentary logics and media 
logics remain relatively stable across the countries of Western Europe, although there are 
differences between Anglo-Saxon and Westminster models on the one hand and continental 
consensus models on the other hand (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Strøm et al., 2003). National 
parliaments have adopted a range of different scrutiny mechanisms that range from strong 
ex ante control like in Denmark or Finland, to limited control such as in the Southern member 
states (O'Brennan and Raunio, 2007). As these institutional logics are resilient to change, 
little change over time in parliamentary debates can be expected.  Based on the 
institutionalist perspective, we would thus expect communication on Europe in parliaments to 
be framed as domestic partisan conflict whereas media coverage of the EU would be more 
framed as intergovernmental conflict, emphasizing the national interests at stake and 
(personal) conflict between Member State government leaders. 
In short, the three perspectives based on European integration theory lead to different 
expectations concerning patterns and trends in the communication of EU issues in mass 
media and national parliaments. If communication is primarily a product of national interests, 
countries with clear economic interests at stake in the issue in question will feature more 
visible and more conflictual debates than countries with less pronounced interests at stake. 
Following the functionalist perspective, communication of EU issues will become increasingly 
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visible and contentious over time from the late 1980s onwards. Furthermore, debates will be 
particularly heated around referendums on Treaty changes or EU accession and in the 
aftermath thereof. Thus, the most observable communication patterns in this second 
perspective are expected to unfold over time, rather than across countries. Thirdly, according 
to the institutionalist perspective institutional operating logics structure political behavior, and 
thus also communication. To the extent that institutional logics structure communication, 
differences will manifest themselves strongly between different institutional arenas. In other 
words, differences will be most pronounced between weak and strong publics rather than 
between countries or over time. Taken together, these three perspectives highlight the need 
for a comparison of communication patterns between countries, over time and between 
different institutional arenas to assess their relative and combined explanatory power. 
3. Claims-Making in a Comparative Case Study of EU Budget Negotiations 
In order to assess the explanatory power of these three theoretical perspectives, this study 
presents data from EU budget negotiations taking place between 1992 and 2005, in three 
different Member States, including both newspaper coverage and plenary parliamentary 
debates. The EU budget is a recurrent major political package dealing with a clear difference 
in economic interests among EU member states (Laffan, 1997). It also has direct bearing on 
the integration process as the size of the budget and the degree of freedom supranational 
institutions enjoy in allocating funds greatly affects their power vis-à-vis national 
governments and EU citizens. Budgetary politics traditionally stand at the core of democratic 
politics (Kahn, 1997). Policy formulation on the EU multiannual budget culminates in 
European Council meetings with strong media coverage. As member state governments 
need to agree unanimously, national parliaments are involved in controlling their own 
government. Negotiations are held every seven years. The three countries included 
represent a net-contributing country (The Netherlands), a net-recipient country (Ireland) and 
a country paying more or less as much as it received (Denmark) between 1992 and 2005. 
The inclusion of these three countries allows for assessing the validity of the liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective’s expectations. The inclusion of three budget negotiations 
(Delors II, negotiated between February 1992 and December 1992; Agenda 2000, July 1997 
– March 1999; and Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, February 2004 – December 2005) 
allows for the mapping of trends over time and the assessment of the explanatory power of 
the functionalist perspective. All three budget negotiations coincide with ratification 
processes on EU Treaties. During the negotiations of Delors II in 1992, the Treaty of 
Maastricht was ratified with referenda in Denmark (2 June 1992: 52% against) and Ireland 
(18 June 1992: 68,7% in favor). The Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified during the negotiation 
of Agenda 2000 including referenda, again, in Denmark (28 May 1998: 55,1% in favor) and 
Ireland (22 May 1998: 61,7% in favor). Finally, during the negotiations of Financial 
Perspectives 2007-2013 the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification failed with a referendum in the 
Netherlands (1 June 2005: 61,5% against).  Besides facilitating the tracking of trends over 
time, the inclusion of these three budget negotiations thus allows linking the visibility of the 
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EU budget to moments of explicit contestation about European integration in the form of 
referendum campaigns. Finally, the inclusion of both newspaper coverage and transcripts of 
plenary debates allows an assessment of the explanatory power of the institutionalist 
perspective. The comparative research design resulting from the case selection may thus be 
characterised as a 3x3x2 comparative case study (Yin 2003: 39ff). That is, three budget 
negotiations (Delors II, Agenda 2000 and Financial Perspectives 2007-2013), times three 
countries (the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland), times two forums (media and parliament) 
result in eighteen separate cases in which to study communication of the EU budget. 
Newspapers included in the sampling are NRC Handelsblad, Trouw and Algemeen Dagblad 
for the Netherlands, Berlingske Tidene, Politikken and B.T. for Denmark, and Irish Times and 
Irish Independent for Ireland. This study thus incorporates both quality and sensation-
oriented newspapers of different political signatures in all three countries. As differences 
between quality and sensation outlets are larger than between different media – e.g. TV and 
printed press – this sample forms a representative sample of national media (Semetko et al., 
2001). Newspaper articles and plenary parliamentary debates were sampled from digitalized 
archives using the search string: “European budget” OR “EC / EU budget” OR “Delors II / 
Agenda 2000 / financial perspectives”, with the exception of plenary debates from 1992 in 
the Netherlands and Denmark, which were manually selected from the physical archives of 
the Tweede Kamer and Folketing.  
To measure the three key aspects of communication derived from the public sphere 
approach – visibility, inclusiveness and framing – this study employs claims analysis 
(Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Claims analysis is very suitable for measuring the 
communication of the EU budget as it takes a very small unit of analysis – a ‘claim’ – and 
measures relevant variables at that level. A claim is defined as a unit of strategic or 
communicative action in the public sphere: ‘... which articulate[s] political demands, 
decisions, implementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, 
actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective 
actors in a policy field’ (Statham, 2005, p. 12). Coded variables of claims include WHERE 
and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE 
interests and WHY. The amount of claims functions as an indicator for the visibility of 
communication. The inclusiveness is measured through the relative amount of claims made 
by each actor in comparison to other actors present in the debate. To map the presence of 
national parliaments as a collective and individual MPs, this group is contrasted to 
government officials including heads of state and all senior and junior Ministers on the one 
hand and ‘others’, including EU institutions, other Member State governments, civil society 
organizations, journalists and organized interests on the other hand. Finally, the ‘why’ 
variable here refers to how the EU budget is ‘framed’. In other words, how claimants 
organize ‘[...] an apparently diverse array of symbols, images and arguments, linking them 
through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is at stake on the issue’ (Gamson, 
2004, p. 245). A distinction is made between framing EU budget negotiations as 1) 
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‘intergovernmental conflict’ where different Member States are pitted against each other in a 
zero-sum game of national interests; 2) ‘supranational conflict’ where EU institutions are 
involved, either as opposing other supranational institutions or opposing Member States; 3) 
‘domestic conflict’ which in particular includes partisan conflict within a single Member State; 
4) ‘other conflict’ which may include sectoral interests or regional governments; 5) 
‘cooperation’ which does not portray EU budget negotiations as conflict, but rather as an 
effort to maximize utility for everyone based on values such as economic growth, sustainable 
development or solidarity; 6) claims without framing. In total, 462 newspaper articles and 133 
parliamentary debates were coded, resulting in 4435 claims.1 
4. Findings 
This section proceeds with the assessment of the explanatory power of the three developed 
perspectives – the national interests, contentiousness of European integration and 
institutionalist perspectives – to the three key components of communication: visibility, 
inclusiveness and framing. In effect, the three perspectives are applied three times allowing 
for the assessment of their relative explanatory power concerning each of the three 
components as well as for generating a rich understanding through their combination. 
4.1 Visibility 
Visibility of communication on the EU budget is operationalised here as the total amount of 
claims made in the mass media and in plenary sessions of national parliaments. Graph 1 
below, displays these amounts per country, budget and forum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 The codebook, the heuristic ATLAS.ti files and the SPSS database can be obtained from the author upon request. 
To safeguard reliability of the data, the coder received intensive training (Krippendorff, 2004). 
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Graph 1: Visibility of EU budget negotiations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, we would expect communication on 
the EU budget to be particularly visible in the Netherlands and Ireland in comparison to 
Denmark. This is because, during the time of study, both the Netherlands and Ireland had 
clear national economic interests at stake in the EU budget negotiations as large net-
contributor and net-recipient country respectively. In contrast, Denmark received more or 
less as much as it paid and thus did not have national interests at stake to the same extent 
as the other two Member States. However, the data do not support this expectation. Taking 
into account that the exact numbers for Ireland are based on more stringent sampling of 
material, the Agenda 2000 budget negotiations were particularly visible in Ireland. Yet, the 
differences between the Netherlands and Denmark are not pronounced. 
The functionalist perspective would generally expect visibility of EU budget negotiations to 
increase over time as the process of European integration became more controversial 
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between 1992 and 2005. In addition, one might expect the budget to be more visible in 
Denmark than in the other two countries as Denmark has been a notably more Eurosceptic 
country than the Netherlands or Ireland. Finally, we might expect visibility to be particularly 
pronounced in Denmark and Ireland in 1992, fueled by the referendum campaign on the 
Maastricht Treaty. Similarly, we expect high visibility in Denmark and Ireland during the 
negotiation of Agenda 2000 and in the Netherlands during the negotiation of Financial 
Perspectives 2007-2013. These expectations based on the politicization perspective are only 
partially supported by the data. Media reporting of the latter two budgets is clearly higher 
than on Delors II, but there is no clear trend upwards. In fact, Agenda 2000 negotiations 
were the most visible in absolute numbers of claims in the media. Visibility in parliaments 
increased steadily over time in the Netherlands and Denmark, but there is a sharp drop in 
Ireland. Whereas there is limited empirical evidence in this study to support the functional 
perspective as a general trend over time, the impact of coinciding referenda on Treaty reform 
with budget negotiations has no clear effect. In the first two budget negotiations, visibility of 
the budget negotiations was not higher in Denmark and Ireland than in the Netherlands, nor 
was the reverse true during the last budget’s negotiations. This would have been the 
expectation if the coinciding of referenda and budget negotiations would reinforce each 
other’s salience and visibility. EU referenda do not seem to influence the visibility of EU 
budget negotiations. This is remarkable especially in case of the Netherlands and Ireland, as 
it has been argued that net contributions and receipts have played an important role in Dutch 
and Irish national perceptions on EU membership and on the referenda outcomes (Gilland, 
2008; Petter and Griffiths, 2005). Instead, the communication of EU budget negotiations 
appears relatively self-standing. 
Finally, the institutional perspective expects the clearest differences to be observable 
between mass media and parliaments, rather than between countries or over time. 
Interestingly, media coverage patterns are strikingly similar in all three countries. There was 
most reporting on Agenda 2000, followed by slightly less coverage of the Financial 
Perspectives 2007-2013 and very little coverage of Delors II. Not only this pattern, but also 
the absolute numbers of claims in the media in all three countries are remarkably similar. 
This suggests that the agenda of the mass media in all three countries is more influenced by 
common overarching negotiations in Brussels than by differing national political contexts. In 
contrast, parliamentary debates diverge. The larger visibility of parliamentary debates in the 
Netherlands in comparison to those in Denmark can be explained by the organization of EU 
scrutiny in ex post plenary debates in the Dutch case, whereas Danish scrutiny relies on ex 
ante mandating behind closed doors (De Wilde, 2011a). Parliamentary debates in Ireland, 
following the Westminster model, have long been particularly vibrant (Mitchell, 2003) in 
comparison to continental consensus based models, also on EU matters. Yet, in 2002, The 
Irish Parliament adopted the EU Scrutiny Act creating a formally much stronger European 
Affairs Committee (Barrett, 2008; Conlan, 2007). As indicated by the presented data, this 
may have the side effect of reducing the importance of plenary sessions for debating EU 
affairs. The visibility of EU budget negotiations thus reflects the liberal intergovernmentalist 
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perspective to some extent as the negotiations were more visible in The Netherlands and 
Ireland than in Denmark. In addition, the functionalist perspective highlights a clear increase 
of visibility between the first and second budget in the mid 1990s, but this trend does not 
carry on into the 21st century. Of the three adopted explanatory perspectives in this 
contribution, the data reflect the institutionalist perspective most when it comes to visibility. 
Whereas media coverage is strikingly similar in all three countries, the visibility of plenary 
debates differs highly according to the organization of EU scrutiny mechanisms. 
4.2 Inclusiveness 
Graphs 2a and 2b present the share of total claims made in the media (2a) and parliaments 
(2b) by the government, Members of Parliament and others. 
Graph 2a: Actors in the Media 
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Graph 2b: Actors in Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As clearly shown by the Graphs 2a and 2b, national politicians – government and 
parliamentarians combined – are responsible for about 10 to 20 per cent of claims made in 
the media and, unsurprisingly, for close to 100 per cent of claims in parliaments. Whereas 
parliamentarians are more vocal than government members in parliaments, the reverse is 
true in the media. When it comes to explaining the observed patterns, it is very clear that the 
difference between the mass media and parliaments is much more pronounced here than 
either the differences over time or across countries. Regarding the actors dominating political 
communication about Europe, the data presented here is best explained from an institutional 
perspective. In fact, it is striking to see the similarities in media coverage across countries 
and time. Apparently, media logics in all three countries under study here result in relatively 
stable patterns where national governments are featured much more prominently than 
parliamentarians and both categories together are only responsible for a minority of the total 
amount of claims made. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that all three countries 
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under study here are small Member States. Media in all three countries focused strongly on 
the actions of what are often considered the most influential EU Member States: Germany, 
France and the UK. Other important actors in the case of the EU budget include the 
European Commission, farmer associations, and Spain as arguably the most influential net 
recipient Member State. Differences in the parliamentary composition of claims-making can 
also be explained by institutional factors. Whereas Government ministers in Ireland formally 
remain MPs, this is not the case in either the Netherlands or Denmark. Following the 
Westminster model, Irish parliamentary debates are characterized by conflicts between 
members of government and opposition MPs resulting in similar amounts of claims by both 
groups of actors. In contrast, the parliaments of the Netherlands and Denmark feature 
tripartite debates between members of government, opposition MPs and coalition MPs 
leading to a smaller section of claims by government. To the extent that national interests or 
the general politicization of European integration affect communication in either mass media 
or parliaments, it is not observable in the composition of actors and their relative presence in 
terms of percentage of claims made in the public sphere. 
4.3 Framing  
In the case of EU budget negotiations, framing might emphasize different types of conflict 
such as those between richer and poorer Member States, between those advocating a 
stronger redistributive role for the EU against those advocating a free market polity, between 
farmers and consumers and – in the case of regional policy – between richer and poorer sub 
national regions. But framing could also be ‘cooperative’ through stressing common values 
that might be advanced through certain budgetary programs, like solidarity within Europe, 
the competitiveness of the EU in the world economy or sustainable development of third 
world countries. Graphs 3a (media) and 3b (parliaments) display the relative amount of 
different types of framing in the debates in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland during the 
three budget negotiations in question. 
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Graph 3a: Framing in the Media 
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Graph 3b: Framing in Parliament 
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Dominant national interests, as assumed in the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, 
would be reflected in a dominance of intergovernmental conflict framing in the debates of 
both media and parliaments. Furthermore, we would expect this to be the case especially in 
the net-contributing country (The Netherlands) and net-recipient country (Ireland). Yet, from 
this perspective, it would not be surprising to find domestic conflict framing as well. A 
domestic conflict concerning the establishment of the national interest co-occurs with 
intergovernmental conflict between member state governments in ‘two level games’ 
(Moravcsik, 1998; Putnam, 1988). Graphs 3a displaying the nine debates taking place in the 
media show a strong presence of intergovernmental conflict framing. In Parliaments, this is 
much less pronounced. That is, the framing in parliamentary debates frames the EU less as 
an arena for intergovernmental conflict based on mutually exclusive national interests than 
the media does. There is not a clear difference among the three countries included in this 
study in the media debates. However, the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective carries 
considerable explanatory power with regards to parliamentary debates, as EU budget 
negotiations are more often framed as a case of intergovernmental conflict in the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer and the Irish Dáil Éireann than in the Danish Folketing. 
Following the functionalist perspective, we would expect rising levels of conflict framing in 
relation to cooperative framing over time. In particular, as national identity has increasingly 
become a prominent factor in EU politics since the late 1980s (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), 
this conflict framing would involve intergovernmental conflict framing, but also supranational 
conflict. In other words, the changing public attitude in Europe from a ‘permissive consensus’ 
to a ‘constraining dissensus’ may be reflected in political communication becoming 
increasingly characterized by a framing in which Member States are portrayed as in conflict 
with each other and with EU institutions. Yet, this ‘postfunctionalist’ theory (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009) does not appear to be able to shed much light on how the EU budget 
negotiations are communicated. There is little evidence to speak of either decreasing 
amounts of cooperative framing or of increasing amounts of intergovernmental conflict 
framing. Rather, the debates continue to be characterized by a plurality of framing including 
intergovernmental conflict framing, conflicts involving EU institutions, domestic conflict 
framing and cooperative framing. 
Finally, the question remains to what extent an institutionalist account may be able to explain 
patterns and trends in the framing of the EU budget. When looking at framing, differences 
are clearly less pronounced than the differences in actors featured in the debates (Graphs 
2a and 2b). Yet, in comparison to differences between countries and over time, there are 
notable differences between media and parliaments. In particular, the framing of 
intergovernmental conflict in the media is much more prominent than in parliaments. 
Parliaments, in contrast, feature more domestic conflict and more cooperative framing. This 
confirms that the media logic of focusing on stories that are characterized by personalized 
conflict as well as a media bias towards executive actors are reflected in an emphasis on 
European Council meetings (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). Although this framing is also 
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present in parliamentary debates, there is relatively more emphasis on domestic conflict as 
different political parties and opposition and coalition MPs contrast their visions to those ‘on 
the other side of the aisle’ and challenge other party representatives on the consistency and 
value of their positions. Furthermore, parliamentarians tend to bring more cooperative 
framing into the debate as they make a stronger effort than mass media to relate EU budget 
issues to societal values such as solidarity, competitiveness and sustainable development. 
When it comes to explaining patterns and trends in framing the EU budget, the institutionalist 
perspective provides the richest picture of the three perspectives as is the case for 
explaining actor constellations. 
5. Discussion 
This contribution has investigated political communication of EU issues in a comparison of 
weak publics (mass media) and strong publics (national parliaments). A major contribution to 
this research is provided through a comparative case study of debates on the EU budget 
during negotiations of EU’s multiannual financial perspectives. Observed differences and 
similarities in patterns and trends of communication across countries, time and forums are 
explained by assessing the relative explanatory power of national economic interests, 
increasing contentiousness of European integration and the operating logics of mass media 
and parliaments. These factors resonate with the three prominent theories of European 
integration of liberal intergovernmentalism, functionalism and institutionalism respectively. 
The major finding is that communication of Europe, at least in the case of EU budget 
negotiations, differs mostly between mass media and parliaments, rather than across 
countries or over time. This is very clearly the case for the inclusiveness of the debate and to 
a lesser extent also for how the budget negotiations are framed or made sense of by those 
contributing to the debate. Visibility reflects more the national interests at stake and the 
contentiousness of integration when it comes to mass media coverage, while visibility in 
parliamentary debates is highly influenced by the organization of scrutiny procedures. 
Whereas parliamentarians are responsible for a majority of claims in parliament, this study 
finds clear executive bias in the media in their coverage of EU affairs. Although less 
pronounced, there is also a clear difference between the framing of EU budget negotiations 
in the mass media and in national parliaments. While there is a plurality of conflict and 
cooperation framing in both mass media coverage and parliamentary debates, there is more 
emphasis on conflict in general and intergovernmental conflict in particular in the media. That 
is, more so than parliamentary debates, the mass media depict EU budget negotiations as a 
conflict between Member State governments based on mutually exclusive national interests 
where victory of the one means defeat for the other. Domestic partisan conflict, where 
different national political parties contest each other’s vision on the EU budget, is much less 
prominent in the mass media than in parliaments. 
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These findings have clear repercussions for the possibility of institutional reform to affect the 
communicative role of national parliaments in EU affairs. Clearly, parliamentary organization 
and different scrutiny mechanisms have profound effects on the extent to which parliaments 
perform their communicative function. Firstly, parliamentary communication is prominent 
when the plenary has a substantial role in the scrutiny of EU affairs, such as the Irish Dáil 
Éireann before the constitutional reform of 2002 and – to a lesser extent – in the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer. In contrast, strong emphasis on committee work in EU scrutiny leads to a 
less publicly visible parliament, such as in the case of the Danish Folketing and the Irish Dáil 
Éireann after 2002. Secondly, a temporal link of parliamentary activity to European Council 
meetings stimulates communication. Ex post debates soon after such meetings are very 
lively, precise in terms of issues and feature vocal contestation between parties. In contrast, 
plenary debates early on in the policy cycle are relatively timid and parties articulate only 
broad issue preferences (cf. De Wilde, 2011a). At the same time, this study provides 
evidence that increasing the extent to which parliaments publicly debate EU affairs, or its 
‘transparancy’ (cf. introduction to this Collection of Working Papers), only marginally affects 
its ‘publicity’ in the sense of reaching mass audiences through media coverage. To bring out 
national parliaments as actors and debating arenas more in EU politics, the operating logics 
of mass media would have to change. 
The differences between mass media coverage and parliamentary debates are more 
pronounced than either the differences across countries or the differences over time in 
debating EU budget negotiations. However, that does not mean there are no considerable 
differences across space and time. When major national interests are at stake, such as 
when a Member State is either a large net contributor or a large net recipient of EU funds, 
debates tend to be more visible than when no clear national interests are at stake. The most 
visible debate took place during the negotiations on Agenda 2000 in the Irish media and Dáil 
Éireann. This can be explained as Ireland was at the time a major recipient of EU Agricultural 
and Structural Funds with a considerable impact on Irish economy. Similarly, as the 
Netherlands turned from a net recipient of EU funds up until the early 1990s to the largest 
net contributor per capita in the late 1990s, the visibility of EU budget negotiations in both 
media and the Tweede Kamer rose considerably. The functionalist perspective expecting a 
general rise in the visibility of EU budget negotiations as the political climate of the EU turned 
from a ‘permissive consensus’ into a ‘constraining dissensus’ directs attention to the clear 
difference in visibility between the first budget in the early 1990s on the one hand and the 
second and third budgets on the other hand. As the second of three budget negotiations – 
Agenda 2000 – was the most hotly contested budget in all three countries, challenges arise 
for the postfunctionalist theory to explain communication of Europe, however. The biggest 
change in politicization of European integration may have happened in the early 1990s after 
which levels of contestation leveled off. The presentation of Agenda 2000 by the European 
Commission as financing Eastern enlargement may have added to its visibility whereas the 
2002 deal between France and Germany on keeping CAP spending equal in the next budget 
kept this major issue off the agenda during the third budget negotiations and thereby reflect, 
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to some extent, a temporarily successful elite de-politicization strategy of closing opportunity 
structures for politicization (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Finally, taking into account the co-
occurrence of national referendums on Treaty changes does not provide a clear 
understanding of EU budget debates. Had this been the case, we would have expected 
debates to be particularly visible in the Netherlands during the negotiations of Financial 
Perspectives 2007-2013 (coinciding with the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty) and in 
Denmark and Ireland during Delors II and Agenda 2000 (coinciding with referendums on the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties). However, neither an amplifying nor a crowding out 
effect of referendums during budget negotiations could be observed.  
Of the liberal intergovernmentalist, functionalist and institutionalist perspective, the third 
clearly carries the most explanatory power for communication of EU issues in weak and 
strong publics. Taken together, the three theoretical perspectives drawn from European 
integration theory provide a richer understanding of communication of Europe in mass media 
and parliaments than any one of them individually. This raises two interesting points for 
further research on European integration and its communication. First, it demonstrates that 
theories of European integration, created to explain the political process of sovereignty 
pooling by European countries, can also shed valuable light on the public communication of 
this process. This contribution thus presents a modest argument that communication and 
politics in the case of the EU are not disconnected. Secondly, this study demonstrates the 
use of combining these three theories of European integration to shed light on 
communication of EU issues. Rather than only viewing them as alternatives and testing their 
relative strengths, they can be considered complementary to a certain extent. These 
perspectives present different angles, if you will, from which to study communication of 
Europe. Combined only, they provide a full picture of the nature of the beast.  
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EU Politicisation and National Parliaments: Visibility of Choices and 
Better Aligned Ministers? 
Eric Miklin 
 
Abstract 
Recently, there have been calls for a politicisation of EU decision-making to 
reduce the EU’s democratic deficit. This article takes the debate to the EU’s 
national channel of representation. It discusses, how politicisation could be 
achieved and how it affects the way national parliaments fulfil their citizen-
related and their government-related functions in EU decision-making. Two 
arguments are developed. First, I argue that politicisation requires legislative 
proposals that polarise between centre-left and centre-right actors. By 
changing the incentive structure of national parties, such proposals help to 
overcome parties’ current reluctance to publicly discuss European issues. 
This leads to open parliamentary debates where parties discuss their 
different views and provide citizens with choices in EU decision-making. 
Second, I argue that the higher salience of polarising proposals also 
increases national parliaments’ attention for, and hence control over, the 
processes on the European level. This reduces the risk of agency losses in 
Council decision-making—leading to ministers better aligned to their 
constituencies’ interests. The plausibility of the arguments is evaluated 
empirically through a qualitative comparative case study of the discussions 
in Germany and Austria on one of probably the most politicised examples of 
EU decision-making in recent years—the EU Services directive. 
 
1. Introduction 
Discussing the EU’s alleged democratic deficit, several scholars have recently criticised the 
missing communicative or electoral link between the institutions on the European level and 
the citizens on the national level (see esp. Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008, Thomassen 
and Schmitt 1999). While the EU today is dealing with highly political issues, there still is 
hardly any public debate about these issues between the actors involved resulting in ‘policies 
without politics’ (Schmidt, 2006). As a consequence, citizens’ knowledge about what is going 
on inside the EU, and about the alternatives available, is low. This leads to a lack of 
opposition, which makes the EU largely unresponsive in terms of elections (e.g. Mair, 2007). 
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To overcome this problem, voices have been raised that call for a targeted politicisation of 
EU decision-making (Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Zürn 2006). According to these 
voices, reforms should be taken that increase ideological conflicts within and between the 
EU’s institutions, and make them better visible to the public. This would provide citizens with 
alternatives in EU decision-making which they could take into account at the next election. 
This article takes up on this debate and takes it to the national level. It discusses how 
politicisation could be achieved and how it would affect the way national parliaments fulfil 
their functions in EU decision-making. 
In a first step, the article is looking at national parliaments’ citizen-related functions and at 
how the currently weak electoral link between national parliaments and their electorates 
could be strengthened. Building on insights from research on party competition and issue 
salience, I argue that politicisation requires polarising legislative proposals on which centre-
left and -right parties take different positions. By changing the incentive structure of the 
parties within Parliament, such proposals lead to open parliamentary debates, where parties 
publicly present and justify their different views on the issue. 
In a second step, the article discusses the effect of such a politicisation on national 
parliaments’ government-related functions. Thus, it relates the debate about electoral 
linkages back to the debate about parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs. Based on a Principal-
Agent model it is argued that, despite several improvements throughout the years, attention 
of national parliaments to European politics is still limited. This involves the risk that ministers 
in the Council take up positions that are not in line with their national parliaments’ interest. 
Politicisation through polarising legislative proposals, I argue, reduces this risk as the higher 
saliency of these proposals increases parliamentary attention for, and hence control over, the 
processes on the European level. This, again, leads to ministers better aligned to their 
constituencies’ interests. 
The plausibility of both arguments is evaluated through an analysis of parliamentary 
discussions and position-finding processes in two EU member states (Germany and Austria) 
on probably the most politicised (and most polarising) example of day-to-day EU decision-
making in recent years – the Services directive. The empirical data supports both arguments. 
Comparing parliaments’ behaviour before and after the polarising nature of the directive was 
detected, I show that once the Services directive became politicised, this led to intense 
plenary debates in which the parties communicated and justified their different views. 
Looking at the level of parliamentary control, comparing the two phases shows that national 
parliaments paid hardly any attention to the directive before politicisation set in. In both 
countries, this allowed the ministers in charge to take up a position that later turned out not 
to be in line with their constituencies’ interest. Once politicisation set in and parliaments took 
a closer look at the directive, however, both ministers had to realign their position 
significantly. 
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The article proceeds as follows: the next section introduces the theoretical framework that 
underlies this study. Section two briefly outlines the research design and explains the case 
selection. In section three and four, I present the empirical findings for the two country 
studies. Section five discusses the results in light of the theoretical framework and 
concludes.  
2. EU Politicisation and Domestic Impact 
2.1 The effect of polarising legislative proposals on the communicative link between national 
parliaments and their electorates. 
So far, much of the debate about the missing link between citizens and EU decision-makers 
has focused on the relationship between voters and the institutions on the European level 
(see esp. Hix 2008). However, the same (or an even worse) situation can be found also on 
the national level when looking at the relationship between national parliaments and their 
national electorates (e.g. Schmidt 2006).  
According to the responsible party model (e.g. Thomassen 1994; Thomassen et al. 2004), 
democratic representation in any political system crucially relies on political parties taking 
different positions on the issues at stake and communicating these positions to their voters – 
thereby providing them with policy choices between which they can choose at national 
elections. 
‘[P]ublic contestation or political competition has been generally recognized as one of the most 
essential characteristics of modern democracy (Dahl 1971). As modern democracy is hardly 
conceivable without political parties, political competition implies a major function for mass political 
parties’ (Thomassen et al. 2004, p.141) 
Providing a forum for this competition is exactly what the communicative or citizen-related 
function of national parliaments is about (see also the introduction by Auel and Raunio in this 
volume). However, research so far suggests that national parliaments currently restrict their 
EU-related activities mainly to scrutinising their governments (i.e. their government related 
functions) but hardly discuss EU issues in plenary (Bergman et al. 2003). More recent 
studies show that today, salient EU issues can cause some debates (see the contributions 
by Auel and Raunio and de Wilde in this volume). However, they also suggest that national 
MPs are overall rather reluctant to communicate Europe to their citizens (see also the 
contribution by Pollak and Slominski in this volume) and that also outside the parliamentary 
arena, national parties have shown little interest to put European issues on their agenda 
(Ladrech 2007).  
The reason for this situation lies to a large extent in the incentive structure of the parties 
themselves. According to theories on party competition and issue salience in particular, 
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parties generally only raise those issues, from which they expect to gain an electoral 
advantage (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983). For this to be the case, four conditions must be 
met: 
First, an issue must have at least some salience for the parties’ potential voters and hence 
potentially affect their voting behaviour. Second, parties only raise issues on which they hold 
a position different to their main competitors as otherwise there is not only little to discuss 
about, but also not much to gain from discussing these issues in electoral terms (e.g. Taggart 
and Sczcerbiak 2008, p. 349). Third, to gain from raising an issue, the position of the party 
must be in line with the interests of the voters it seeks to attract. Finally, the party needs to 
be internally cohesive regarding the issue as otherwise politicising it would first and foremost 
lead to detrimental conflicts within the party.  
Looking at national parliamentary parties in EU decision-making today, these four 
requirements are rarely met. First, while the question of EU integration with the end of the 
‘permissive consensus’ recently increased its salience (Hooghe and Marks 2009), public and 
citizen attention to EU ‘day-to-day’ decision-making is still low and plays a minor role even at 
elections to the EP let alone in national elections (e.g. Thomassen 2009).  
Second, it has been stated that amongst European elites (i.e. between mainstream parties), 
there is rather broad consensus about questions of EU integration (Ray 2003). In recent 
years, this elite consensus, as the citizens’ permissive consensus, may have been reduced, 
and indeed actors (parties) holding different ideological positions today often take different 
views regarding how things should be handled on the EU level (Hix 2008). Still, the question 
is whether the actual legislative proposals presented by the Commission regarding these 
issues can stimulate real political ‘battles’ and hence significantly increase public attention. 
This because these proposals usually already reflect a rather ‘centrist’ compromise as, to get 
its proposal through, the Commission needs the support of both centre-left and centre-right 
actors within the Commission, the EP and the Council. As a result, the very nature of 
legislative proposals often remains quite uncontested, and discussions are therefore 
confined to more or less small details, which are of little interest to both the media and the 
broader public. 
Third, at least with regard to the question of EU integration in general especially the large 
parties at the ideological centre usually hold more positive views than their voters (Mattila 
and Raunio 2006). And finally, these parties are also often internally quite divided on EU 
issues (Hix 1999). The last three points may be less true for parties located further to the left 
or right. These parties generally take positions different to those of centrist parties, they are 
often internally more cohesive than bigger parties and their own position is also frequently 
more in line with the position of their electorates. However, these parties are usually too 
small to enforce broad plenary debates. 
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In sum, while some authors have argued that politicisation cannot be enforced on national 
parties top down but that it is the parties themselves who would have to start debating EU 
issues (Ladrech 2007), the likelihood for this to happen is low. What seems necessary 
therefore is to change the nature of the issues discussed in a way that they change the 
incentive structure of the parties. This, I argue, could be achieved through stronger polarising 
legislative Commission proposals on which centre-left and centre-right parties hold different 
views. For various reasons, such polarising proposals should ‘help’ national parliamentary 
parties to overcome their current reluctance to debate EU issues.1 
First, they increase conflict and contestation between and within the institutions at the 
European level—thereby increasing the salience of the issues for national voters. This not 
only makes it more interesting for parties in national parliaments to take them up, too, but it 
also makes it harder for them to ignore these issues, even when they are internally divided, 
or when their (initial) position might not be in line with their potential voters. 
Second, and probably even more importantly, polarising proposals (as on the European 
level) should break up the ‘grand coalitions’ at the ideological centre within national 
parliaments, which often involve major parties from both government and opposition, and 
stimulate discussions between these parties not only about technical details, but about the 
very nature of the proposal. They create an incentive for e.g. a large centre-left opposition 
party to criticise its centre-right opponent(s) in government for either supporting a proposal or 
for supporting it not strongly enough. This, on the one hand, forces governing parties to 
publicly explain their position. Opposition parties, on the other hand, cannot restrict 
themselves to criticising the government, but need to present an alternative position and to 
argue why this position would be better for the country.  
In sum, therefore, I expect top-down politicisation through polarising Commission proposals 
to lead to (a) open parliamentary debates in which (b) national parties outline and justify their 
different positions. 
2.2 The effect of polarising legislative proposals on minister alignment in Council decision-
making 
By now, debates about the missing electoral link between citizens and EU decision-makers 
on the one hand, and debates about the classical critique about the EU’s ‘institutional’ 
democratic deficit on the other, have proceeded by and large in separation from each other. 
However, in the following I will argue why - especially when looking at national parliaments - 
there might actually be a link between how national parliaments fulfil their citizen- and their 
                                                     
1
 Due to restrictions in space the question, how such proposals could be achieved will not be addressed in this 
article. 
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government-related functions and how EU politicisation may not only strengthen the former, 
but also the latter - leading to ministers better aligned to their constituencies interests. 
The shift in the debate about the EU’s democratic deficit from institutional shortcomings to 
missing electoral linkages is, inter alia, owed to the fact that several prominent scholars 
during the last years have argued that – after various institutional reforms that strengthened 
both the EP and national parliaments – the EU’s current institutional setting indeed ensures 
that, most of the time, the outcome of EU decision-making reflects the interest of the 
European ‘median voter’ (e.g. Hix 2008, pp. 67-86; Moravcsik 2002; Scharpf 2009, p. 177). 
However, based on a principal-agent model I will argue below why, (a) at least when looking 
at national parliaments, parliamentary control is still far from perfect and how (b) politicisation 
could reduce this problem.2 
Decision-making in the Council is characterised by a long chain of delegation. In 
parliamentary democracies, this chain starts at the national electorate, goes on to the 
national parliament, the government and finally ends up at the minister in charge of the issue 
discussed, her ministry, and its civil servants (cf. Strøm 2000). While principal-agent 
problems can of course occur between every two links in this chain, for now I focus on the 
problems that may occur in the delegation from the national parliament to the minister in 
charge and her ministry. 
As agency theory argues, each act of delegation is faced with two problems (e.g. McCubbins 
et al. 1987). First, principal and agent may have conflicting interests (interest heterogeneity). 
Second, there may be a structural information asymmetry between principal and agent 
regarding the agent’s behaviour. If both conditions are met, delegation bears the risk of 
agency loss, which means that the agent is not acting according to the principal’s, but 
according to her own interest. 
Both problems can be found in the relationship between national parliaments and the 
ministers sitting in the Council. First, and looking at interest heterogeneity, a minister and her 
civil servants may have biased preferences and may use Council decision-making to pursue 
their own (ministry’s) instead of the parliament’s interest (e.g. Steunenberg 2003). While 
parliaments usually take into consideration the expected effects a proposal may have on a 
large number of policy fields or societal groups, a single minister may be quite willing to 
accept a proposal that fits her sectoral interests, even if it involves considerable societal 
costs, as long as these costs do not fall into her area of responsibility. Such biases are even 
more likely, as the sectoralization of Council decision-making also raises major challenges 
within governments to develop a coordinated and well balanced position (Kassim et al, 
2000). 
                                                     
2
 For principal-agent problems in Council decision-making see also Miklin (2009).  
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Second, the two-level game nature of Council decision-making makes it particularly prone to 
information asymmetries between the minister on the European level and the parliament on 
the national level (cf. Moravcsik 1994; Putnam 1988). Despite some improvements regarding 
its openness, negotiations in the Council still largely take place behind closed doors. This not 
only makes it very hard for parliaments to control the behaviour of their agents in the 
Council, but it also makes it difficult for them to judge whether their agents’ position is 
appropriate in the light of the positions of the other member states. 
Principals that want to avoid agency loss despite heterogeneous preferences and 
information asymmetries need to create a system that allows them to effectively control and 
monitor their agents’ behaviour and hence to detect potential problems in time (e.g. 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  Research on national parliaments in the EU shows that 
parliaments have responded to this challenge by continuously adopting formal measures that 
allow them to scrutinise the governments’ activities in the Council (e.g. the creation of 
specialised EU-committees or the introduction of increased reporting requirements; for a 
review see Raunio 2009). Still, research looking at national parliaments’ actual behaviour 
rather than at formal provisions suggests that control of national parliaments over Council 
decision-making is still far from perfect. There are two main explanations for this. 
First, national parliaments face a lack of resources. While in the early days of EU integration 
it was difficult for parliaments to receive sufficient information about the processes on the 
European level, getting enough information today is often not a problem anymore. But as all 
national parliaments have to deal with EU issues in addition to their ‘normal’ tasks in national 
decision-making, they often simply lack the resources to screen all the documents effectively, 
critically and in time (e.g. Pollak and Slominski 2003). 
Second, like in the case of plenary debates, the incentive structure of the parties within the 
parliament works against spending more of their time on EU issues rather than on national 
issues (Raunio 2009, p.328). Given the current low salience of EU issues, most national 
voters mainly base their votes on parties’ stands towards ‘national’ issues. Hence, for ‘vote 
seeking’ parties, it is perfectly rational to spend their scarce time on national, rather than on 
European issues. 
In sum, heterogeneity of interest between national parliaments and their ministers as well as 
the limited resources national parliaments have available for, and are willing to spend on, EU 
decision-making bear the risk that representatives in the Council pursue their own rather 
than their national parliaments’ interest. However, as with regard to the missing 
communicative link, there are at least two reasons for why a politicisation of EU decision-
making should reduce this risk. 
First, intense debates about polarising issues at the European level, and the public and 
media attention they generate in the member states, simply make it less likely for 
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parliaments to miss important matters. Second, the higher salience of these issues for 
national voters again changes the incentive structure of parliamentary parties in a way that 
parties spend more time on them. Looking at formal provisions, Saalfeld (2005) has shown a 
positive link between the political saliency of EU integration overall in a given country and the 
scrutiny rights of this country’s national parliament vis-á-vis its government. There is little 
reason to assume that this causal mechanism does not also work for the actual attention 
paid to specific European issues.  
Hence, I expect ‘top-down’ EU politicisation (a) to increase parliamentary attention for, and 
control over, Council decision-making, which (b) results in ministers better aligned to their 
parliaments’ interests. 
3. Data and case selection 
The plausibility of the hypotheses formulated above is evaluated through a qualitative 
comparative case study of parliamentary activities in two member states (Germany and 
Austria) with regard to the first Commission draft on the ‘Directive on Services in the Internal 
Market’ (COM2004/02 final). The Services directive is a particularly interesting case for two 
reasons. First, it probably is the most highly politicised and polarising issue of day-to-day EU 
decision-making in recent years that sharply divided actors located left and right of the 
ideological centre. The directive, therefore, provides one of the rare opportunities to look at 
the effect EU-level polarisation and politicisation actually has on the variables of interest in 
this study: parliamentary debate, visibility of choices, parliamentary control, and minister 
alignment. 
In January 2004, the European Commission presented its first draft, which aimed at 
removing obstacles that hampered intra-EU trade in services. While this first draft was by 
and large welcomed by (centre-) right actors, it met with serious criticism from (centre-) left 
actors for two reasons mainly: Opponents (a) criticised the directive’s de-regulatory 
character, and especially the inclusion of the so-called country of origin principle (CoOP). 
The CoOP provided that a service company, with certain exceptions, would have to follow 
only its homeland’s regulations when providing services in other member states on a 
temporary basis. Together with trade unions and small and medium sized enterprises (SME) 
organisations, (centre-) left parties in the EP, and at the national level, feared that the 
principle would lead to social dumping and a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’. Criticism (b) was 
raised against the inclusion of services of general economic interest into the scope of the 
directive, which was feared to force member states to liberalise their public-services sectors. 
After intense debates within and between the Commission, the Council and the EP and even 
the European Council, the EP, therefore, adopted a strongly revised version of the directive 
in its first reading in February 2006. Most importantly, the EP eliminated the CoOP and also 
clarified the scope of the directive with regard to services of general economic interest. In 
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April 2006, the Commission by and large agreed on the EP’s amendments and presented a 
revised draft. The Council agreed on this new draft in August 2006. 
What also makes the Services directive an interesting case is the fact that the problems the 
initial Commission draft caused from a left-wing perspective remained undetected for several 
months after the proposal was presented. As a result, politicisation set in only after a 
considerable time lag. This provides the analysis with variation over time on its independent 
variable and facilitates a quasi-experimental setting in which I (a) compare the way national 
parliaments dealt with the issue before and after it was politicised and (b) analyse how this 
has affected the ministers’ positions in the Council. 
The idea behind choosing Germany and Austria was to hold factors other than the degree of 
politicisation that might influence national parliaments’ behaviour constant as far as possible. 
Comparative research on parliamentary control in EU decision-making has shown very 
similar results for Germany and Austria, and both belong to the countries with comparatively 
active parliaments and strong scrutiny rights (Bergman et al. 2003; Raunio 2005). 
In the following, I reconstruct the processes of position-finding in the countries before and 
after politicisation set in. For both cases, I first examine the way national parliaments dealt 
with the directive before and after it had become politicised. I then show whether and how 
potential changes in the parliaments’ behaviour affected the positions of the ministers in the 
Council. 
Data used for the analysis are official documents and protocols mainly from national 
parliaments and governments, as well as position papers and press releases from various 
national actors and the national news coverage. In addition, I conducted 26 semi-structured 
expert interviews with actors directly involved in the discussions both at the European level 
(i.e. representatives from the Commission or the member states sitting in the Council’s 
working groups and the Council itself) and at the national level (members of the national 
governments and parliaments, civil servants from the ministries in charge, and 
representatives from national interest groups).3 
4. The Services Directive in the German Bundestag 
4.1 Parliamentary Debates and Visibility of Choices 
When the Commission published its draft in January 2004, public and media attention for the 
directive in Germany was low for several months. During these months, no debate on the 
directive in the plenary of the Bundestag took place. The first and only time the directive was 
                                                     
3
 Interviews were conducted with the assurance of the anonymity of the interviewee. References therefore follow the 
system ‘Interview number: Line in transcript’ (e.g. Int99:356). The full transcripts are accessible through the author. 
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mentioned at all was a brief and very general statement of a Green parliamentarian in April 
(plenary protocol 15/102: 9222). Apart from that, no party took up on the issue, let alone did 
parties discuss their views on it. 
Politicisation in Germany set in during early summer 2004, about half a year after the 
proposal was presented. This was stimulated mainly by the increasing debates in the EP and 
massive public protests mobilised by national trade unions and SME organisations. From 
autumn onwards, these debates increasingly also found their way into the plenary sessions 
of the Bundestag. After some rather muted discussions as of November 2004, debates 
clearly intensified in spring 2005. Between March and June the directive was discussed in 
several plenary sessions, either directly or in the context of other debates (e.g. plenary 
protocols 15/166; 15/167; 15/175; 15/181; 15/184). After the 2005 summer break and early 
federal elections in September, debates started again in December and reached a second 
peak during the weeks before and after the EP’s First Reading in February 2006. Again the 
directive was addressed repeatedly either directly or during debates on other topics (plenary 
protocols 16/14; 16/22; 16/28; 16/29; 16/30; 16/36). 
The positions of the parties in these debates reflected the classical left-right divide. On the 
left side, the two governing parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen (Greens), were in principle positive about the idea to increase the integration of the 
European services market but clearly rejected the Commission’s actual draft (Int08:25; 
Int06:145). They strongly criticised both the inclusion of services of general economic 
interest and the CoOP. The latter they expected to lead to a comprehensive regulatory race-
to-the-bottom, which would harm especially rich and highly regulated countries like Germany. 
Instead of a ‘radical’ de-regulatory framework-directive, the parties therefore advocated a 
more restrictive approach, accompanied with EU-wide regulatory minimum standards. In 
their position, SPD and the Greens were joined by the even more critical Left party, who also 
rejected the very idea of the necessity of increasing intra-EU trade in services (Int33:10). 
It was mainly these left-wing governing parties that motivated the debates in the plenary. 
One reason for this was their aim to further increase public pressure and hence to prevent 
the directive from becoming adopted. But for the SPD there was also a second reason. At 
this time, the party had just lost a number of regional elections and also did rather badly in 
electoral forecasts for upcoming elections. In this situation, making the Services directive an 
issue was seen as a welcome opportunity to re-build the party’s tattered reputation on the 
social dimension (Int04:308; Int07:64; Int09:271; Int12:195). 
On the right side, the (centre-) right opposition parties, the Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and especially the Free Democratic Party (FDP), 
took a much more positive position. Both parties basically welcomed the Commission’s draft, 
the inclusion of services of general economic interest and also the CoOP. They rejected the 
left-wing parties’ claim that the CoOP would lead to a race-to-the-bottom and regarded 
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Germany as one of the big winners of the draft. Also, they rejected the idea of the governing 
parties to achieve integration via common minimum standards as un-realistic (e.g. plenary 
protocol 16/14: 1008; Int02:78).  
This left-right divide became also visible in the voting results on two parliamentary motions. A 
motion supportive of the Services directive moved by the FDP and endorsed by CDU/CSU 
(Bundestag Drucksache 15/5131) was rejected by the left parties, who in turn adopted a 
‘dismissive’ motion (Bundestag Drucksache 15/5832) against the votes of CDU/CSU and the 
FDP. The cleavage disappeared only in February 2006, when the EP presented its revised 
draft. This new draft was by and large welcomed as a successful compromise by CDU/CSU 
and SPD, but was criticised for still being too liberal by the Green party and the Left party 
and for being too restrictive by the FDP. 
4.2 Parliamentary Control and Minister Alignment 
During about the first five months after the presentation of the draft, parliamentary 
engagement with regard to the directive was basically inexistent. Interviewees from 
opposition and governing parties uniformly confirmed that initially the parties paid hardly any 
attention to the directive. Rather, ‘as usual’ the parties just relied on the information they 
received from the government and especially from the ministry in charge, the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour (FMEL; e.g. Int04:96; Int02:261; Int03:270). As a result, 
the minister in charge, economics minister Wolfgang Clement (SPD), was quite free to 
choose his position during this phase. Even more so, as during this early phase hardly any 
coordination regarding the directive had taken place within the German government either 
(Int04:260; Int08:367). 
In this phase, the ministry adopted a very positive position at the European level (Int20:270; 
Int10:154; Int26:355) and at the national level, with members of the Bundestag describing 
the ministry’s position as almost enthusiastic (e.g. Int04:260; Int09:262; Int03:73). Minister 
Clement welcomed both the directive in general and the CoOP, which for him formed the 
heart of the directive. No critique was raised with regard to services of general economic 
interest, and Clement expected Germany to be a clear winner of the directive, which he 
expected to create about 100,000 jobs in the German services sector. 
Parliamentary attention for the directive increased only in early summer, when politicisation 
set in and the parties were woken up by the debates in the EP and the protests of national 
interest groups (Int12:317; Int04:89/285). Especially the two governing parties now took a 
closer look at the directive and Clement’s position, and both set up an internal working group 
to do so. This soon resulted in the very critical positions discussed above. 
While forming their position, the two governing parties soon realised the mismatch between 
this critical position and the positive position of their minister. As of the summer months, this 
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led to quite severe debates, especially between minister Clement and the SPD. Conflicts 
increased further throughout autumn 2004, as Clement still stuck to his positive position (e.g. 
Int08:101). By then, this position was also supported by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
(SPD). 
However, as a result of the ongoing public debates and the increasing conflicts within the 
party, but also with other ministers, Schröder changed his position in early 2005. At a 
meeting with then French President Jacques Chirac, he even called on the Commission to 
withdraw its draft.4 Now, Schröder also urged Clement to pay more attention to the 
objections raised, and told him he needed to involve other (more critical) ministries better in 
the development of the German position if he wanted to retain the leadership on the directive 
(Der Spiegel 21 February 2005: 85). As a result, Clement gave in, and the FEML as of 
February 2005 adapted to the critical position of the parliamentary majority (Int26:156; 
Int10:153; Deutscher Bundestag Ausschussdrucksache 15(9)1853).5 
5. The Services Directive in the Austrian Nationalrat 
5.1 Parliamentary Debates and Visibility of Choices 
In Austria, public attention for the directive was also low in the early months of 2004. During 
these months, no debate on the directive took place in the Austrian parliament or its EU 
committee either. Until October 2004, the directive was not mentioned a single time, let alone 
discussed among the parties or between them and the government in the plenary. 
Politicisation in Austria started in about June 2004 and really took off as of September. As in 
Germany, this was mainly driven by protests of employee- and SME organisations, as well 
as by the debates in the EP. Additionally, politicisation in Austria was also a result of a spill-
over from other member states, where debates on the proposal had already started earlier 
(Int28:251; Int24:415). 
As of late autumn 2004, these debates found their way into the Austrian parliament. While 
the directive was mentioned in some plenary meetings as of November 2004 (plenary 
protocols XXII/85; XXII/84; XXII/83) and discussed with the minister in charge, minister of 
economics Martin Bartenstein (ÖVP), in the EU committee in December (Austrian 
Parliament, 2005), debates intensified throughout 2005 and proceeded until the parliament’s 
summer break (plenary protocols XXII/97; XXII/99; XXII/102; XXII/104; XXII/109; XXII/115; 
XXII/124). After the summer break, debates started again with a lengthy discussion of the 
                                                     
4
 For Schröder’s full speech see: 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/allemand/ansprachen_und_dokumente/2005/pressekonferenz_mit_staatsprasidenten_c
hirac_und_bundeskanzler_schroder_in_blomberg.33201.html (last accessed: 18.12.2009) 
5
 After early elections in September 2005, a new government composed of CDU/CSU and SPD assumed power. 
Because of an internal conflict on the CoOP, this new government and the minister now in charge, Michael Glos 
(CSU), never took a clear position on the draft but rather waited for the revised draft coming from the EP. 
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directive in September (plenary protocol XXII/124) and intensified again in the weeks before 
and after the EP’s first reading in February 2006 (plenary protocols XXII/131; XXII/133; 
XXII/138; XXII/144; XXII/152). 
Looking at the positions of the parties, again a left-right divide comes to the fore. The two 
left-wing opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Green Party 
(Greens), adopted a very critical position (e.g. plenary protocols XXII/124:58f; Int24:24; 
Int34:10). Both parties principally welcomed the idea of a directive to increase the integration 
of the EU’s market for services, but strongly rejected the Commission’s proposal. They 
criticised the inclusion of services of general economic interest and, most importantly, the 
CoOP. Like their German sister parties, they expected it to lead to a regulatory race-to-the-
bottom, which would especially harm countries like Austria. 
Again, it was mainly these centre-left parties that motivated the debates in the plenary and 
criticised the, here centre-right, governing parties for being reluctant to discuss the directive 
(plenary protocol XXII/109:73). To force a debate, the Social democrats also addressed a 
number of parliamentary inquiries to various ministers from February to March 2005 (2686/J 
XXII. GP; 2752/J XXII. GP; 2687/J XXII. GP; 2688/J XXII. GP; 2685/J XXII. GP). 
The critique from the left was initially largely rejected as unfounded and unrealistic by the 
centre-right governing parties, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom 
Party/Alliance for the Future of Austria (FPÖ/BZÖ).6 While the governing parties also stated 
that some aspects of the directive still needed to be clarified, during the first wave of debates 
they clearly welcomed the Commission’s comprehensive de-regulatory approach, and also 
voiced their support for the CoOP. This left-right cleavage was also reflected in the voting 
results on a critical motion brought by the SPÖ in May 2005 (plenary protocol XXII/109: 157f) 
which received the support of the Green party, but was rejected by the majority of the 
governing parties. 
After the 2005 summer break, the picture somewhat started to change, though. Especially 
the FPÖ/BZÖ, but also the ÖVP, now asked for a number of clarifications and new 
exceptions from the directive, most notably in the field of services of general economic 
interest. Still, despite this more nuanced position, the governing parties continued to defend 
the directive against the criticisms of the opposition. In line with this, they voted down 
another critical motion from the SPÖ and the Greens and adopted their own, more positive 
one, instead (plenary protocol XXII/124: 61, 68, 72, 92, and 94). The left-right divide 
disappeared only after the EP’s first reading. The EP’s new draft was welcomed as a 
successful compromise by the ÖVP, the SPÖ, and the FPÖ/BZÖ. Only the Greens rejected 
the new draft as still too neo-liberal. 
                                                     
6
 In April 2005 the majority of FPÖ delegates (including all government representatives) left their party and joined 
the newly founded BZÖ. However, within the Nationalrat, the parties still acted as a uniform parliamentary party. 
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5.2 Parliamentary Control and Minister Alignment 
In Austria, parliamentary control with regard to the directive was also completely absent for 
at least the first six months after the proposal was presented. Again, members of the 
parliament confirmed that they had simply overlooked the proposal (Int24:397; Int34:283) 
and that nobody was interested in it (Int28:257). Hence, in Austria the ministry in charge, the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (FMEL), and its minister, Martin Bartenstein 
(ÖVP), were largely free to choose their position as well, not least because at that point other 
ministers did not pay any attention to the directive (Int28:251; Int24:366). 
In this phase, the FEML adopted a very positive position at the European level (Int05:333; 
Int10:36) and at the national level (Austrian Parliament, 2004). Minister Bartenstein 
welcomed the Commission’s proposal, its de-regulatory character and especially the CoOP 
as the cornerstone of the directive. Austria was seen as one of the big beneficiaries of the 
proposal, and no criticism was raised regarding the inclusion of services of general economic 
interest. 
Parliamentary attention for the directive started to increase only during the summer of 2004. 
It was again the centre-left parties that first reacted to the discussions on the European level 
and in other member states, and to the protests of national interest groups. Once the SPÖ 
and the Greens took a closer look at the directive and adapted their critical stance on it, they 
started to criticise the minister in the parliament repeatedly for his positive position and, by 
doing so, also tried to ‘wake up’ the governing parties who until then had not paid any 
attention to the directive (Int24:373). 
And indeed, while in the first debates the governing parties clearly supported the minister’s 
position in the course of the discussions they became more critical. While members of the 
ÖVP raised their critique mainly ‘off the record’ (Int35:213; Int24:515), BZÖ members also 
publicly criticised the minister for his, in their view, too positive position (Austrian Parliament, 
2005). Inside the government, some ministries also took a more reserved position when they 
had to reply to the SPÖ’s inquiries. As a result, the FEML gave in to this internal critique 
step-by-step and adopted a more critical, although still basically supportive, position (e.g. 
Int10:43; plenary protocol XXII/124: 65, 82). 
In November 2006, another change in the Austrian position occurred. At a social-partner 
meeting in Brussels, Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) surprisingly called on the 
Commission to withdraw its draft and to replace it by a new one that would prevent social 
dumping and should not threaten member states’ systems of public services (BKA 2005). 
After a short delay, also minister Bartenstein and his civil servants adapted to this position 
(BMWA 2006). 
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This change in the Austrian position this time was not the result of inter-party or intra-
governmental discussions, though. Rather it was a reaction to the ongoing and still 
increasing public critique on the directive. As members of governing- and opposition parties 
stated, strategic electoral considerations within the ÖVP played an important factor in this 
context. At this time, the ÖVP had just faced a major defeat at a regional election and 
therefore wanted to improve its social profile for an upcoming national election (Int24:263; 
Int25:78, also Int28:181). Giving up its previous position, however, was clearly alleviated by 
the fact that - at this point - it had become already clear that the initial Commission draft 
would not get sufficient support either in the EP or in the Council. Hence, the costs for the 
government from a policy-seeking perspective were modest. 
6. Conclusion 
This article takes up recent arguments that EU decision-making should be politicised to 
strengthen the electoral link between the institutions on the European level and the citizens 
on the national level (Hix 2008; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Zürn 2006). To advance this debate, 
the article discussed how a top down politicisation through polarising Commission proposals 
would affect the way national parliaments fulfil their citizen- and government-related 
functions in the European Union.  
Looking at national parliaments’ citizen-related functions, I have argued that greater 
polarising of legislative proposals helps to overcome parliaments’ current reluctance to 
publicly discuss and compete on EU issues because such proposals change the incentive 
structure of those large centrist parties that are able to enforce broad parliamentary debates. 
In a second step, I have argued that EU politicisation also improves the way national 
parliaments fulfil their government-related functions because it increases their attention for 
Council decision-making, and hence reduces the risk that ministers pursue idiosyncratic 
positions. 
The empirical findings of the study on the debates in Germany and Austria about the 
Services directive clearly support the argument that politicisation stimulates open 
parliamentary debates in which national parties discuss and justify their different views. Once 
the Services directive’s ‘polarising’ nature had been detected and it had become politicised, 
the directive was publicly discussed several times in both parliaments. Additionally, a number 
of parliamentary motions and inquiries forced the government, the governing parties, but 
also the opposition parties to explain and justify their position. 
These debates also clearly disclosed the differences between the parties in the parliament. 
(Centre-) Right parties welcomed the Commission’s approach of a de-regulatory framework-
directive covering basically the whole services sector. To some extent, they also welcomed 
the inclusion of services of general economic interest and the CoOP as the directive’s main 
instrument. (Centre-) Left parties, except for the Left Party in Germany, were also in favour of 
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a deeper integration of the services market. However, they feared that a comprehensive 
approach, as was included in the first draft, based exclusively on de-regulation in a field as 
diverse as the services-sector, would probably create more problems than it would solve. 
Therefore, these parties favoured a more restrictive approach, where remaining barriers 
should be removed later via sectoral directives and EU-wide regulatory minimum standards.  
The results also support the argument that politicisation increases parliamentary attention 
for, and hence control over, EU decision-making—which leads to a better alignment of the 
actors sitting in the Council. In both countries, the phase before politicisation was marked by 
a classical principal-agent problem. First, there were large information asymmetries between 
the parliaments and the ministries in charge. Not only did parliamentary parties fail to publicly 
discuss the directive, they did not engage with it at all. Information asymmetries were 
removed only after about six months, when parliaments were woken up by the debates on 
the European level and interest group protests in the member states. 
Second, not removing these asymmetries would have been problematic as in both countries 
there was a substantial (Germany) or at least significant (Austria) heterogeneity of interests 
between the ministers in charge and the parliamentary majority. In Germany, minister 
Clement took a very positive position on the directive, while both governing parties later 
rejected the Commission’s draft completely. In Austria, the governing parties did not oppose 
the draft completely. Still, they took a much more reserved position on the directive than the 
Austrian minister in charge, Martin Bartenstein. However, once the parties had been woken 
up and noticed the mismatch between their own and their minister’s position, they entered 
into a debate with their government, which in the end forced both ministers to adapt their 
position to their principals’ interests. 
Of course, generalisations from these findings to other examples of EU decision-making - as 
well as to the general ability of politicisation to strengthen the electoral link between national 
parliaments and citizens in EU decision-making - have to be made with care. First, this paper 
only shows that there were public debates in the parliaments. It did not examine, whether 
and to what extent, these debates were indeed absorbed by the media and - as a 
consequence - the national electorate. Second, given its left-right nature and the fact that it 
fit perfectly with established dimensions of party contestation in both parliaments, the 
Services directive is certainly a most-likely case for finding parliamentary debates on EU 
issues. 
Still, what the results suggest is, first, that addressing a political question, on which parties 
left and right of the centre provide different answers, may be a necessary, but not necessarily 
sufficient, condition for a legislative proposal to cause broad plenary debates. In addition, the 
proposal itself needs to cause polarisation. Both Commission proposals (the initial draft and 
the revised draft) were dealing with the same question (‘How to regulate the internal market 
for services?’). Only the first draft, however, generated comprehensive parliamentary 
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debates. These debates were driven mainly by centre-left social democratic parties. And it 
was only they who could do so, because they were large/powerful enough to repeatedly put 
the issue on the plenary agenda. Once the Commission presented its revised, ‘centrist’, draft 
that took Social democrats on board again, debates stopped quickly. The only parties now 
still opposing the directive (the Left Party in Germany and the Green Party in Austria) simply 
did not have sufficient power to keep them on their parliaments’ plenary agenda. 
Second, in contrast to other views (cf. Ladrech 2007), the results also suggest that 
politicisation can be imposed on parties top down and that even internal differences do not 
necessarily lead parties to suppress an issue. While, for example, German Social democrats 
were heavily divided on the issue initially, this did not detain them from raising the issue. 
Rather, it simply forced them to agree on a joint position internally before politicising the 
issue. In sum, while parliamentary parties both in scholarly and political debates are often 
criticised for hardly debating EU issues in public, this study did not reveal any hints that 
parties themselves try to avoid such discussions. What they seem to need, however, is 
something to compete on in the first place. 
 
7. References 
Austrian Parliament (2004) 'Beratungen des Ständigen Unterausschusses des 
Hauptausschusses in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (Auszugsweise 
Darstellung). Freitag, 12. November 2004.'  Vienna: Austrian Parliament. 
Austrian Parliament (2005) ‚Beratungen des Hauptausschusses in Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union (Auszugsweise Darstellung). Donnerstag, 20. Oktober 2005.’ 
Vienna: Austrian Parliament. 
Bergman, T. (2000) 'The European Union as the next step of delegation and accountability'. 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 415-29. 
Bergman, T., Müller, W.C., Strøm, K. and Blomgren, M. (2003) 'Democratic delegation and 
accountability: cross-national patterns'. In Strøm, K., Müller, W.C. and Bergman, T. 
(eds.) Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 109-220. 
BMWA (2006) 'Bartenstein begrüßt neue Dynamik bei Dienstleistungsrichtlinie'. Press 
Release, 10 January 2006.  Vienna: BMWA - Österreichisches Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft und Arbeit. 
BKA (2005) 'Schüssel: Dienstleistungsrichtlinie darf kein Sozialdumping verursachen', Press 
release, 25.10.2005.  Vienna: Bundeskanzleramt Österreich. 
Budge, I. and Farlie, D. (1983) Voting and Party Competition. London: Wiley. 
Føllesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) 'Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: a response to 
Majone and Moravcsik'. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 533 - 
62. 
Hix, S. (1999) ‘Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints 
and Partisan Responses.’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 35 Issue 1, 
pp. 69–106. 
I H S — Miklin / EU Politicisation and National Parliaments — 147 
Hix, S. (2008) What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix it. London: Polity 
Press. 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus.’ British Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 1-23.  
Kassim, H., Peters, G. and Wright, V. (eds.) (2000) The national co-ordination of EU policy. 
The domestic level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ladrech, R. (2007) 'National Political Parties and European Governance: The Consequences 
of 'Missing in Action''. West European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 945-60. 
Mair, P. (2007) 'Political Opposition and the European Union'. Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 1-17. 
Maurer, A. and Wessels, W. (2001a) 'The German case: A key moderator in a competitive 
multi-level environment'. In Kassim, H., Menon, A., Peters, G. and Wright, V. (eds.) 
The national co-ordination of EU policy. The European level. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 101-28. 
Mattila, M. and Raunio, T. (2006) ‘Cautious Voters -Supportive Parties. Opinion Congruence 
between Voters and Parties on the EU Dimension’ European Union Politics, Vol. 7 
No. 4, 427-49. 
McCubbins, M. and Schwartz, T. (1984) 'Congressional oversight overlooked:  Police patrols 
versus fire alarms'. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, pp. 165-79. 
McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R. and Weingast, B.R. (1987) 'Administrative procedures as 
instruments of political Control'. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 3, 
pp. 243-77. 
Miklin, E. (2009) ‘Government Positions on the EU Services Directive in the Council: 
National Interests or Individual Ideological Preferences?’. West European Politics, 
Vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 943-62. 
Moravcsik, A. (1994) 'Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domestic politics 
and European integration'. Working Paper Series 52 (Cambridge: Center for 
European Studies). 
Moravcsik, A. (2002) 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union'. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 603-24. 
Pollak, J. and Slominski, P. (2003) ‘Influencing EU Politics. The Case of the Austrian 
Parliament’. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 707-29. 
Putnam, R.D. (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games'. 
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-60. 
Raunio, T. (2005) 'Holding Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining Cross-
National Variation'. Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, pp. 319-41. 
Raunio, T. (2009) ‘National Parliaments and European Integration. What we know and 
Agenda for Future Research’. Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 317-
34. 
Ray, L. (2003) ‘When Parties Matter: The Conditional Influence of Party Positions on Voter 
Opinions about European Integration.’ The Journal of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 
978-94. 
Scharpf, F. (2009) 'Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity.' European Political Science 
Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 173-203. 
Schmidt, V.A. (2006) Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
148 — Miklin / EU Politicisation and National Parliaments — I H S  
 
Steunenberg, B. (2003) 'Deciding among equals: The Sectoral Councils of the European 
Union and their Reform'. In Holler, M., Kliemt, H., Schmidtchen, D. and Streit, M. 
(eds.) European Governance. Leiden: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 1-23. 
Strøm, K. (2000) 'Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies'. European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37, pp. 261-89. 
Taggert, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2008) ‘Conclusion: Opposition Europe? Three Patterns of 
Party Competition over Europe.’ In Szczerbiak, A. and Taggert, P. (eds.) Opposing 
Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 348-63. 
Thomassen, J. (1994) ‘Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy 
or Failing Models?’ In M. Jennings and T. Mann (eds.) Elections at Home and 
Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren Miller. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, pp. 237-65. 
Thomassen, J. (2009) ‘In Conclusion: The Legitimacy of the European Union after 
Enlargement‘ In Thomassen J. (ed.) The Legitimacy of the European Union after 
Enlargement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225-44. 
Thomassen, J., Noury A. G. and Voeten, E. (2004) ‘Political competition in the European 
Parliament: evidence from roll call and survey analyses.’ In Marks G. and  
Steenbergen M. (eds.) European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 141-64. 
Zürn, M. (2006) 'Zur Politisierung der Europäischen Union'. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 
Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 242-51. 
I H S — de Ruiter / Public Parliamentary Activities — 149 
Public Parliamentary Activities and Open Methods of Coordination  
Rik de Ruiter 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands how 
MPs of opposition parties go public with information on the performance of 
national policies from six Open Methods of Coordination (OMCs), and to 
what extent country differences in parliamentary procedures and the set-up 
of democratic systems matter in this context. The empirical findings indicate 
that Dutch MPs use more information from OMC reports to shame the 
incumbent government than British MPs. In both parliaments these shaming 
activities take primarily place in committee meetings and have no link with 
the newspaper coverage on OMCs. Activities of MPs aimed at going public 
with information from OMC reports established only a weak link between 
OMCs and the citizens in EU member states. 
 
1. Introduction 
Although regulations and directives remain the main output of European integration, new 
modes of governance (NMGs) - such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) - gained 
prominence in the EU decision-making process in the last decade. Through the publication 
at the EU level of OMC reports, on the performance of national policies and the sharing of 
information on policy practices between member states, national governments can gain 
insights on the performance of national policies. From the start of the OMC processes the 
European Commission and the member states were aware that their introduction could go 
hand in hand with the introduction of a new democratic deficit due to the dominance of 
national executives in OMCs at the EU level. Hence, the architects of the OMC included in 
the design of the method the promise of openness to stakeholders, MPs and the public in 
order to guarantee the input legitimacy of the method (Buchs 2008b; Smismans 2008; Zeitlin 
2008; MacPhail 2010). The European Commission fulfilled its part of this promise by 
publishing online OMC-related documents, including reports with country-specific information 
on the performance of national policies. Yet, it is unclear to what extent this information is 
known among a larger group of actors at the national level other than only to representatives 
of the government, and whether this larger group of actors discussed the country-specific 
information on the performance of policies in publicly accessible fora (Kroger 2009a; De La 
Porte 2010).  
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This paper looks at the public parliamentary aspects of the promise of openness included in 
the institutional design of OMCs and aims to answer two questions: how do MPs go public 
with information on the performance of national policies from OMC reports, and to what 
extent do country differences in parliamentary procedures and the set-up of democratic 
systems matter in this context? In this paper two possibilities are identified for MPs to go 
public with country-specific information on the performance of national policies from OMC 
reports; i.e. i) shaming the incumbent government by MPs from opposition parties in the 
parliamentary arena with the use of information from OMC reports and ii) MPs from 
opposition parties influencing journalists to raise attention for these parliamentary shaming 
activities in the media. These two strategies could contribute to raising wider awareness for 
OMCs in national politics and for the public at large. This paper is especially interested in the 
first possibly, but also pays some attention to the presence of OMC related parliamentary 
activities in newspaper coverage.  
In the next section background information is provided on the origin and functioning of 
OMCs, the literature on the involvement of MPs in OMCs is reviewed and the two 
possibilities for MPs to go public with information from OMCs are elaborated on. Second, 
hypotheses are formulated on possible country differences with regard to the frequency of 
the shaming activities in the parliamentary arena by MPs of opposition parties. Next, 
information is provided on the data collection and analysis to assess to what extent the two 
possibilities to go public with information obtained from OMC reports are used in practice by 
MPs from opposition parties, and how country differences in the use of OMC-related 
parliamentary shaming activities can be explained. Fourth, results are presented of the 
analysis of parliamentary and media data on six OMCs for the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Netherlands in the period 1996/1999-2009. In the concluding section it is assessed to what 
extent the activities of MPs aimed at going public with information from OMC reports provide 
a link between new modes of EU governance and the citizens in EU member states. 
2. Open Methods of Coordination: origin, functioning and openness 
The heads of state and government of the EU member states codified the OMC in 2000 by 
including four elements in the Lisbon presidency conclusions, together forming the 
institutional infrastructure of an OMC (Council of the European Union 2000).1 The complete 
infrastructure of the OMC consists of guidelines/objectives, indicators and benchmarks, 
reporting via National Action Plans (NAPs), and peer reviews. In subsequent years these 
four elements came to function as a template for implementing the OMCs education, 
Research and Development (R&D), e-Europe/i2010 (internet), social inclusion, and 
pensions. Because of the use of this template national governments play the central role in 
all OMCs. They approve by qualified majority in the Council the guidelines, indicators and 
                                                     
1
 This OMC template was strongly inspired by the Luxembourg process, designed in 1997 to establish the European 
Employment Strategy (EES). The latter strategy is referred to in this article as the OMC employment. 
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benchmarks on which the different national policies are scored, and formulate NAPs in which 
it is specified how they plan to improve their policies. The respective European Commission 
DGs and experts of national ministries identify the factors that cause a national policy to 
perform best and review the NAPs and policies of the member states in peer learning 
groups. The Commission and the Council draw up joint reports in which a summary is given 
of the progress made in each member state towards the objectives and worst and best policy 
practices are identified. Although these reports are non-binding, they do contain information 
on the performance of national policies for each member state – both worst and best policy 
practices are mentioned – including recommendations on how to improve dysfunctional 
policies. The reports are publicly available and are the main information source from OMCs 
on the performance of national policies.  
It is claimed in this paper that MPs have two possibilities to go public with information from 
OMC reports. First, MPs of opposition parties can ‘shame’ the incumbent government in the 
parliamentary arena with the use of information from OMC reports (Weishaupt 2009; De 
Ruiter 2010; Tholoniat 2010; Føllesdal 2011). Such a shaming strategy can lead to greater 
contestability of national policies of the incumbent government when the strategy is used in 
public meetings of parliamentary committees and in plenary debates and is documented in 
the minutes and are made publicly available afterwards (see A in figure 1). 
Second, MPs from opposition parties can influence journalists to try to raise attention for the 
OMC-related parliamentary shaming activities in the media (Meyer 2005). This second 
possibility for MPs to go public with information on the performance of national policies from 
OMC reports can result in direct references in the media to the OMC-related shaming 
activities by MPs (see B1 in figure 1), or more indirectly by references in the media to the 
bad performance of national policies in OMCs around the same time as MPs shame the 
incumbent government with the use of information included in OMC reports (see B2 in figure 
1). In figure 1 an overview is provided of the relationships under study in this paper. Because 
of the focus of this Collection of Working Papers on the communicative function of 
parliaments through parliamentary channels, more attention is paid in this paper to the first 
possibility for MPs to go public, i.e. shaming the incumbent government by MPs of opposition 
parties with the use of country-specific information from OMCs in parliamentary committee 
meetings and plenary debates.  
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Figure 1: Two types of OMC related public parliamentary activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Until now, scholars paying attention to the practical involvement of MPs in OMCs came to a 
rather negative assessment, claiming that MPs are not interested in OMCs because they 
judge their impact as marginal (Duina and Raunio 2007: 298-299), and are not able to 
scrutinize OMCs, due to the absence of scrutiny rules for OMCs, the open-ended nature of 
OMCs, and the concentration of information from OMC policy comparisons in the executive 
branch outside of the control of the legislature (Armstrong 2005; Jacobsson, 2005: 123; 
Visser 2005: 199-200; Raunio 2006; Benz, 2007; Tsakatika 2007; Papadopoulos 2010; 
Føllesdal 2011). However, these assessments are often based on the study of the OMC 
employment and OMC social inclusion, and do not look empirically at the actual amount of 
information on the performance of national policies which is publicly available for MPs to use. 
Hence, it is impossible to assess, on the basis of previous studies, to what extent MPs 
learned over the years how to use information from OMC reports to, for example, criticise the 
performance of policies of the incumbent government. This study aims to shed light on these 
issues. 
A second question answered in this paper is to what extent country differences in 
parliamentary procedures and the set-up of democratic systems matter for the extent to 
which shaming strategies are used by MPs. It is expected that the ‘shaming’ public 
parliamentary activity related to OMCs is not present to the same extent in the countries 
under study in this article, i.e. the Netherlands and the UK. On the basis of two structural 
differences between the parliamentary system of the UK and the Netherlands, three 
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hypotheses are formulated. First, the formal procedures with regard to parliamentary 
questioning differ between national parliaments of EU member states. Russo and Wiberg 
(2010) rank the UK parliament higher than the Dutch parliament on the formal procedures 
with regard to parliamentary questioning of the government, meaning that MPs in the UK 
have more opportunities to ask questions than in the Netherlands. In the next section it will 
be assessed whether the difference in formal procedures on parliamentary questioning 
between the two countries influences the public parliamentary activities related to OMCs in 
practice. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
1. MPs of opposition parties in a parliamentary system with extensive formal procedures to 
question the government, more often go public with information from OMC reports to shame 
the incumbent government, than MPs of opposition parties in a parliamentary system with 
more restrictive formal procedures to ask questions of the government. 
Second, parliaments in EU member states differ from each other with regard to the degree 
they are a ‘debating’ or ‘working parliament’. In a working parliament, parliamentary activities 
take primary place in the parliamentary committee meetings, whereas in debating 
parliaments, discussions more often take place in plenary sessions. As a result, working 
parliaments often have a more developed committee system than debating parliaments. 
Hence, it can be expected that: 
2. MPs of opposition parties in a debating parliament more often go public in plenary 
debates, with information from OMC reports, to shame the incumbent government than MPs 
of opposition parties in a working parliament. 
Third, and related to the second hypothesis, working parliaments have a give-and-take 
relationship between the legislature and the executive, with the latter trying to achieve a 
broad consensus for its plans, also among MPs of opposition parties. Debating parliaments 
are characterised by a more confrontational attitude between the government and the MPs in 
opposition. This increases the likelihood that MPs in a debating parliament are more eager to 
shame the incumbent government with information from OMC reports – both in committee 
meetings and plenary debates – than MPs in working parliaments. This reasoning leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
3. MPs of opposition parties in a debating parliament more often go public with information 
from OMC reports to shame the incumbent government than MPs of opposition parties in a 
working parliament.  
Whereas the second hypothesis only formulated an expectation of the difference in number 
of plenary debates between working and debating parliaments, the third hypothesis 
formulates an expectation of the total of parliamentary shaming activities in committee 
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meetings and plenary debates and the difference between working and debating 
parliaments. 
Table 1 gives a summary of how, according to the three hypotheses, the main differences 
between the Dutch and British parliamentary systems are likely to impact on public 
parliamentary activities by MPs of opposition parties in the context of OMCs. 
Table 1: Parliamentary procedures and OMC related shaming strategies by MPs of 
opposition parties in the UK and the Netherlands 
 H1: parliamentary 
questioning 
H2/H3: type of parliament 
 Formal 
procedures 
Expected 
degree of  
shaming 
through 
written or 
oral 
questions 
Working or 
debating 
parliament 
Expected 
degree of 
shaming in 
plenary 
debates 
Expected degree 
of total shaming 
in public 
parliamentary 
arena 
The 
Netherlands 
Restrictive Less Working Less Less 
United 
Kingdom 
Extensive More Debating More More 
 
3. Data collection and analysis 
The occurrence of the two possibilities for going public for MPs with information from OMC 
reports on the performance of national policies is studied through an analysis of 
parliamentary debates in the Dutch and British Upper and Lower House. The OMCs studied 
in this article are explicitly labeled as such by the European Commission and the Council. 
Multilateral Surveillance tools adopted at the EU level, that were in practice never developed 
as OMCs or only recently introduced, were not included in the analysis. These criteria 
resulted in the selection of the following OMCs: employment, social inclusion, pensions, 
education, R&D, and e-Europe/i2010 (internet). The period under study for the OMC 
employment runs from 1996 till 2009. Because of the later starting date for the other five 
OMCs the time period studied for these OMCs runs from 1999 till 2009. The end date of 
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December 2009 is chosen because of the new EU2020 strategy launched at the beginning 
of 2010, which led to a considerable restructuring of the patchwork-structure of OMCs that 
emerged during the last decade. 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were selected in this study because these 
member states differ from each other on the main independent variables of the three 
hypotheses (see table 1). The bicameral parliamentary system of the Netherlands is a 
working parliament. It has a highly developed committee system, while the formal 
procedures to ask parliamentary questions are somewhat restrictive (Russo and Wiberg 
2010). The bicameral system of the UK is a debating parliament with, as a result, a strong 
focus on plenary debates and a less developed committee system. Also practical reasons 
are underlying the choice for the UK and the Netherlands as country studies in this paper. In 
both countries the minutes of plenary and committee meetings are public and easily 
accessible via databases on the internet.  
The use of information from OMC reports by MPs is measured through the coding of minutes 
of plenary debates and public committee meetings, and questions by MPs. Documents for 
coding were selected through the use of search strings consisting of references to the 
European Union and the policy field on which the OMC is adopted. The documents were 
obtained from the databases on www.overheid.nl and http://www.parliament.uk, which 
provide access to all documents related to the plenary and committee debates of the Dutch 
and British Upper and Lower House. The parliamentary documents were analysed in detail 
and subsequently coded. When an MP of an opposition party, in a written or oral question, 
criticized the incumbent government using information from OMC reports, this was coded as 
one shaming question. Questions were only counted if they were explicitly addressed to the 
government and if the government was required to give an answer to them. An example of 
parliamentary shaming is the question asked to the Dutch government by three social-
democratic MPs in the Lower House of the biggest opposition party (PvdA: Hamer, Van Dam 
en Tichelaar) on the low number of students obtaining a degree in technical studies at Dutch 
universities. This information was obtained from the OMC policy comparisons and was 
summarized in one of the joint reports of the OMC education.2 
The number of shaming questions is aggregated for six month periods for each OMC 
(January-June; July-December) in the period 1996/1999-2009. A distinction was made in the 
data between OMC-related parliamentary shaming questions (in oral or written form) in 
plenary debates and in committee meetings. The latter category was further divided in 
‘written questions’ and ‘oral questions’. 
                                                     
2
 Aanhangsel van de Handelingen, Vragen gesteld door de leden der Kamer, met de daarop door de regering 
gegeven antwoorden, kvr18297, August 14 2003. 
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The media coverage on OMCs and/or the shaming activity of MPs of opposition parties was 
measured for the same periods in both EU member states through a content analysis of 
national newspapers included in the Lexis-Nexus database. For the Netherlands this 
resulted in a study of articles occurring in the following newspapers: Algemeen Dagblad, 
NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant, Trouw, Het Parool. In the case of the UK, articles for the 
following newspapers were studied: The Independent, The Times/Sunday Times, The 
Guardian, The Sun, The Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror. The articles were selected with the 
same search strings as used in the case of the parliamentary databases.  
The coding results were used to construct a dataset with the two countries as the units of 
analysis and the parliamentary questions by MPs of opposition parties as units of 
observation, aggregated for the six OMCs per six months. Regression models were 
estimated to test the third hypothesis,3 with the total number of parliamentary shaming 
activities by MPs of opposition parties as the dependent variable. Several variables were 
included in the regression model, in order to control for effects unrelated to the differences 
between the British and the Dutch parliamentary system that are expected to have an impact 
on the extent of public parliamentary activities in the context of OMCs.4 The political 
orientation of the minister responsible for the policy field on which an OMC is adopted is 
included as a variable in the analysis. This variable is coded as follows: 0 = left (NL: PVDA; 
UK: Labour); 1 = centre (NL: CDA, D’66; UK: Liberal democrats); 2 = right (NL: VVD; UK: 
Conservatives). This variable controls for the possibility that a minister of an ‘issue owning’ 
political party is in office. It can be expected that a right-wing opposition party is generally 
more critical towards a (centre-) left wing minister responsible for social policies – a so-called 
issue owner – than a (centre-) right wing minister responsible for social policies. Because 
such a dynamic is not related to the differences in parliamentary procedures in the two 
member states, this party political factor needs to be controlled for. A second control variable 
measures the change in government in a six month period (0 = no change; 1 = change). 
When changes in government take place it is likely that the use of information from OMCs by 
MPs and journalists is affected, possibly leading to a decrease in OMC-related parliamentary 
questions or newspaper articles. Hence, it is needed to control for the influence of changes 
in government after elections or government crises, in order to assess the influence of the 
differences in the set-up of parliamentary systems in the Netherlands and the UK. Third, 
other period effects were controlled for by including the total number of parliamentary 
documents related with policy fields on which an OMC is adopted. This variable controls for 
                                                     
3
 Only the third hypothesis is tested in a quantitative way. The other two hypotheses could not be tested 
quantitatively because of the low number of observations in each sub-category (i.e. parliamentary oral or written 
questions and plenary or committee debates). In the next section descriptive results are presented related with 
these two hypotheses, in order to shed light on the country differences in plenary debates/committee debates and 
oral/written questions. 
4
 The degree of Euroscepticism of MPs is not controlled for because the OMC touches upon national policies and 
does not result in any shift of competences from the national to the EU level. This is also explicitly recognised by 
MPs in the UK and the Netherlands, who expressed support in parliamentary discussions of the government on the 
principles of cross-national policy learning through OMCs. 
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fluctuations in parliamentary shaming questions that cannot be attributed to the use of 
OMCs, but are related to a change in the general attention for a policy field. The dependent 
variable with a time-lag of half a year is included in the analysis to control for the series past. 
Ordinary least square regression models with panel corrected standard errors were 
calculated in order to correct for problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Beck 
and Katz 1995).  
4. Results 
Before we can discuss the results of the data collection and analyses on the public 
parliamentary activities in the Netherlands and the UK, it is necessary to assess which 
information is included in the reports published in the context of the six OMCs on the 
performance of Dutch and British policies. Subsequently, the use of this information by MPs 
of opposition parties in the Netherlands and the UK is assessed. The results section 
concludes with discussing the three hypotheses in light of the empirical findings. 
4.1 The performance of Dutch and British policies in OMC reports 
Negative aspects of Dutch employment policies mentioned by the Commission and Council 
in the context of the OMC employment are the lower participation rates by women measured 
in hours, partially ineffective back to work schemes, differences in earning power between 
men and women, and the higher unemployment rates among ethnic minorities. In the context 
of the OMC social inclusion, critical remarks were made with regard to inefficient integration 
courses for ethnic minorities, insufficient attention for gender imbalances in anti-poverty 
measures, and shortages in childcare. After 2005 the social inclusion agenda was discussed 
together with country-specific reporting in the OMC pensions through joint reports on social 
protection. In these reports, some concerns are raised with regard to the financial 
sustainability of the Dutch pension system due to its reliance on the stock market. In the 
context of the OMC education, the Commission and Council are critical of the percentage of 
early school leavers, and the low number of women studying mathematics, science and 
technology. Criticism is voiced at the EU level through the OMC R&D on the low public and 
private investment in R&D policies in the Netherlands and the low number of R&D related 
public-private partnerships. In the context of the OMC e-Europe/i2010, the Commission 
indicates that Dutch government services became only recently available online, which 
results in a low use of these online-services by the Dutch population. 
In the UK, according to joint employment reports published in the context of the OMC 
employment, too few policy efforts are made to fight the long term unemployment, which is 
especially high among people with poor basic skills. Moreover, the UK has a large gender 
pay gap, low quality child care provisions and less active labour market policies than 
presented by the government. The joint reports on social protection and social exclusion 
make general statements on the need for the UK to reduce persistent inequalities, such as 
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those in income, health, skills and life chances. The social protection joint reports are more 
critical towards the adequacy of pensions in the UK and the decline in active participation in 
private pensions, causing a high risk-on-poverty among pensioners, particularly for those on 
low incomes. In joint reports published in the context of the OMC education, the Council and 
the Commission mention the relatively high share of early school leavers in the UK, ranging 
between 18.4% in 2000 and 13.0% in 2006. The reports published in the OMC R&D express 
concern about the relatively low UK government spending on R&D and the absence of a 
national target in line with the EU 3 per cent R&D investment target. In the e-Europe/i2010 
benchmarking reports it is noticed that the take-up of eGovernment services by British 
citizens and enterprises slumped after 2008 and that the UK scores below average on ICT 
R&D intensity.  
In sum, the OMC reports published at the EU level, on Dutch and British national policies, 
contain sufficient information that can be used at the national level in the assessment of the 
underperformance of national policies. In the next two sections it is determined whether this 
information from OMCs gained presence in the national parliamentary arena, and was 
referred to by, respectively, Dutch and British MPs of opposition parties and newspaper 
journalists. 
4.2 Shaming 
The data collected on the Dutch and British parliamentary debates show that Dutch MPs 
hardly made any use of information from the OMCs social inclusion, pensions and e-
Europe/i2010. Before 2005 the OMC employment is the most used OMC by Dutch MPs. The 
information from the OMC employment is primarily used by (center) left-wing opposition 
parties (PvdA, SP, Groen Links). The topics on which the Dutch governments were shamed 
by these parties were the low participation on the labour market (measured in hours), 
ineffective back to work schemes and differences in earning power between men and 
women. Information from the OMC education is used by MPs of opposition parties to put 
emphasis on the poor performance of Dutch policies on the benchmark with regard to early 
school leavers and the low number of students in technical studies. In the context of the 
OMC R&D, MPs of opposition parties – from left to right – use information from peer review 
reports to criticize the low private investments in R&D in the Netherlands vis-à-vis other EU 
member states. 
In the case of the UK, the shaming activity is highest for the OMC R&D, touching upon the 
low investment of the government and companies in innovation and ICT. The other OMCs 
have no more than 2 shaming questions.  
The empirical findings further indicate that there are differences in shaming strategies by 
MPs between the UK and the Netherlands. These differences are only partially in line with 
the three hypotheses formulated. First, the type and number of parliamentary questions 
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asked by MPs differed for the UK and the Netherlands, resulting in different OMC related 
shaming activities by MPs from opposition parties. The amount of oral questions asked by 
opposition MPs is much higher in the case of the Netherlands than in the UK. The number of 
written questions is higher in the UK than in the Netherlands (see figure 2). These findings 
hold both in absolute numbers as well as in percentages of the total of shaming activities in 
each member state (see figure 3). 
Figure 2: shaming questions by MPs of opposition parties  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the questions are asked in committee meetings, both in the UK and the Netherlands 
(see figure 3). The oral question category is high in the Netherlands because of the many 
committee meetings scheduled and the oral questions asked in those meetings. Here the 
'working parliament' characteristic – with its developed committee system – of the Dutch 
parliament comes clearly to the fore. The oral questions, in the Netherlands, are most of the 
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time asked in specialized standing committees (i.e. on economic affairs, education, social 
policy, employment) and not in the European Affairs Committee. 
Figure 3: written and oral questions in plenary and committee debates (in %, UK/NL) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the UK parliament oral questions are more rare (see figure 3). The shaming strategies of 
British MPs consist mainly of criticism on the incumbent government in written questions, 
based on information from committee reports of the European Scrutiny Committee, with the 
use of information on the bad performance of British policies included in the joint reports 
published in the context of OMCs. The European Committees used to be the most 
developed committees in the rather underdeveloped committee systems of the British 
parliament. 
Whereas in the Dutch parliament only MPs of opposition parties in the Lower House ask 
questions to shame the incumbent government with the use of information from OMC 
reports, in the UK a more diverse picture emerges with regard to the OMC related shaming 
activities by MPs in the Upper and Lower House (see figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Shaming questions in the House of Commons and House of Lords in the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the UK, the bulk of the shaming questions are asked by members of the House of 
Commons, both in written and in oral form. However, a considerable number of questions 
are asked by the Lords as well.  Members of the House of Lords ask almost as many written 
as oral questions. 
A second set of findings, relevant for testing the hypotheses formulated in this paper, 
touches upon the topic - in which sub-arena of the parliamentary arena the OMC-related 
parliamentary shaming takes place, i.e. in plenary debates or in committee meetings. It was 
hypothesised that in a working parliament the parliamentary activities primarily take place in 
the parliamentary committee meetings, whereas in debating parliaments, discussions 
relatively more often take place in plenary sessions. As a result, working parliaments such as 
the Dutch parliament often have a more developed committee system than debating 
parliaments, such as the British House of Commons and House of Lords. The results 
indicate, however, that MPs of opposition parties in the Netherlands make (percentagewise) 
as much use of plenary debates for their OMC related shaming strategies as British MPs 
(see figures 5 and 6). 
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Figure 5: shaming questions by MPs of opposition parties in committee meetings or 
plenary debates (in absolute numbers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the absolute numbers are higher in the Netherlands for the number of shaming 
activities in plenary debates (see figure 5), the percentage difference between the two 
parliaments is marginal (see figure 6; around 12% in the Netherlands and 13% in the UK). In 
sum, the second hypothesis does not hold because the degree of plenary shaming activity is 
the same for the Netherlands and the UK.  
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Figure 6: shaming in plenary/committee debates (in %, UK/NL)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from this similarity, there are also differences between the two countries. In the UK the 
Upper House is rather active, whereas the Upper House in the Netherlands is not involved in 
any kind of OMC-related shaming activity (see figure 7). Especially striking is the relative 
large amount of shaming activity in plenary debates in the House of Lords compared to the 
shaming activity in committee meetings of the House of Lords.  
Figure 7: Shaming questions in plenary/committee in the House of Commons/Lords in 
the UK 
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The third hypothesis formulated an expectation on the overall difference between the UK 
parliament and Dutch parliament across all categories, i.e. written and oral questions in 
plenary and committee debates in the Upper and Lower House. It was stated that working 
parliaments - like the Dutch parliament - have a give-and-take relationship between the 
legislature and the executive, with the latter trying to get broad consensus for its plans. 
Debating parliaments are characterised by a more confrontational attitude between the 
government and the MPs in opposition. This makes it likely that MPs in a debating 
parliament are more eager to shame the incumbent government with information from OMC 
reports than MPs in working parliaments.  
We already saw that MPs in the Netherlands ask the government in total more OMC related 
shaming questions than British MPs (see figures 2 and 5). When we control for changes in 
government, the political orientation of the incumbent government, and the total attention by 
MPs for a policy field on which an OMC is adopted, this country difference still holds. The 
results of the regression models estimated show that Dutch MPs use significantly more 
information from OMCs to publicly criticize the incumbent government than the British MPs 
(see table 2). There is on average almost one shaming question more every half year made 
by Dutch MPs of opposition parties than by British MPs of opposition parties. This is a rather 
small difference between the two countries, however, the difference is not random. 
Table 2: Shaming questions by MPs, six OMCs, country differences 
 Model I Model II 
Country -.731** 
(.293) 
-.715*** 
(.173) 
Change of government  .203 
(.234) 
 
Left political orientation -.065 
(.278) 
 
Right political orientation -.513 
(.323) 
 
Total parliamentary documents on policy field .000 
(.000) 
 
Lagged variable shaming .435*** 
(.058) 
.456*** 
(.056) 
Constant 1.679*** 
(.357) 
1.579*** 
(.292) 
N 265 265 
F-test 21.304*** 62.173*** 
Adjusted R-squared .315 .316 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. OLS-regression models. Panel Corrected Standard Errors are shown in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is ‘shaming government by MPs from opposition parties with the use of country-
specific information from OMCs’. 
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In sum, MPs in the Dutch (working) parliament more often go public with information from 
OMC reports to shame the incumbent government than MPs in the British (debating) 
parliament. This finding is in contrast with the expectation formulated in the third hypothesis. 
4.3 Media coverage 
The empirical findings indicate that the public parliamentary activities do not have a link with 
the media coverage on OMCs. There is no explicit reference in the collected newspaper 
articles to shaming strategies of MPs or other parliamentary discussions on the substance of 
OMCs. Moreover, the media coverage on OMCs is neutral in character, both in the UK and 
the Netherlands. In other words, the information from OMC reports is not used to criticize the 
performance of the incumbent government but has an informative function to newspaper 
readers. The media coverage in newspapers only referred to the launch of OMCs at the EU 
level on specific policy fields and did not have any ‘shaming’ character or report on the 
results of the OMC policy comparisons; i.e. the country specific information on the 
performance of national policies included in OMC reports. 
Figure 8: Neutral media coverage on six OMCs 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fluctuations in non-parliamentary related newspaper coverage on OMCs show a 
somewhat similar pattern for the UK and the Netherlands (see figure 8). In the introduction of 
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this Collection of Working Papers the expectation was formulated that media coverage on 
EU issues depends on the salience of 'Europe' in a country. The empirical findings seem to 
confirm this expectation for the neutral media coverage on OMCs when viewed through time. 
The studied newspapers report on the adoption of a Treaty article on the OMC employment 
in the Amsterdam Treaty around 1997, and on Council summits in which attention was paid 
to social and employment policies and the knowledge-based society through reporting on the 
start-up of OMCs. In the Dutch newspapers, this led to attention for the role of the Dutch 
Council Presidency in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of an employment chapter 
in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997-1998), and in both the UK and Dutch newspapers to 
coverage on the introduction of a Third Way/New Labour outlook for the EU through the 
Lisbon agenda (2000-2001). This agenda shows strong similarities with the active labour 
market policies of the Dutch (led by the social democrat Wim Kok) and British government 
(led by the Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair) in power at the time. Figure 8 also shows that 
when the UK or the Netherlands held the presidency of the Council of Ministers, this goes 
together with higher levels of non-parliamentary related newspaper coverage on OMCs in 
1997 (NL), 1998 (UK), 2004 (NL) and 2005 (UK). 
In sum, the public parliamentary OMC related shaming activities by MPs of opposition 
parties do not have any exposure outside of the parliamentary arena; British and Dutch 
journalists do not find the public parliamentary activities in the context of OMCs newsworthy 
or do not notice the activities. The latter is most probably related to the modest public 
parliamentary activities of MPs in the Netherlands and the UK related with OMCs – which 
most of the time take place in committee meetings. On a more speculative note, the lack of 
media attention for OMC related parliamentary shaming activities can also be related with 
the absence of a strategy of Dutch and British MPs to signal to journalists that they are 
actually using information from OMC reports to criticize the policies of the incumbent 
government. 
4.4 Discussion 
The results of the analysis of the Dutch and British parliamentary debates lead to the 
rejection of the three hypotheses. First, the number of oral questions is much higher in the 
case of the Netherlands compared to the UK. This finding leads to the rejection of the first 
hypothesis. A finding which is in line with the first hypothesis touches upon the amount of 
written questions: written questions are more often asked by British MPs than by Dutch MPs. 
Second, the Dutch and British parliaments have the same degree of shaming activities by 
MPs of opposition parties taking place in plenary debates. Hence, the second hypothesis 
needs to be rejected. Third, the empirical findings indicate that the total amount of OMC 
related shaming activities is higher in the Netherlands than in the UK. This is against the 
expectation formulated in hypothesis 3. 
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Given the almost complete rejection of the three hypotheses, the question arises whether 
any alternative explanations can be identified on the basis of the data analysed. At face 
value, there seem to be three alternative explanations for the differences found between the 
two countries in OMC related parliamentary shaming activities by MPs of opposition parties. 
First, OMC related shaming is an activity which, most of the time, takes place in committee 
meetings, perhaps because the information from OMC reports is too specific for plenary 
debates. In other words, it seems that OMC-related shaming is an activity which is more 
appropriate for committee meetings. Because the committee system is more developed in 
the working parliament of the Netherlands compared to the debating parliament of the UK, 
OMC related shaming is higher in the Dutch parliamentary arena. Second, British MPs of 
opposition parties do not take the information in OMC reports at face value. Although British 
MPs support the principles of cross-national policy learning through OMCs (see also footnote 
4), they often expressed their dissatisfaction with how these principles were put in practice 
through country-specific reporting on OMCs, which they occasionally judged to be repetitive 
and superficial. In contrast, Dutch MPs take the content of joint reports as given and do not 
criticise the structure and content of these OMC reports. This less critical approach with 
regard to the substance of the OMC reports by the Dutch MPs compared to the British MPs 
increases the likelihood that Dutch MPs use more information from OMC reports for shaming 
the incumbent government than British MPs. Third, previous research indicated that the 
better the information provision to MPs by the government on how OMCs function, the more 
the subsequent OMC related shaming activity by MPs of opposition parties. It has been 
shown that Dutch MPs receive much more information on the functioning of OMCs from their 
government than British MPs, resulting in less OMC related shaming by British MPs of 
opposition parties when compared to Dutch MPs of opposition parties (De Ruiter 2010). 
5. Conclusion 
This article looked at the public parliamentary aspects of the promise of openness included 
in the design of OMCs. Two questions were addressed: how do MPs go public in the context 
of OMCs, and to what extent do country differences in parliamentary procedures and the set-
up of the democratic system matter in this context? With regard to the first question the 
analysis of the data indicates, first, that OMC reports published at the EU level on Dutch and 
British national policies contain sufficient information that can be used at the national level in 
the assessment of the underperformance of national policies. Second, this information was 
sometimes used by British and Dutch MPs to criticize the incumbent government for its 
policy choices, foremost through questions by MPs of opposition parties in committee 
meetings. Whereas in the Netherlands more oral questions were asked in meetings of 
specialized standing committees by MPs of the Lower House, in the UK more written 
questions were asked by members of the Lower and Upper House. In the UK the questions 
were more often asked in the European Affairs Committees than in the Netherlands. 
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The data further indicates that country differences in the set-up of the parliamentary 
democratic system – with either a debating or working parliament – matter for the degree of 
shaming exercised by MPs of opposition parties, but not as initially expected. OMC-related 
shaming is an activity, which may be more appropriate for committee meetings because 
information from OMC reports touches upon topics which are too specific for plenary 
debates. Hence, MPs in a parliament with a highly developed committee system (i.e. working 
parliaments) may be more likely to use information from OMC reports to criticise the 
incumbent government than MPs in a parliament with an underdeveloped committee system 
(i.e. debating parliaments). 
On the basis of the empirical findings it can be concluded that the activities of MPs aimed at 
going public with information from OMC reports established only a weak link between OMCs 
and the citizens in member states. The parliamentary shaming activity in the Netherlands 
and the UK did not have any exposure outside of the parliamentary arena, because 
journalists did not pay attention in their reporting on OMCs to the shaming strategies by MPs 
of opposition parties. Because of the marginal OMC related shaming activities by British and 
Dutch MPs in plenary debates – which receive in general more attention by the media than 
committee meetings – and the stronger presence of shaming activities in committee 
meetings, the link established between the citizens and OMCs through the communicative 
function of national parliaments is weak. Moreover, in many EU member states the 
committee meetings take place behind closed doors and the minutes are not public. Hence, 
in these member states there is likely to be no link at all through the communicative function 
of national parliaments between the citizens and OMCs. 
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III. Beyond Plenary Debates: Informing the Electorate and 
Defending Constituency Interests in EU affairs 
 
The Silence of the Shepherds – How the Austrian Parliament Informs its 
Citizens on European Issues 
Johannes Pollak and Peter Slominski 
 
Abstract 
National Parliaments have a number of functions. Yet while their legislative 
function and their control function have largely fallen prey to party politics in 
domestic as in EU politics, the information function could be a last resort for 
the justification, explanation and communication of executive politics. 
National parliaments could provide the missing link between a national 
electorate and ever more supranationally acting executives. But the 
communication and information function can also be hampered, with 
parliamentary communication being perceived along the lines of government 
and opposition only. However, little empirical evidence exists to what extent 
national parliaments can and want to fulfil a communication function.  
This paper addresses this research lacuna by providing an in-depth study of 
the Austrian parliament. Its objective is to investigate and compare the 
communication strategies of three different sets of actors, namely (1) the 
parliament as an institution, (2) parliamentary groups, and (3) individual 
MPs, and to show how these strategies have changed over time in the 
context of the last three ratification debates (Nice Treaty (2001); the 
Constitutional (2005); Lisbon Treaty (2008)). We will analyse if and how 
communication tools available to the Austrian parliament including press 
releases, organizing events and public debates as well as recent forms of 
internet and web-based tools such as websites, blogs, have been used to 
enrich the public debate on the ratification of EU Treaties. Given the 
increased level of politicization of EU integration, we expect an increased 
level of communicative action of all three sets of actors concerned. However, 
we suppose that Eurosceptical parties and certain individual MPs are more 
active than the parliament as an institution and governmental parties. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the end of the permissive consensus in the early 1990s, national parliaments have 
been increasingly conceived as one of the crucial institutions to tackle the ‘democratic deficit’ 
of the European Union (EU). Every Treaty amendment since Maastricht as well as the 
Laeken Declaration and the Constitutional Convention stressed the importance of national 
parliaments and called for their greater involvement to increase the overall legitimacy of the 
Union.1 However, the main thrust of these documents lay on keeping the parliaments 
informed, facilitating cooperation amongst themselves and the European Parliament (EP) 
and expecting them to monitor the application of the principle of subsidiarity. Informing the 
general public on EU affairs was not considered the primary objective of national 
parliaments.  
What has escaped scholarly attention almost entirely is the question to what extent national 
parliaments are communicating EU affairs. We find some analyses on plenary debates (de 
Wilde 2008; Maatsch 2010) but hardly any research (notable exceptions are e.g. Marschall 
1999; Schüttemeyer and Siefken 2008: 504-508) has been done on how parliaments try to 
connect with a domestically structured public sphere, i.e. how they engage in a dialogue with 
its citizens and how they initiate EU-relevant debates to reduce wide-spread stereotypes and 
to rationalize public discourse (Marschall 2009: 218). Thus, this paper asks whether and how 
national parliaments have communicated the EU to their citizens. Studying public activities of 
parliaments requires us to take into account the institutional setting and the political culture 
parliaments are embedded in. Gone are the days when parliaments acted as the only 
institutionalized representation of the electorate, which had an independent identity and 
indulged itself in the control of the executive. Parliaments have to vie for the attention of 
publics with civil society organisations claiming to have a better understanding of politics 
untainted by party politics, thus being in a better position to represent. Nowadays, 
parliaments in Europe are dominated by party government which implies that they are under 
the control of those parties which support the government thereby building a union (King 
1976; Clett and Cotta 2000) which hardly allows for any independent parliamentary activity. 
Conceiving of parliaments as collective actors (Scharpf 2000: 101) allows us to distinguish 
three sets of actors (Marschall 1999: 23): 
(1) Parliament as an institution; 
(2) Parliamentary Party Groups;  
(3) Individual Members of Parliament (MP). 
The Austrian Parliament serves as a test case to assess whether a strong, constitutionally 
granted role in EU politics impacts on its communication function. This seems even more 
relevant since research (Pollak and Slominski 2003; 2009) suggests that more formal rights 
                                                     
1
 Declaration No. 13 attached to the Treaty of Maastricht; Declaration No. 23 attached to the Treaty of Nice.  
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do not translate easily into significant political influence. It is by no means certain that a 
strong legal position of a parliament in EU politics leads to more justification of the use of 
parliamentary resources for a topic rather distant to citizens’ preferences. At the same time 
the Austrian population has a long-standing tendency not to trust the European Union and its 
institutions (e.g. Eurobarometer 2011: 46) which makes information not easier but all the 
more important. Since all parliamentary parties except the far right-wing Freedom Party 
agree on the value added of Austria’s EU membership, it can be assumed that certain 
communication efforts are undertaken to increase systemic legitimacy. As case studies we 
selected the debates around the treaty ratifications of the Nice Treaty (August 2000 – to 
June 2002), the Constitutional Treaty (April 2004 – December 2005), and the Lisbon Treaty 
(June 2007 – October 2008). 
Analytically we will focus on the supply side of political communication. Thus, we will analyse 
the scope of information and communication with regard to EU matters. In doing so we will 
analyse who – at which level (parliament, parliamentary party groups, MPs) – is providing 
information streaming (or rather trickling) from the Austrian parliament and how it has been 
communicated. Since lack of data prevents a systematic analysis of the demand side, i.e. if 
and how these communication offers have been received by the media and the general 
public, we nonetheless provide some data, if available, to illustrate how many people have 
actually used the information supplied by the Austrian Parliament. The paper is based on 
quantitative data as well as on a series of semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
parliamentary groups2 and officials of the administration of the Austrian parliament conducted 
in February and March 2011. 
The paper will proceed as follows: Section two will provide a brief overview on the 
communication function of national parliaments in general and of the three sets of actors in 
particular. In section three we will present data on the activities of all three levels in the 
Austrian parliament. A conclusion sums up our findings and presents the urgent case for 
more comparative research on the national parties communication function.  
2. Information and communication efforts of parliaments  
Scanning the literature (e.g. Beyme 1998; Patzelt 2003) on parliamentary functions we can 
differentiate between the (a) representative function: parliaments express the views and 
beliefs of their constituents and make certain that they are reflected in the house debates 
and enacted policies; (b) the scrutiny function which comprises the control of the executive 
as well as the implementation of policies as prescribed by law; (c) the legislative function: to 
propose, amend and pass laws and (d) the formation of government function. How 
parliaments fulfil those functions is determined by the institutional, operational and legal 
                                                     
2
 Social Democratic Party, People’s Party, and Green Party. The right-wing Freedom Party refused to grant any 
interviews pointing to the confidential character of any information concerning communication structures. 
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framework they are operating in. Part of the representative function is the task of “explaining 
policy“ (Fenno 1978), which can take place at various levels, reaching from the 
parliamentary presidium to the work of individual MPs in their electoral districts. Bagehot 
(1981: 150), in his famous analysis of the English constitution, further emphasises that 
informing the general public also implies an educative or teaching function. In the best 
Burkean tradition, parliament has to enlighten the general public, i.e. “to teach the nation 
what it does not know” (ibid.) so that it can gain an ‘enlightened understanding’ “about the 
relevant policy alternatives” (Dahl 2000: 37).  
Before we discuss the three ‘levels of actorness’ (parliament, parliamentary party groups, 
MPs) in greater detail we have to clarify the crucial terms of this article, in particular 
information and communication. Informing the public on a given issue is typically a one-way 
and top-down process. In the field of policy analysis, information is regarded as a policy tool 
to – put bluntly – elicit desired policy outcomes (Weiss 2006: 218). By contrast, this paper 
deals with information policy which – in the words of Brüggemann (2005: 9) – can be broadly 
defined as “to give or deny information, to just respond to demands or to pro-actively inform 
citizens, to guarantee a right to information, to advertise or to explain policies, to centralize 
information in an information office or to spread it over all government agencies”. It 
encompasses both the well-balanced, education-oriented piece of information as well as the 
selling of a (political) message by a parliamentary group or by an MP. 
According to Brüggemann (2005: 9) information policy as “the aims and means of 
information and communication of a political institution” (ibid.) has three elements.  
(1) Transparency: making information and documents available to the general public; 
(2) Professional Public Relations: aims that the information seeks the audience (and to 
persuade it); 
(3) Political Rhetorics: the communicative activity of the political management floor. 
Contrary to information, communication is a more ambitious enterprise. Instead of one-way 
and top-down communication is a two-way process of talking and listening which is not 
solely concerned with delivering a certain message but also includes a deliberative element 
of listening to the arguments and concerns brought forwards by others which may transcend 
prior interests and ideas. As will be shown in the empirical chapter, the Austrian Parliaments 
only has an information policy on EU issues, i.e. providing basic facts, making parliamentary 
debates public in which individual party positions can be identified. A deliberative element 
could neither be found in the press releases from the parliament and the party groups nor 
was it claimed by any of the interviewees.  
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As said, European parliaments are dominated by party government (King 1976; Clett and 
Cotta 2000), which also affects the information and communication strategies of the three 
actors under scrutiny. Broadly speaking, we can regroup the three actors under two headers: 
(1) Parliaments as institutions can be expected to inform and communicate in a “neutral” 
well-balanced and fact-oriented manner. The officials of the parliamentary administration 
mainly define their communicative efforts as a civic education project aiming to enhance the 
political knowledge of the electorate. By increasing the knowledge of the citizens, 
parliaments hope to strengthen the acceptance of democratic principles and political 
participation but also to make them more immune towards populist rhetoric and political 
mistrust (Galston 2001). This educational undertaking of parliaments is usually carried out by 
the staff of the parliamentary administration and operates on two levels. First, it aims to 
provide basic knowledge on political institutions, procedures and – to a lesser extent – 
policies and tends to avoid current and contested political issues. Secondly, in cases where 
parliaments communicate current affairs, they are keen not to get lost in partisan turf wars 
and frame their information and communicative efforts in a cautious and carefully balanced 
way incorporating the views of all parliamentary groups involved. (2) By contrast, 
parliamentary groups as well as MPs are less interested in mere education but try to “sell” 
their views, policies as well as brands to win the hearts and minds of the electorate. 
Information and communication efforts of these actors are thus based on the logics of party 
politics operating along the government/opposition line, i.e. they try to sell their own position 
as well as to develop a negative spin on the other parties.  
Linking political information and communication with parliamentary models we can see that 
the first approach mainly reflects the liberal model of parliamentarism, which regards 
parliaments as the prime location of political decision-making and deliberation (Bagehot 
1981). However, the image of a monolithic parliament operating vis-à-vis the executive being 
the heart of political decision-making does not do justice to the role political parties have in 
contemporary political systems (King 1976). Since European parliaments are dominated by 
political parties, we also have to put emphasis on the relationship between the parliamentary 
groups which support the government and those which oppose it. Seen from that angle, not 
parliaments as institutions (collective actors) but political parties are the dominant actors 
(Sarcinelli 2011: 264-267; Fraenkel 1964: 110-117). With regard to the communicative 
efforts, we see that both types of parliamentary models can be discerned in the political 
reality. While the more educational effort corresponds with the liberal model of parliaments 
as a venue of deliberation and education, the latter model views parliaments as the main 
stage of airing partisan positions (Fraenkel 1991, quoted in Sarcinelli 2011: 255).  
Taking into account the above mentioned three different actors, we may derive the following 
set of hypotheses: 
(ad 1) Given the dominant impact of party politics, we expect that the Austrian Parliament, as 
an institution and collective actor, has few incentives to inform and communicate with the 
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general public on EU issues. In case it does, this takes place on the occasion of important 
European events and largely remains a one-off undertaking (e.g. ratification of EU treaties) 
broadly covering all issues and positions on that topic leaving controversial issues to partisan 
political communication.  
(ad 2) The interest of parliamentary parties to inform and communicate the EU varies along 
the level of pro/anti EU sentiment in the electorate (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008; Raunio 
2005). Against the background that in Austria support for the EU is weak, we expect that 
Eurosceptical parties will be more active in putting EU topics on the political agenda to 
exploit the anti-EU sentiments of the electorate. Similarly, given that most EU issues have 
limited political salience (Moravcsik 2002: 615; Saalfeld 2003) at first glance, individual MPs 
also have little incentives to deal with and communicate EU issues. Despite the increasing 
level of information MPs are receiving (comp, art. 12 TEU, Protocol No.1, art. 1), EU issues 
were only dealt with if (a) they are part of the MP’s field of interest (e.g. GMO, transit, 
environment); (b) the MP is in charge of EU affairs within his/her party; (c) the MP has a 
personal interest in international and European affairs. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Parliament as an Institution 
The information and communication effort of the Austrian parliament is mainly carried out by 
the parliamentary administration (Parlamentsdirektion). While the main task of this body is to 
the support the day-to-day parliamentary activities, they also provide a number of information 
and communication activities for the general public. Since information necessarily includes 
transparency and making things public, we have to stress that this has always been an 
important part of the parliamentary activity. Plenary debates are usually open for the general 
public. The same holds true for the three EU committees of the Austrian parliament, which 
also hold their meetings in public. Since the start of the parliamentary website in 1996 the 
Austrian parliament has also made legally and politically important documents and activities 
as well as information on the individual MPs publicly available on its website. In cooperation 
with the Austrian Broadcasting Cooperation some plenary debates are also broadcasted via 
livestream. Given the importance of interparliamentary cooperation it is also of some 
relevance that the website contains information in other languages than German. While it 
goes beyond the scope of this paper, a first scan of the website reveals that all formal 
documents (motions, legislative proposals, bills etc.) are available only in German. Only 
general information concerning the internal organisational structure, information on MPs or 
on the legislative and control function of the Austrian parliament is translated into English. 
However, it is possible to state a query or concern to the Austrian Parliament in English. 
Apart from that the website also contains some information in French, Italian and Spanish 
mainly with regard to the visitors centre and the guided tours as well as a short fact sheet of 
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two pages in more than twenty languages.3 Having said that, the following activities can be 
considered of particular relevance: 
3.1.1 Press releases (Parlamentskorrespondenz) 
The press office or ‘Parlamentskorrespondenz’ of the Austrian parliaments regularly covers 
the work of parliamentary activities, notably committee activities. Considering their work 
somewhere “between journalism and documentation” (Janota 2010: 84) the main task for the 
Parlamentskorrespondenz is to provide a comprehensive overview of parliamentary activities 
including the coverage of plenary debates and committee meetings of both chambers. 
Furthermore, the staff of eight press officers also provides short summaries of legislative 
proposals, parliamentary motions as well as international activities of and events taking 
place in the parliament. With regard to EU affairs, the Parlamentskorrespondenz covers the 
main and sub-committee of the Nationalrat as well as the EU committee of the Bundesrat 
and the so-called Aktuelle Europastunde – a new plenary format established in 2010 which 
allows a general debate on a current EU topic (for further information see § 77b Abs 2 GOG-
NR). Nearly all press releases are sent to the Austrian Press Agency (APA) where they may 
find the attention of the general media and are also published on the parliamentary website.4 
In addition, it is also possible to subscribe to the Parlamentskorrespondenz and receive a 
newsletter of current press releases on a regular basis but only around 800 people have 
done this so far. According to one interviewee of the Parlamentskorrespondenz, the press 
releases are “a bit boring” to read which can largely be explained by the staff’s endless effort 
to provide a well-balanced coverage of parliamentary activities including the views of all 
parties involved.  
With regard to the ratification procedures of the selected three Treaties we can see that a 
modest number of press releases have been published revolving mainly around 
announcements, general description of parliamentary procedures and summaries of party 
positions and external experts, mainly legal scholars.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 For a short overview on various bi- and multilingual parliamentary websites in the EU see Schüttemeyer and 
Siefken (2008: 505-506). 
4
 See http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/.  
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Table 1: 
Number of press-releases 
Treaty of Nice  
(2000-2002) 
10 
Constitutional Treaty 
(2004-2005) 
15 
Treaty of Lisbon 
(2007-2008) 
21 
Source: Austrian Parliament; own calculation 
 
It does not take a huge effort to see that the number of press releases in the wake of the 
ratification process is modest but that they have more than doubled in the last decade. This 
can be explained by more parliamentary activities. In the context of the Nice Treaty, the 
Parlamentskorrespondenz usually mentioned the various procedural stages of the ratification 
process. With regard to the Constitutional Treaty and even more so concerning the Lisbon 
Treaty we could observe slightly more parliamentary activities revolving around the mere 
ratification process including parliamentary enquetes involving external experts, political 
reactions to the adoption of the Treaty at EU level, summaries of pros and cons of the Treaty, 
debates on the impact of the Treaty in certain policy domains etc. Although the overall 
number of press-releases of the Austrian parliament is modest, it nonetheless reflects the 
increasing parliamentary involvement in EU affairs both in the extent of involvement of 
parliamentary committees and the willingness to react to EU events and discuss them on a 
broader basis than before. This modestly rising trend of EU-related press releases will 
probably continue due to the new participatory rights for national parliaments granted by the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
3.1.2 Parliamentary website 
The website of the Austrian parliament, which was re-launched after a comprehensive reform 
in 2004, contains numerous information on the EU in general as well as the participation 
rights of the Austrian parliament in particular including additional links to the agenda of the 
pertinent committees and a summary of the deliberations of all three parliamentary EU 
committees.5 In addition is also possible to research every document (by date or subject) 
                                                     
5
 For further information see http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/SA-EU/SA-EU_00001_00279/index.shtml 
(EU sub-committee); 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/DE/index.shtml?jsMode=&xdocumentUri=&NRBR=NR&ITYP=IV&INR=&SUCH=&l
isteId=120&FBEZ=FP_020 (EU main committee); 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/PE/MIT/EUBundesrat/index.shtml (EU committee of the Bundesrat).  
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forwarded by EU institutions to the Austrian parliament6 and to get a general overview of the 
interparliamentary activities, notably with regard to COSAC and the newly established Early 
Warning Mechanism. Especially the latter has been identified as a great potential for 
parliamentary activities in the years to come (for a sceptical view see Slominski and Pollak 
2012). That said, while the parliamentary website offers citizens an abundance of information 
about the activities of the various EU committees, it is currently difficult to obtain detailed 
information on the early warning mechanism established by the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, it 
is surprising that the website does currently not have a link to the Interparliamentary EU 
Information Exchange (IPEX) database which enables citizens – at least in principle – to 
keep track of the scrutiny process of the individual national parliaments in the EU.  
Particular attention has been paid to children and young adults by the parliamentary 
administration. Since 2009 the website offers selected school classes the possibility of on-
line chats with MPs on a chosen topic. EU affairs have only once been selected for such an 
on-line chat. Apart from that, new online social media such as Facebook and Twitter have 
not yet arrived at the Austrian parliament. While these forms of communication are generally 
considered as important tools of political communication, talks about a possible introduction 
have been met with skepticism due to a lack of available resources which are required to 
communicate on a permanent basis.  
3.1.3 Events and Visitors Service 
The department of events and visitors service has a staff of 16 officers covering three kinds 
of activities, namely events, guided tours and the visitors centre. Since these activities do not 
include those which are organized by a parliamentary group, they are more of an informative 
nature and can therefore not be regarded as politicized in terms of left/right politics (Hix 
2006). These guided tours attract a considerable number of visitors of which a large chunk 
are primary and secondary school pupils. While in 2000 56.600 people took part in a tour, 
this number more than doubled in 2006 and reached its height in 2009 when nearly 140.000 
participated in such an event.7 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 See http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/.  
7
 It has to be noted that the exceptionally high number of visitors in 2008 and 2009 can partly be explained by the 
fact that between November 2008 and April 2009 the parliament also organised an exhibition on the occasion of the 
90th anniversary of the Austrian Republic, which attracted many people. Similarly a considerable share of visitors 
who came to Vienna during the European Championship UEFA Euro 2008 also led to a sharp increase of visitors.  
I H S — Pollak; Slominski / The Silence of the Shepherds — 179 
Table 2: Visitors to the Austrian Parliament who took part in guided tours 
YEAR Visitors (total number) Percentage of Pupils 
2000 56.600  
2001 59.800  
2002 54.035  
2003 63.333  
2004 63.543 55 % 
2005 73.989 52.4 % 
2006 117.505 37.6 % 
2007 112.045 43 % 
2008 123.407 41.2 % 
2009 139.443 42.8 % 
2010 96.685 49 % 
Source: Parliamentary Administration 
 
Once again, European issues are not on the agenda very often. The dominant view of many 
MPs and other officials within the political parties and the administration of the parliament is 
– as an official put it – that “we are a national parliament and we focus on national affairs and 
legislative activities. Information and communication on EU issues are not our core 
business”. That is not to say that there is no EU-related activity at all. For instance, the 
Austrian parliament in cooperation with the Federal Ministry of Education offers guided tours 
inter alia on EU affairs for Austrian pupils who are not from Vienna.  
The same holds true with regard to the visitor centre which also primarily focuses on the 
Austrian political systems thereby only including some rudimentary EU information. However, 
since the re-launch of the visitor centre in October 2005 it presents video clips and 
interactive media stations where visitors are offered the possibility to “test” their knowledge 
on certain political and historical issues including the EU both in German and English. 
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Table 3: Hits of the EU-related information offered at the visitor centre 
Year Total In German In English 
2005 3277 2325 952 
2006 10553 4310 6243 
2007 13691 8481 5210 
2008 25406 16336 9070 
2009 28101 17521 10580 
2010 18920 12049 6871 
Source: Austrian Parliament 
 
But all this information is of a very general nature and aims to communicate only a basic 
knowledge of the EU including its institutions, a comparison between the Austrian and the 
European Parliament and how the Austrian parliament is involved in EU decision-making. 
3.1.4 Democracy and EU Workshops 
Since September 2009 the Austrian parliament offers special workshops on “the EU” for 
children and young adults (between the age of 8 and 14 years) in the context of its so-called 
“democracy workshop”. Besides the EU, the workshops cover a variety of topics of political 
education including political institutions in Austria, the role of media or contemporary history.8 
Available data show that the absolute number of EU workshops considerably increased in 
the second year (from 51 in the school year 2009/10 to 74 in 2010/11), yet given the parallel 
rise of the amount of all democracy workshops the percentage of EU-related workshops 
remained roughly steady (13% in 2009/10 and 16% in 2010/11). The main aim of these EU 
workshops, which last around four hours, is not only to provide basic knowledge – which is 
obviously nearly non-existent at this particular age – but also to encourage the participants to 
express their opinion on the EU and to work out how EU decisions impact their own lives. By 
this, parliamentary officials hope to address the perceived complexity and remoteness of EU 
policy-making. This is of particular importance since nearly half of the pupils participating in 
these workshops are from secondary schools (Hauptschule) of which most have a migration 
background and/or are socially disadvantaged with poor educational opportunities who prior 
to these workshops have not devoted much time or interest towards the EU. The workshops 
also aim to complement teaching at school and to provide teachers with additional 
information on EU issues. Although we have not interviewed teachers and pupils on how 
                                                     
8
 See http://www.demokratiewebstatt.at/.  
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they experienced these workshops, responsible parliamentary officials told us in the 
interviews that an increasing number of schools are interested to attend the EU workshops 
and that they “are currently fully booked”.  
3.1.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the Austrian parliament has increased its relations with the general public in the last 
decade. The parliamentary website has been modernized and re-launched in 2004 and a 
new visitor centre has been established in 2005. Despite the fact that national parliaments 
have gained more and more powers the officials in charge of parliamentary public relations 
still emphasise that “they are a national parliament” whose main task is to adopt Austrian 
laws and control the Austrian government (emphasis added). With regard to the EU, the 
parliament is meanwhile also aware that it has considerable powers at its disposal and can 
make an impact on national EU policy-making. But according to our interviewees informing 
let alone communicating Europe is not considered as a major task of the Austrian parliament. 
Although parts of the increasingly varied information supply are also devoted to EU issues 
the information can largely be considered as general and basic. This also reflects the wide-
spread attitude found in the interviews that the EU is neither liked, not properly understood 
by most of the citizens due to its complexity and remoteness. While this may be true it is 
somehow surprising that this does not lead the Austrian parliament to improve the situation 
and embark on a comprehensive strategy to inform and communicate Europe. New media 
tools such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs and podcasts are generally regarded as relevant 
communication tools by parliamentary officials, but the same officials are also sceptical that 
there are enough resources available to make these things work on a permanent basis.  
3.2 Parliamentary Party Groups and MPs 
The analysis of the information and communicative effort of parliamentary party groups are 
difficult to assess for various reasons. First, with the exception of press-releases issued by 
the parliamentary party groups there are no quantitative data available allowing to track 
down communication activities to date. Second, given the dense relationship between the 
parliamentary group and the party organization it is almost impossible to determine which 
organization is responsible for a given activity.  
Like the officials in the parliamentary administration many party officials who have been 
interviewed for this paper are convinced that communicating Europe is not part of the core 
tasks of a parliamentary party group. Although communicative efforts are regarded as 
important for the overall legitimacy of the Union, these activities should be pursued, at least 
in their view, by the EU institutions or the (national) party organisation and not the 
parliamentary party groups. The principle task of a parliamentary party group is to adopt 
laws, control the government and debate with other parliamentary party groups on policy 
issues. This modest ambition is consistent with three other views, which – according to our 
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interviewees – are also widely held within the parliamentary party groups: (1) Most MPs are 
neither interested nor capable to pursue such a communicative effort. (2) And even if they 
(would) do so, the media are also not interested in EU stories, which would make the whole 
strive to communicate Europe a rather futile exercise. (3) And finally communicating Europe 
is a safe bet in terms of losing votes given the widespread anti-EU sentiments of the citizens.  
If the EU is communicated at all, these activities are in most cases the result of the initiative 
of individual MPs and are not part of a comprehensive communication strategy designed by 
the parliamentary party group or the party. Thus it largely depends on the personal initiative 
of individual MPs whether and how the parliamentary party group communicates the EU. 
3.2.1 Press Releases 
As mentioned above, the press releases of the parliament are well-balanced and informative 
and focus mainly on procedural issues of parliamentary activities thereby presenting the 
various party positions or providing background information. Press-releases of the 
parliamentary party groups, in contrast, follow a more contentious political rhetoric 
attempting to “sell” a political message and delegitimizing the position of the opponent. As 
said, it is not easy to count press-releases of a parliamentary party group because besides 
individual MPs, the parliamentary party group also issues press releases from party 
colleagues who are in fact MEPs9, ministers, or even the (vice-) president of the parliament. 
Generally speaking, most press releases are clustered around specific times and events, 
which implies that they usually relate to each other and thus constitute a self-referential 
system. But it also indicates that parliamentary parties are by no means agenda setters but 
rather agenda takers. According to the dates of the press releases, parliamentary parties 
usually issue press releases either if the ratification of a Treaty is on the parliamentary 
agenda or if other important events on the national or EU level are taking place, such as EP 
or national elections, an EU summit etc. Apart from these event-driven occasions the 
communication effort through press releases can be regarded as non-existent. 
Similar to the press releases from the parliament, we can also observe a significant increase 
of the press releases of the parliamentary party groups.10 While in the context of the 
ratification of the Nice Treaty parliamentary party groups issued a total of 61 press releases, 
the number sharply increased to 235 on the occasion of the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty and raised again to 377 in the wake of the Lisbon ratification. The same holds true if 
we focus on those press releases, which come from MPs. While the ratification of the Treaty 
of Nice a meagre number of 39 press releases have been issued by all MPs, the amount 
                                                     
9
 All parliamentary parties allow “their” MEPs to participate in meetings of the parliamentary party (Luther 2007: 33). 
10
 Press-release of the various parliamentary factions are published by the APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH 
since 1999 and can be accessed via the following website: http://www.ots.at/.  
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sharply rose to 129 in the context of the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and further to 
204 during the Lisbon Treaty. 
If we compare the amount of press releases between the parties we observe that opposition 
parties are – by and large – more active that government parties. This can be shown in the 
context of the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty when the Social Democrats (SPÖ) who 
were the major opposition party had more press-releases than the two government parties 
(the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) and the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ)) combined 
(see figure 2). The same happened in the context of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
when the major opposition party, the FPÖ alone issued 132 press releases more than twice 
as much the two government parties combined (see figure 3). With regard to the Nice 
ratification we observe that MPs from the governing ÖVP and the main opposition party SPÖ 
issued almost the same number of press releases. However, if we combine these data with 
the press releases of the ÖVP-dominated ministries and the press releases of the 
parliamentary president which were held by the Social-Democrats at the time, we have again 
the same picture that the opposition party is the most active one when it comes to 
communicating the EU. 
Figure 1: Number of press-releases on the occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of 
Nice  
(Period: August 2000 - June 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH; own calculation  
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Figure 2:  Number of press-releases on the occasion of the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty  
(Period: April 2004-December 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH; own calculation  
 
Figure 3: Number of press-releases on the occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon  
(Period: June 2007-October 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH; own calculation 
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These data reflect the assumption found in the literature that governing parties, which are 
also present in the EU institutions and are held responsible for EU decisions, are generally 
more pro-European than opposition parties. Taking into account the notorious EU scepticism 
of the Austrian population it is hardly surprising that the opposition parties use press releases 
as a tool to attack government party positions by appealing to and nurturing the anti-EU 
sentiment of the electorate. The data also reveals that opposition parties are more active in 
their communicative efforts than incumbent parties, irrespective of the ideological position. 
This supports the thesis that communication activities by parliamentary parties are driven by 
voter preferences on the EU (Carrubba 2001) rather than by political ideology. That does not 
mean that party ideology (Hix and Lord 1997) does not play a role at all but it seems to be – 
at least in the Austrian case – less relevant than the government/opposition status of the 
party concerned. But within this dichotomy, party ideology as well as the principal view 
towards European integration also plays an important role. This implies that e.g. the SPÖ, 
during its opposition years (2000-2005), had to ponder their future perspective: as a potential 
governmental party aggressive anti-EU rhetoric is not a credible political option. By contrast 
the moderate amount of press releases of the FPÖ during their years in government seems 
to indicate that the party has not been able to live out their fully-fledged anti-EU rhetoric but 
seemed to unleash it only once they became an opposition party again leading to an 
unprecedented high number of press releases. This view can also be supported by the fact 
that as soon as the SPÖ re-entered government in 2006 it was only half as active during the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty than during the Constitutional Treaty.  
3.2.2. Individual MPs 
How much time do individual MPs devote to communicating Europe? What instruments are 
they using and how often? Furthermore, who is more active in communicating Europe, the 
MPs belonging to the government parties or the opposition? To get a grasp on these 
questions an online questionnaire was launched in fall 2011. All 183 members of the National 
Council were sent the questionnaire in October 2011, 43 MPs have replied (24%).  
The general question of how much time of their working time MPs devote to explain and 
communicate EU policies was answered in the following way. 
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Figure 4: How much time to you devote to explain and communicate EU policies? 
 
In line with our hypothesis about the higher activity of Eurosceptical parties, the chart shows 
that oppositional MPs devote a bigger share of their working time to EU issues than MPs 
belonging to government parties.  
Concerning the question of who should be responsible for the communication of EU policies 
the MPs answered in the following way.  
Figure 5: Who should be responsible for informing and communicating Europe? 
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The chart shows that all respondents whether from governmental or opposition parties see 
the primary responsibility for informing and communicating European policy lying with the 
government. This reflects the above mentioned self-understanding of the parliaments as a 
national institution responsible for national topics only. Considering the role of EU 
representations in Austria the Green Party most strongly wants them to play a role. In 
interviews, representatives of the Green Party explained this by hinting at the unbiased and 
more balanced way of communicating EU policies of EU representations in Austria 
compared to governmental sources and social partners. When it comes to the social 
partners it is shown that the FPÖ as an EU sceptic party and without a stronghold in the 
social partner representation shows no great interest in their communication efforts.  
Finally, which media do MPs use and is there any difference between younger and older 
MPs? In general direct contacts are the preferred means of contact, as for instance party 
events, public events and lectures, are preferred over traditional print media and television. It 
is also clear that younger MPs see advantages in using social media whereas older MPs rely 
on traditional media (figure 6). 
Figure 6: Media usage by age 
 
 
Figure 7 shows that in general direct voter contact is preferred over indirect ones by 
government as well as opposition parties. Regarding indirect media, the data hint at 
oppositional MPs being more prone to use social media than government MPs (not overall, 
since they prefer print media most out of all indirect media), whereas MPs belonging to 
governmental parties prefer print media.  
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Figure 7: Media usage by government and opposition MPs 
 
 
3.2.3 Other Communicative Efforts 
Apart from the presented data, there are no other quantitative data available. This suggests 
that there are no official records made by the (parliamentary) party on their communication 
activities on EU affairs. The interviewees confirmed this and explained it with their perception 
already quoted above that for the parliamentary parties the EU is (1) too complicated to 
communicate, (2) EU issues are not interesting neither for the media nor for the general 
public, and (3) public debate in Austria is dominated by a strong and persistent anti-EU 
sentiment which makes it even more difficult to communicate certain issues. As a 
consequence, most actors seem to draw the conclusion that there are no incentives for the 
party and individual MPs to embark on a comprehensive communication strategy on EU 
issues (Saalfeld 2003).  
4. Conclusion 
The data, which could be collected on the EU information and communication effort of the 
Austrian Parliament allow us to draw the following conclusions: (1) the parliament as a 
collective actor does not make any specific efforts to link the supranational level with the 
national electorate. (2) Parliamentary party groups, in the light of persistent anti-EU 
sentiments of the Austrian electorate (as well as the dominating position of one anti-EU 
tabloid), refrain from communicating Europe beyond press releases. Such press releases 
are mainly an instrument to react to other parliamentary party groups’ releases and are not 
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perceived as having a lasting impact on the public. (3) Individual MPs are reluctant to 
engage in communicating Europe since it is neither rewarded by the central party nor is it 
considered to be advantageous in terms of vote-winning. Taken together, all communication 
efforts are top-down and do not aim at any deliberative engagement of the citizens. It seems 
that the provision of information and the offer to participate in guided tours or workshops of 
the parliament are currently the only structured efforts to spread knowledge about EU affairs. 
What has been slightly surprising, though, is the openly voiced critique of almost all party 
interviewees of the modest efforts to make Europe understood and the lack of any coherent 
communication structures. Neither do the Austrian parties keep track of any un/successful 
communication efforts nor do they actively aim at linking Europe with the citizens.  
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Who Cares About the EU? French MPs and European Politics          
Since 1988 
Julien Navarro and Sylvain Brouard 
 
Abstract 
Discussions on the Europeanisation of national parliaments have tended to 
focus predominantly on how national legislatures cope with the challenges of 
EU integration and decision-making processes by elaborating new scrutiny 
mechanisms and by granting more powers to their specialised committees. 
To some degree, this emphasis on the institutional aspects of 
Europeanisation overshadows the problem of the effective involvement of 
national representatives in EU affairs. Beyond the diverse existing 
institutional arrangements, one might indeed question the extent to which 
the Europeanisation of national politics affects the ‘traditional’ tools of 
parliamentary work, the manners in which MPs utilize these tools, and how 
this relates to the voters. In this paper, we investigate these problems by 
looking at the attention to EU-related issues in the parliamentary questions 
of French MPs since 1988. Parliamentary questions are particularly relevant 
as a measure of legislators’ Europeanisation because they are an easily 
available tool at the individual level and because legislators can freely define 
their content. Thus, the study of parliamentary questions allows assessing 
whether national MPs are more attentive to EU issues as the course of 
European integration progresses and their underlying motivations for asking 
such questions. More precisely we are examining whether attention to EU 
affairs is simply varying according to the immediate saliency of European 
issues (due to the proximity of treaty negotiations, for example) or if there 
are other political factors that can account for it. Relying on individual-level 
data, we analyse the ‘identity’ of those MPs who ask questions on EU 
politics. Is there only a small group of specialized legislators interested in EU 
affairs? Are parliamentary questions an instrument of the opposition to 
scrutinize government’s activities? Do Euro-sceptic MPs put more emphasis 
on European issues? Our analysis is based on a unique dataset of more 
than 334,000 questions in the French National Assembly from 1988 to 2007. 
 
In a 1996 survey, a majority of the members of the National Assembly (59 percent) declared 
that the legitimacy of the European Union (EU) should be based on national parliaments, 
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while only a small minority (18 percent) saw the European Parliament as the main source of 
legitimacy for the EU (Wessels 2005). Compared to other nationalities, French MPs were 
amongst the strongest supporters of the national parliaments’ role in EU affairs. This 
reflected, for 55 percent of them, a negative judgment about the working of democracy in the 
EU. 83 percent regarded the parliamentary control of the Council as insufficient and 68 
percent (more than the EU average) acquiesced to the proposal that national parliaments 
should be able to instruct national ministers in EU policies. 
The answers of French MPs suggest that they would seize any opportunity to bear upon the 
EU policy process. But there are grounds for doubt in some respects. Most studies of the 
National Assembly under the Fifth Republic highlight the fact that parliamentary behaviours 
are dominated by local constituency preoccupations as a consequence of the personalised 
electoral system and the frequency of dual mandates (Hayward 2004). Furthermore, earlier 
research into the impact of European integration on the National Assembly resulted in 
sceptical conclusions about the readiness of French MPs to deal with European problems 
(Grossman 2008; Rozenberg 2009). Given that the Lisbon Treaty gave new rights to national 
parliaments, one aim of this article is to assess the impact of European integration on the 
French parliament and the capacity of French parliamentarians to fulfil the mission that they 
are claiming for themselves. 
The one simple premise on which this article is based states that attempts to strengthen the 
role of national parliaments in the European process will only succeed if they are 
accompanied by a change in the attitudes and behaviour of elected representatives. This 
point is closely connected to the debate on the Europeanisation of national parliaments and 
the increasing involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs which has attracted a 
significant level of attention from specialists of European integration and parliaments alike 
(Raunio 2009). The discussion has tended to focus on the organizational adaptation of 
national institutions to the challenges of European integration and on the evaluation of the 
parliaments’ real level of influence on their government’s European policies. But the 
necessity to move beyond these predominantly formal and institutional perspectives is now 
more and more recognised. The impact of European integration is then described in terms of 
‘adaptive’ or ‘strategic Europeanisation’ relating to the change in attitudes, self-definition of 
role and behaviour of political actors (A.E. Töller cited in Wessels 2005). 
Regarding national parliaments and parliamentarians, the establishment of new rules and 
procedures, as well as new institutional provisions, is well documented but it represents only 
one of the potential ways to adapt to the consequences of European integration. It implies 
neither that European integration has become a central dimension of parliamentary activities 
at large nor that it will change the way MPs generally behave. This is a major challenge 
since  the capacity of national parliaments to cope with the consequences of European 
integration depends not only on the creation of ad hoc institutional procedures to scrutinize 
governments but also on the willingness and ability of national parliamentarians to get 
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involved in European affairs. The communication to national parliamentarians of the 
legislative initiatives taken by the Commission, or the opportunity that they have to vote on 
special resolutions, will remain virtual weapons until parliamentarians pay attention to 
European issues and decide to use them. But European affairs are only one of the many 
issues parliamentarians are expected to care about. And there might be reasons why they 
want to take care of them – or not. This is why we need to focus on the agenda of national 
parliaments and the attention that they are giving to European issues. 
Taking the French National Assembly as our case study, we will address two complementary 
questions: To what extent is the French Parliament Europeanised? How can the varying 
degree of attention, given by the French Parliament, to European issues be explained? 
Looking beyond statutory powers and an assessment of the parliamentary input in EU 
national policies, we aim to analyse  the parliament’s Europeanisation by focusing on  the 
content of parliamentary questions as an indicator of the attention paid by MP’s to EU affairs. 
Based on the innovative research programme formulated by Baumgartner and Jones (2002) 
concerning agenda-setting in public policies, we propose to analyse how European 
integration affects the substance of parliamentary work in term of issues. 
The first section begins with a presentation of what we know about the Europeanisation of 
the National Assembly and then moves on to propose an alternative approach to 
Europeanisation based on the idea of politics of attention. Our hypotheses regarding how 
attention to Europe is allocated are detailed in the second section. The third section is 
dedicated to analysing the evolution of parliamentary questions in the National Assembly and 
the proportion of Europeanised questions. In the third section we test alternative theories 
explaining the level of attention paid to the EU in the National Assembly. Our findings are 
then discussed in the concluding section. 
1. Europeanisation and the politics of attention 
Europeanisation has become an important research field over the last few years. The focus 
of research has progressively expanded from the impact of European integration on national 
policies and policy-making styles to the transformation of national political institutions (Auel 
2006). The study of national parliaments’ Europeanisation obviously belongs to this second 
category. 
1.1 The impact of the EU on national institutions: the case of the National Assembly 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, national parliaments 
have been recognized with an official role in the institutional structure of the EU. They appear 
for the first time in the text of the Treaty (article 12) and their ‘contribution’ now covers three 
areas: control of subsidiarity, treaty revisions, and the field of freedom, security and justice. 
This enhanced role of national Parliaments in EU affairs marks the latest realisation of a slow 
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maturation process that began with the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty. The rationale for 
such an evolution is the belief that it might compensate for the alleged ‘legitimacy deficit’ of 
the EU. 
National parliaments have actually been involved in European questions even before the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (Maurer and Wessels 2001). In response to political 
developments in the member states, which supposedly advantaged executives to the 
detriment of legislatures, national parliaments have established new control mechanisms. 
These include the right to be informed about EU legislative initiatives and government’s 
European policies, the creation of specialized committees and the right to express (binding 
or non-binding) policy opinions in EU affairs. To meet the European challenge, national 
legislatures also try to foster collaborations, horizontally, between each other (see, for 
instance, the role of the COSAC) and, vertically, with the European Parliament (Costa and 
Latek 2001). 
Generally speaking France has followed a similar trend (Rizutto 2004). The ‘Foyer law’ of 
1979 established parliamentary ‘delegations’ for the European Communities both in the 
National Assembly and the Senate. In 1990, the size of each delegation was increased and 
they gained the right to call before them ministers and Community representatives. With the 
entry in force of the constitutional law of 23 July 2008, the Delegation became the committee 
for European affairs (commission des affaires européennes). With 36 members, it has a dual 
mission of information and control of government. Since 1992, the French parliament may 
also vote resolutions on EU affairs (Grossman 2008). In 2003, the National Assembly 
opened an office in Brussels. 
Although the French National Assembly has always pushed hard for giving national 
parliaments a greater – direct and indirect – role in the EU policy-process, one can question 
the capacity of its members to fulfil the role that they claim for themselves. Looking at the 
resolutions on EU affairs, Grossman (2008) has noted that their number tended to decrease 
after reaching its highest level in 1993. Rozenberg (2009), who investigates the 
management of EU committees by their chairman in France and the UK, highlights the lack 
of incentive of French MPs to deal with EU affairs. These observations converge and call for 
caution about the depth of change driven by European integration and the motivation of MPs 
to take care of the issue. 
1.2 Theoretical framework: from an increase in statutory power to a shift in issue attention? 
As already noted in the introduction, the establishment of new scrutiny mechanisms does not 
tell us much about how they are being used and, even less, about how ‘traditional’ (i.e. 
previously existing) tools of parliamentary control evolved with European integration. Some 
scholars have started to tackle this problem by analysing the impact of European integration 
on national law-making activities (Brouard et al. 2012a). The perspective remains 
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predominantly top-down with a focus on the response of national parliaments to the 
imperatives of European regulations. It is the European stimulus – the adoption of 
regulations or directives – that generates the Europeanisation of laws. 
However, it is possible to view the Europeanisation of national institutions not as the 
implementation of norms defined at the supranational level but as the greater level of 
attention to European affairs. This is in line with the approach developed by Ladrech who 
defines Europeanisation as ‘a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree the EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of 
national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech 1994: 69). Practically Europeanisation can, in 
this sense, have two kinds of consequences: it can bring about new political cleavages and it 
can become a more salient issue. Our focus is not on the first aspect (the degree of 
parliamentary support for the EU) but on the policy content, that is to say the salience of the 
EU in ‘normal’ parliamentary business. In other words, we are more interested in the salience 
of Europe than in the potentially changing attitude of MPs towards the benefits of European 
integration. Have national MPs developed a greater degree of attention to Europe not only 
when it comes to discussions about EU institutions, but also, more generally, in all fields of 
policy-making? 
With this question, we can also reconsider the debate on the alleged parliamentary decline 
by looking more precisely at the capacity of parliamentarians to impact the governmental 
agenda. Although it is acknowledged that the French parliament generally plays a limited 
policy-making role in the Fifth Republic, parliamentary activity has been transformed and has 
developed alternative indirect forms of participation in the policy-process. To compensate for 
their marginalization in the production of law, parliamentarians concentrate on non-legislative 
activities that allow them to control the executive’s actions, evaluate public policies and focus 
the government’s attention on specific issues. It has been argued that the French parliament 
has the capacity to influence the governmental agenda even though its impact on the policy 
process is otherwise limited. Parliamentarians can generate controversies over 
governmental actions by stimulating debates on issues which would otherwise be considered 
only by specialists (Baumgartner 1987). Research should therefore concentrate on the 
allocation of attention between different policy areas. 
Theoretical and empirical studies of agenda-setting stipulate that political institutions can 
devote only a limited amount of attention to different policy issues. As a consequence, giving 
more attention to immigration issues implies, for example, that attention to other issues, such 
as environment, education or taxes, will be reduced. This rule equally applies for 
parliamentarians at the individual level. Any representative faces cognitive and time 
constraints that will force him to make trade-offs concerning the problems that he will give 
priority to by asking questions, writing reports or speaking about in plenary sessions. Looking 
at Europeanisation from an agenda perspective therefore means that we are interested in 
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what issues MPs give priority to and how they allocate their attention to matters in 
connection with European affairs. 
1.3 Questions in the National Assembly as an indicator of Europeanisation 
Parliamentary questions have many qualities that make them an interesting and convenient 
indicator of Europeanisation. 
First of all, thanks to parliamentary questions, we can effectively analyse how European 
integration impacts the content and issues that MPs are dealing with at the national level. 
Until now comparative politics focused mainly on institutions and actors, much less on the 
content of politics, that is to say on the issues that actors and institutions are dealing with 
(Wilkerson et al. 2009). Parliamentary questions allow filling this gap if we analyse their 
content and the issues they tackle. 
Parliamentary questions are a relevant indicator of Europeanisation in the sense that, even if 
they are not considered the most powerful instruments that legislators dispose of, they are 
certainly instruments that allow legislators a large room-for-manoeuvre at the individual level 
(Raunio 2009: 324). Parliamentary questions as an institutional resource make it easy for 
individual deputies to raise problems about which they are concerned (Wiberg 1994). The 
use of parliamentary questions may hence be regarded as an extremely interesting indicator 
of how elected representatives prioritise issues. On top of that, as one traditional instrument 
of parliamentary government, they allow for cross-country and cross-time comparisons. 
In the debate on the Europeanisation of national parliaments, parliamentary questions are 
also significant because they are as much an instrument of control as a means to gain 
information. This is particularly important because, as Raunio and Hix (2000) rightly point 
out, access to information in the field of European politics plays a key role in enabling 
parliamentarians to control their government. They note: ‘parliaments have secured gains 
from governments in the area of EU affairs precisely because it has been in the interests of 
parliamentarians to reduce the information gap’ (Raunio and Hix 2000: 162). If true, we 
should also be able to discern a greater attention for European matters in the questions that 
MPs submit to the ministers. 
The empirical analysis is based on an exhaustive dataset of parliamentary questions in the 
National Assembly from the ninth to the twelfth legislature (i.e. from 1988 to 2007). There are 
three types of questions in the National Assembly: written questions (questions écrites), oral 
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questions to the government (questions au gouvernement) and oral questions without 
debate (questions orales sans débat)1. 
Written questions are addressed to individual ministers either to clarify some points about 
legislation or to receive information about government policies. Ministers have a two-month 
delay to give their answers, which are published in the Official Journal. MPs can ask as 
many written questions as they wish. 
Oral questions are based on article 48 of the Constitution, which states that ‘At one sitting a 
week at least precedence shall be given to questions from members of Parliament and to 
answers by the Government’. The rules regarding oral questions without debate have been 
modified several times since 1958. In March 1993, the sessions of oral questions were 
moved from Friday to Thursday morning so as to ensure a better attendance. In 1996, the 
session was moved again, this time from Thursday morning to Tuesday morning, to avoid a 
time conflict between the session of questions and the discussion of bills. Since the 
constitutional reform of 23 July 2008, oral questions are concentrated on Tuesday and 
Thursday mornings of the Parliament’s ‘control week’ (that is outside of parliamentary 
holidays and special budget weeks). The number of questions is limited to 32 for each 
session with an equal number for majority and opposition parties; there are six minutes for 
each of the questions, which often address local issues. 
Since a constitutional amendment of 1995, two parliamentary time slots are dedicated to 
‘Questions to the government’ on Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons and broadcasted on 
television (until 1995 there was only one time slot of questions to government); the fact that 
this change occurred during the studied period will allow us to investigate its consequences. 
Initially, questions to the government were divided equally between the government and 
opposition parties but since 1993 they are allocated to the parliamentary groups according to 
their size, which clearly favours the government. Parliamentary groups must announce in 
advance the author of the questions and to whom they are put. There is a limited time of two 
minutes for each question. 
Between 1988 and 2007, the members of the National Assembly asked a total of 334,238 
questions: 317,832 written questions, 10,555 questions to the government and 317,832 oral 
questions. By analysing the content of parliamentary questions during a long period of time 
(from 1988 to 2007) we can see whether Europe represents a growing concern for French 
parliamentarians and who is interested in this issue. In order to establish whether a 
parliamentary question is ‘Europeanised’, we rely on the indirect content analysis of 
parliamentary questions based on the National Assembly indexation system (see appendix). 
                                                     
1
 Oral questions with debate (questions orales avec débat), which constituted a fourth type, have de facto 
disappeared from the tool box of French MPs. 
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To sum up, Europeanisation is not defined as the implementation of a binding European 
decision at the national level. European integration is a multi-faceted phenomenon, not a 
single issue. And parliamentarians may use the EU as a policy frame for all kinds of 
problems. 
2. Hypotheses: the impact of time, parties and institutional rules 
We aim to test the hypothesis that the scope of attention to the EU will vary according to a 
number of political and institutional factors. 
2.1 The changing level of attention to the EU across time 
Time is the first factor that should impact the level of attention to the EU. It will do so in two 
ways. According to our first hypothesis, the presence of Europe in the work of French MPs 
should tend to increase during the period 1988-2007. We therefore expect to observe more 
and more parliamentary questions mentioning Europe or the EU (Hypothesis 1a). 
The fundamental reason for this is that the supranational level is more and more present in 
the policy process across the continent. Each new step in the process of European 
integration should bring an increased attention to Europe in national parliaments. The latter 
are involved in the reform of treaties through national ratification procedures: their attention 
should have been drawn by the succession of intergovernmental negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon and national 
parliamentarians should be willing to control their government’s European policies more 
strictly. Besides, national parliaments are also engaged in the national implementation of EU 
regulations and in the scrutiny of the executive’s European policy: the inflation in the 
legislative activity at the European level (Brouard et al. 2012a) should result in a growing 
attention to Europe. 
The temporal hypothesis is also strengthened by the evolution of public opinion about 
European integration. Parliamentary questions are not only a device for asserting 
governmental accountability to parliament. They also provide a forum for arousing public 
opinion against specific government policies. With the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ 
national MPs should be wary not to let the EU follow a course that will displease their 
electors. The saliency of Europe in the public opinion will act as an incentive for them. In 
other words, MPs might want to signal to their voters that they take care of European issues. 
Beyond this expected long-term trend, one should also expect to see ups and downs in the 
attention to the EU on the part of French MPs: events both at the national and European 
level should impact the likeliness that MPs raise European matters in the National Assembly 
(Hypothesis 1b). Questions mentioning Europe should be more numerous when there are 
important issues being discussed at the Community level (for instance, during 
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intergovernmental conferences or European Parliament elections) or when the national 
government is more directly involved in EU matters (during French presidencies). On the 
contrary, Europe should be less visible when major national events occur, especially in the 
periods surrounding national elections. 
However, not all MPs have the same attitude towards the EU, nor the same incentives to 
address European questions. It is therefore important to concentrate on the factors behind 
differentiated individual levels of attention to the EU. 
2.2 Patterns of party interaction and electoral incentives 
One can make the general hypothesis that attention to the EU is inextricably linked to the 
party system and patterns of competition. As noted earlier, MPs are all the more interested in 
raising questions about European integration if they perceive that this is a salient issue in 
public opinion. This indicates that attention to Europe might be driven by electoral 
considerations. Earlier studies suggest that the translation of issues related to European 
integration into domestic politics is driven by the dynamics of long- and short-term 
government-opposition competition, and that the key driver of change is party strategy (Sitter 
2001). 
The number and proportion of Europeanised questions might in particular reflect individual 
motivations linked to party membership. Two dimensions can be distinguished: the attitude 
towards the EU, on the one side, and, on the other side, the political conjuncture which 
draws a line between governmental and opposition parties. 
It has been demonstrated that the attitudes of French political parties towards Europe and 
European policies are closely intertwined with their position on the left-right axis (Sauger 
2005). More precisely, the relationship is quadratic, which means that distance on the 
European dimension is the square of the distance on left-right axis. In other words, 
Eurosceptic parties are to be found on the extreme poles of the left-right axis, while 
moderate parties are also more pro-European. 
Our expectation is that the EU will be more often mentioned by those who have a clear-cut 
vision – in favour of or against – European integration. However, it is generally recognized 
that mainstream parties – from the left and from the right – avoid dealing with European 
issues, which can be a source of inner divisions even when the attitude is overall favourable. 
On the contrary, Euro-scepticism can be used tactically by political parties in an electoral 
appeal against the government. Extreme parties find it particularly attractive to put more 
emphasis on European issues in order to distance themselves from the mainstream parties. 
MPs belonging to Euro-sceptic parties from the far left and the far right should submit more 
questions about the EU than other MPs (Hypothesis 2). 
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A complementary hypothesis relates to the government-opposition status. We anticipate that, 
to distance themselves from the EU policies of the government, MPs from the opposition will 
submit more questions about the EU (Hypothesis 3). This is in line with earlier observations 
that MPs from the opposition as well as Eurosceptic members of majority coalitions are the 
most active on European issues (Raunio and Hix 2000, p. 163; Sitter 2001). 
The propensity of MPs to signal to their voters that they are concerned about European 
matters might also be driven by constituency considerations. MPs might indeed have 
different incentives to raise European questions depending on the characteristics of their 
electoral district. The voters in border regions or in regions hosting EU institutions might 
have a deeper understanding of European politics and they might be more directly impacted 
by European decisions. In other words, MPs from border constituencies and from 
constituencies hosting EU institutions should submit more questions about European politics 
(Hypothesis 4). 
Finally, we also expect MPs to adjust their strategies to the institutional framework and 
opportunities provided by the National Assembly. 
2.3 Institutional factors 
Different institutional structures create different opportunities and incentives to raise 
European issues in the National Assembly. In 1995 two reforms were passed which affected 
the work of French MPs (Hayward 2004). The parliamentary session (‘session unique’) was 
lengthened and the number of paid assistants on whose services deputies can call to help 
with the preparatory work increased from two to three. These changes should result in a 
higher overall level of activity, including questioning. It should thus reinforce the Hypothesis 
1a. 
The type of questions is probably the most important institutional factor influencing the scope 
of attention to the EU, because questions orales, questions écrites and questions au 
gouvernement fulfil different functions and can be expected to serve the MPs’ electoral and 
policy objectives in different ways (Lazardeux 2005 and 2009). Written questions as well as 
oral questions hardly constitute effective means to criticise governmental policies. They 
generally aim at gathering technical or practical information on public policy. Conversely, 
questions to the government are one of the key moments of parliamentary activity and allow 
MPs to engage in a very public scrutiny of governmental policies. 
Written questions are certainly the least visible to the general public. They are, generally 
speaking, perceived as a way for MPs to obtain information, not to raise politicised matters 
or to foster the electoral connection (Lazardeux 2005). It follows that attention to Europe in 
the written questions should be less strategic and should reveal more sincere feelings about 
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the MPs’ real interest in European issues. From this, we can infer three hypotheses as far as 
written questions are concerned: 
- Attention to Europe in written questions should be less sensitive to short-term 
variations due to the immediate electoral context (Hypothesis 5a). 
- The gap between majority and opposition MPs should be reduced (Hypothesis 5b). 
- Declared pro- or anti- European attitudes should be less important, but MPs with 
strong feelings about the EU (either in favour or opposition to European integration) 
should ask more written questions with a European dimension (Hypothesis 5c). 
Oral questions fundamentally serve a local function: they are used by representatives to air 
minor constituency grievances. The hypothesis is that Europe should generally be the least 
present in oral questions and party identities should play a minor role (Hypothesis 6a). 
However, there is one exception which derives from Hypothesis 4: MPs from constituencies 
with specific local European interests should submit more oral questions with a European 
dimension (Hypothesis 6b). 
Contrary to oral questions, questions to the government have a clear partisan function. It has 
been demonstrated that, in the field of defence policy, questions to the government are much 
less likely than oral questions to serve as a channel to raise local matters (Rozenberg et al. 
2011). The same expectation can be had for questions about Europe. One can make the 
hypothesis that the presence of Europe would be greater in the case of the highly politicized 
questions to the government (Hypothesis 7). In addition, we expect that Hypotheses 2 and 3 
on the role of parties are especially pertinent with regard to the questions to the government. 
3. Are French MPs more and more attentive to European issues? 
According to the first hypothesis there should be a general trend of increase in the share of 
Europeanised questions during the period under consideration. There are great variations in 
the number of Europeanised questions in the National Assembly. On the whole, 12,322 
Europeanised questions were asked with a minimum of 328 in 1993 and a maximum of 
1,164 in 2005 (the years 1988 and 2007 are not taken into consideration since they are 
incomplete). Although there are ups and downs, the overall trend during the period seems to 
be one of growth in the total number of Europeanised questions from 604 in 1989 to 969 in 
2006. In detail, three periods can be distinguished. From 1988 to 1997, the number of 
Europeanised questions is stagnating, and even almost declining, with around 500 questions 
every year. During this first stage, a peak can be discerned in 1992 which coincides with the 
ratification referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. During the eleventh legislature, from 1997 
to 2002, the number of Europeanised questions increases slowly. Finally, the twelfth 
legislature marks the strongest increase: the highest point is reached in 2005, the year of the 
referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
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Figure 1: Total number of Europeanised questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the changes in the absolute number of Europeanised questions must be analysed 
in the light of more general transformations of parliamentary activities. In France, as in other 
democracies, the level of activity increased steadily during the last decades (Kerrouche 
2006). Moreover, the constitutional reform of 1995 replaced the two three-month legislative 
sessions of spring and autumn with a continuous nine-month session, with the intention of 
allowing a better control of government. By increasing the legislative session, the reform 
increased the time devoted to parliamentary questions (Lazardeux 2009). It is therefore not 
surprising that the higher number of Europeanised parliamentary questions does not result 
exclusively from a true ‘conversion’ to European issues but from this overall increase. 
From the relative values, the growth in the proportion of European questions is extremely 
modest. The share was 3.28 percent for the ninth legislature, 3.25 percent during the tenth, 
4.27 during the eleventh, and 3.73 percent during the twelfth. The highest point is reached in 
1999, and not 2005 as for the absolute values. This compares poorly to the Europeanisation 
of laws, which - yearly variations aside - has been steady since 1986. From less than 7 
percent in 1986, the proportion of the total number of laws with an EU impulse grew to 
around 10 percent in 1990 and 18.75 percent in 2007. Furthermore, in 21 years there was no 
clear decrease in the global trend of Europeanisation (Brouard et al. 2012). 
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This gap can be explained by the lack of visibility of the European stakes even for the 
parliamentarians. Grossman and Sauger (2007) have noted that the large majority of EU 
directives are transposed through governmental decisions (arrêtés), as they are considered 
to fall under the regulatory competences of the executive. As to the minority of texts 
transposed by law, the government often omits to specify that a given law transposes a 
European directive. As a consequence, the transposition of EU regulations is largely invisible 
to French MPs and, according to Grossman and Sauger (2007: 1128), European integration 
has not fundamentally altered the executive-legislative relationship in France: if anything, 
France’s scrutiny of European affairs has even been weakened. Another explanation relates 
to the lack of incentives for individual MPs to tackle European issues, to which we will return 
later. 
Beyond these medium-term trends, electoral cycles can also be seen throughout the period 
under study, with an important reduction in the proportion of European questions in 1993, 
1997 and 2002. Two interpretations are equally likely: either this corresponds to a general 
decrease in the overall number of parliamentary questions (whatever the issue) because of a 
shorter parliamentary calendar, or an occultation of European issues in the context of a 
national electoral competition. In fact, since the number and percentage of Europeanised 
questions is lower in 1993, 1997 and 2002 than in the preceding and following years, both 
interpretations probably hold and strengthen each other. The electoral cycle also draws 
attention towards shorter but huge variations in time. 
Attention to European issues is not constant over time but changes greatly from one month 
to the other. As hypothesised, peaks in the proportion of European questions seem to 
coincide with French presidencies of the Council of the EU (second semester 1989, first 
semester 1995, and second semester 2000). This is apparent for example in June 1989 (7.9 
per cent of European questions), in June 1995 (more than 8 per cent) and September 2000 
(more than 6 per cent). The months surrounding the European Parliament elections also see 
an increase in the number of Europeanised questions: the second highest peak is in June 
1999. Conversely, the attention to European problems diminishes at the time of national 
elections in February 1993 (1.9 per cent), in June 1997 (2.6 per cent) and in June 2002 (0.7 
per cent). 
Basically, the first set of hypotheses (1a and 1b) about aggregated variations is validated by 
the empirical evidence. We now turn to more specific explanations of the Europeanisation of 
parliamentary questions. 
4. Attention to Europe as a result of institutional and political factors 
The growing Europeanisation of questions in the National Assembly can be interpreted as a 
result of a changing institutional environment. As the same time, it remains necessary to 
explain why individual MPs decide to engage in European affairs. 
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4.1 A differentiated evolution according to the type of question 
Questions to the government are much more Europeanised than written and oral questions: 
amongst the former, 8.9 percent have a European dimension as compared to 3.5 percent of 
the written questions and 3.4 percent of the oral questions (Table 1). This confirms 
Hypothesis 7 which stipulates that the Europeanisation is stronger where the politicisation is 
also more apparent, as it is the case with questions to government. The peaks are most 
apparent in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, in 2000 with the French presidency of the 
Council and the Nice Summit and in 2003, 2004 and 2005 with the negotiation and 
ratification of the European Constitution. 
Figure 2: Proportion of EU-related questions by type of question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the contrary, as anticipated by Hypothesis 6a, MPs have few incentives to address 
European matters in the oral questions, which are traditionally dedicated to local problems. 
And, in line with Hypothesis 5a, attention to Europe is weaker but more constant in the 
written questions. However, it is noteworthy that the proportion of Europeanised questions is 
declining in the questions to the government, as well as in the oral questions. At the 
aggregate level the increase in the absolute number of Europeanised questions in the 
National Assembly results clearly from the great amount of written questions. 
Our data also provides strong evidence regarding the impact of the constituency 
characteristics (Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 6b). We test the hypothesis that MPs from 
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constituencies with specific local European interests should submit many more questions 
with a European dimension by focusing on the questions of MPs from Alsace. Alsace is in 
direct geographical contact with and has strong historical ties to Germany; moreover the 
regional capital (Strasbourg) is host to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. 
Between 1988 and 2007, MPs from Alsace submitted 483 written questions (4.16 percent), 
24 questions to the government (8.70 percent) and 16 oral questions (4.75 percent) with a 
European dimension.  
As expected, this is proportionally more than for the other MPs in the case of written and oral 
questions. The difference is particularly striking for oral questions, but it simply demonstrates 
that in Alsace, Europe is perceived as a local issue (many questions relate to the problem of 
the seat of the European Parliament in Strasbourg). The special interest for Europe of MPs 
from Alsace is also evident from the proportion of written questions. In addition, MPs from 
this region are also more likely than their colleagues to put forward European issues in the 
more politicised questions to the government. This is clearly where the impact of party 
membership is the strongest. 
4.2 Partisanship and Europeanisation 
As expected, the impact of this European cleavage is the most visible in the questions to the 
government, where politicisation is at its upmost. The Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), 
which is a small leftist anti-European (souverainiste) party, asked most EU-related questions 
(14.75 per cent); it is followed by the non-attached MPs who included right-wing 
Eurosceptics such as Philippe de Villiers during some legislative terms (13.79 per cent). 
Amongst left-wing parties the PS (Socialist Party) is the one with the smallest proportion of 
Europeanised questions (but the case of the Greens is difficult to interpret since they are 
quite divided on European matters). On the centre and right, attention to the EU is higher 
amongst the Gaullists (RPR) than the pro-European Centrists and the Union pour la 
Démocratie Française (UDF). The numbers for the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(UMP) is lower but it exists only since 2002, when the overall trend was already on the 
decline. 
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Table 1: Proportion of Europeanised questions by party 
QE QG QOSD 
% 
Europeanised 
questions 
Total 
number of 
questions 
% 
Europeanised 
questions 
Total 
number of 
questions 
% 
Europeanised 
questions 
Total 
number of 
questions 
PCF 2,44% 17281 8,77% 1152 3,35% 508 
MDC 6,59% 1913 14,75% 183 2,27% 88 
PS 3,40% 68530 8,35% 2826 2,98% 1613 
DVG 3,64% 2338 9,54% 283 2,54% 118 
Greens 3,79% 2903 10,43% 115 3,57% 28 
Centre 3,87% 1707 7,53% 93 0,00% 42 
UDF 3,43% 73166 9,10% 2087 5,11% 1116 
RPR 3,56% 63896 9,45% 1883 3,04% 1186 
UMP 3,77% 84355 8,43% 1897 3,01% 1131 
FN 4,88% 410 0,00% 7 
NI 3,90% 1333 13,79% 29 4,76% 21 
Total 3,52% 317832 8,92% 10555 3,40% 5851 
 
The relationship between partisanship and Europeanisation is not so clear for the less 
political oral and written questions. If the MDC parliamentarians are – as already observed – 
proportionally the most attentive to Europe in their written questions, Socialist 
parliamentarians tend to ask more Europeanised written questions than the Eurosceptic 
members of the Communist Party (PCF). Similarly, Centrist MPs asked more Europeanised 
written questions than the other right-wing MPs, and the UDF MPs asked more 
Europeanised oral questions than the RPR and UMP MPs. To sum up, it seems that pro-
European parties have an interest to raise European issues in the case of more technical 
questions whereas parties which are critical of the EU address this issue when politicisation 
is the strongest. These aggregated observations find some support in the detailed analysis 
of Europeanised questions by legislature. 
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Table 2: Written questions with a European dimension 
9th legislature 
(1988-1993) 
10th legislature 
(1993-1997) 
11th legislature 
(1997-2002) 
12th legislature 
(2002-2007) 
% N % N % N % N 
PCF 1,64% 5311 2,71% 3684 2,52% 3975 3,13% 4311 
MDC - - 4,07% 762 8,25% 1151 - - 
PS 2,80% 16686 2,43% 5760 4,41% 20808 3,19% 25276 
DVG 0,00% 135 3,55% 451 4,59% 959 3,15% 793 
Vert - - - - 3,79% 2743 3,75% 160 
Centre 3,97% 731 3,79% 976 - - - - 
UDF 3,65% 23493 2,87% 19661 3,61% 22441 3,67% 7571 
RPR 2,96% 20609 3,02% 19709 4,53% 23578 - - 
UMP - - - - - - 3,77% 84355 
FN 4,88% 410 - - - - - - 
NI 2,37% 379 9,55% 157 3,71% 458 3,24% 339 
Total 3,07% 67754 2,93% 51160 4,15% 76113 3,62% 122805 
Khi2 79.23*** (df=7) 37.37*** (df=7) 106.15*** (df=7) 22.64*** (df=6) 
*** p<0.01  
 
Three patterns can be discerned following the category of questions. As already noted, 
written questions of pro-European MPs are more Europeanised than those of Euro-sceptic 
ones. However, with the overall growing salience of Europe in the written questions, these 
differences tend to be reduced: during the twelfth legislature, the PCF and RPR 
parliamentarians were putting forward a proportion of Europeanised written questions similar 
to that of the Socialists and UDF respectively. Therefore, belonging to the majority or the 
opposition does not impact the level of attention to the EU. 
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Table 3: Oral questions with a European dimension 
9th legislature 
(1988-1993) 
10th legislature 
(1993-1997) 
11th legislature 
(1997-2002) 
12th legislature 
(2002-2007) 
% N % N % N % N 
PCF 6,85% 73 3,85% 156 2,90% 138 1,42% 141 
MDC 6,67% 30 0,00% 58 
PS 7,61% 197 3,36% 268 2,75% 692 1,10% 456 
DVG 3,45% 29 3,23% 62 0,00% 25 
Vert 3,57% 28 
Centre 0,00% 40 
UDF 3,45% 145 7,14% 434 4,52% 376 2,48% 161 
UMP 3,01% 1131 
RPR 2,88% 243 3,37% 534 2,69% 409 
Total 4,86% 658 4,49% 1491 3,06% 1765 2,34% 1919 
Khi2 6.54 (df=3) 11.91 (df=6) 5 (df=6) 6.41 (df=4) 
 
A different trend is apparent in the case of oral questions. The overall decline in the 
proportion of Europeanised questions is mostly attributable to the declining attention towards 
Europe by left-wing parliamentarians, who – from twice as many Europeanised questions 
during the ninth legislature – got to the same level than right-wing parliamentarians in the 
eleventh legislature and fell below them during the twelfth one. It should be noted, for the 
sake of precision, that the steady decline in the share of Europeanised questions from 
Socialist MPs from the ninth to the tenth legislature, is partially explained by the fact that the 
most Euro-sceptic members left the PS and created the MDC. However, the relationship 
between party membership and the Europeanisation of parliamentary questions is never 
statistically significant. Contrary to Hypothesis 2 and to Hypothesis 3, neither Euro-sceptic 
nor opposition MPs pay more attention to Europe in their parliamentary questions. 
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Table 4: Questions to the government with a European dimension 
9th legislature 
(1988-1993) 
10th legislature 
(1993-1997) 
11th legislature 
(1997-2002) 
12th legislature 
(2002-2007) 
% N % N % N % N 
PCF 12,87% 202 6,14% 277 5,56% 414 13,51% 259 
MDC - - 13,79% 58 15,20% 125 - - 
PS 14,14% 488 6,50% 446 9,79% 1072 4,02% 820 
DVG - - 7,41% 81 8,98% 167 17,14% 35 
Vert - - - - 9,82% 112 - - 
Centre - - 7,95% 88 - - - - 
UDF 11,65% 455 9,01% 677 5,01% 679 15,22% 276 
RPR 10,10% 307 12,39% 783 6,31% 793 - - 
UMP - - - - - - 8,43% 1897 
Total 12,33% 1452 9,34% 2410 7,64% 3362 8,40% 3287 
Khi2 3.14 (df=3) 18.29*** (df=6) 29.57 (df=6) 49.37*** (df=4) 
*** p<0.01  
 
Focusing on questions to the government, it seems that, contrary to our expectations, 
majority – not opposition – parliamentarians are the most attentive to European issues. In 
the ninth and eleventh legislatures, when the left was in government, socialist 
parliamentarians asked proportionally more Europeanised questions than the UDF and RPR 
parliamentarians. In turn, centrist and conservative MPs were more attentive to EU-related 
problems than their political rivals when they were in the majority, namely during the tenth 
and twelfth legislatures. Overall, the majority/opposition cleavage has an opposite impact on 
the Europeanisation of parliamentary questions than the one hypothesised. 
This counter-intuitive observation can be interpreted as follows: questions to the government 
are not only used in a predictable ‘role game’ where opposition parties systematically 
denigrate the deeds of the executive while the majority indistinctively praises the 
government’s actions. On the contrary, questions to the government seem to have a real 
political function: they are used by MPs from the majority to control the government’s 
European policy. This has become important in the last decades where French governments 
have, for the most part, been supported by a coalition of parties. In this conjuncture, coalition 
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partners are particularly eager to scrutinize the executive in order to be sure the compromise 
in the cabinet sufficiently reflects their partisan preferences (Holzhacker 2002). As a matter 
of fact, French MPs have been more attentive to European issues when they do not belong 
to the same party than the minister in charge of European affairs2. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The study of parliamentary questions brings some nuances to the common understanding of 
the Europeanisation of national institutions. First of all, we have highlighted that 
Europeanisation is not simply about the design of new institutional instruments but also 
about the attention being paid to European problems when using existing institutional tools. 
Second of all, the pattern of Europeanisation is less clear than expected in the sense that the 
attention to European issues is not growing quickly and is even declining if we consider the 
proportion of Europeanised questions to the government. Another finding is that, contrary to 
what is often assumed, Eurosceptic and opposition MPs do not automatically ask more 
questions regarding Europe than pro-European and government MPs. 
In fact, the Europeanisation depends mostly of the type of questions under consideration: 
this confirms that parliamentary questions have different functions. Europeanised written 
questions, which are deemed technical, are the most closely related to a genuine interest in 
European politics and politicians with strong pro- or anti-European views tend to ask more 
such questions than their colleagues. Oral questions, the most visible to the voters, are 
submitted in relation to local district concerns, even in the case of questions dealing with 
European issues: they serve direct electoral purposes. And questions to the government are 
used by majority parliamentarians to scrutinise their government, especially when the 
minister in charge comes from a different party within the coalition. From this we can 
conclude that the logic of parliamentary questioning in European affairs does not differ from 
the one that applies in other policy fields. 
 
 
                                                     
2
 Such was the attitude of the Gaullist RPR MPs during the 10th legislature towards Alain Juppé (RPR, in charge of 
Foreign Affairs) and Alain Lamassoure (UDF, in charge of European Affairs) between 1993 and 1995, as well as 
towards Hervé de Charette (UDF, in charge of European Affairs) and Michel Barnier (RPR, in charge of European 
Affairs), because Juppé and Barnier represented the most pro-European fringe of the RPR. During the Jospin 
government, the MDC parliamentarians were the most active in supervising the action of Hubert Védrine (Socialist, 
in charge of Foreign Affairs) and Pierre Moscovici (Socialist, in charge of European Affairs), the latter being an 
assumed pro-European. The configuration of the 12th legislature was symmetrical to that of the 10th with the UDF 
parliamentarians submitting a great number of Europeanised questions to UMP ministers of Foreign Affairs 
(successively Dominique de Villepin, Michel Barnier and Philippe Douste-Blazy); the fact that the first two secretary 
of states for European Affairs (Noelle Lenoir and Claudie Haigneré) had no official party affiliation and the third one 
was from the UMP (Catherine Colonna) probably strengthened the will of the UDF pro-European parliamentarians to 
scrutinise their actions. 
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6. Appendix: the coding protocol 
Data on parliamentary questions was downloaded from the webpage of the National 
Assembly. For each question this included: an identification number, the type of question 
(written, oral, to the government), the ministry to whom the question was asked and the one 
who gave an answer, the date when the question was put (day, month, year), the author of 
the question, the author’s political group, and the department where he was elected. The 
National Assembly also attributes a set of three keywords (sometimes a keyword comprises 
more than one word) indicating the theme of the question. There are however two major 
difficulties when using this indexation system to identify the European content of the 
questions. First, there is no clear hierarchy between the three keywords, which makes it 
difficult to use. Second, there is no consistency across time in the use of keywords. It would 
therefore be extremely difficult to rely directly on these keywords to analyse the evolution of 
attention to the EU in the National Assembly. However, the National Assembly indexation 
system can be of use to create a new dummy variable which takes a different value 
depending on whether or not the question has a European dimension. We define this 
European dimension as anything in relation to the European Communities and later the 
European Union3. Parliamentary questions dealing with EU policies, the transposition of 
directives, treaty reforms, European symbols, French European policies, the Euro, etc. are 
therefore classified as Europeanised4. In other words, we are interested in measuring to 
what extent Europe, broadly defined, receives more attention than previously and not 
whether the attitude of French MPs has become more pro-European. 
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